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Nations around the world are increasingly turning to decentralisation to improve the 
performance of the public sector. This is because subnational governments (SNGs) are 
believed to be more responsive to the particular preferences of their constituencies and 
therefore in a better position to align public services and investment with the needs of 
citizens. This development is accompanied by an increasing demand for substantial amounts 
of credit to finance investments at the SNG level. To ensure the proper and sustainable 
implementation of tasks, affordable and reliable sources of credit are of key importance.  
 
For SNGs, the main sources of credit are the issuance of municipal bonds and bank loans. In 
many countries outside Europe, the issuance of municipal bonds appears to be much more 
customary than obtaining bank loans. However, in Europe, the opposite is the case, with 
credit to SNGs predominately in the form bank loans. In most countries of Europe, the public 
sector has set up public sector banks to make funds available at low costs and favourable 
terms. These banks are specialised in providing cheap, reliable and easy access to credit for 
loans to SNGs. Moreover, to remove or reduce the credit risk of SNGs, government 
guarantees are sometimes provided, either explicitly or implicitly. 
 
For most countries, the highest attainable credit-risk guarantee is an unconditional guarantee 
provided by the central government. Usually, credit rating agencies will not give national 
institutions or SNGs a higher rating than their central government. After all, any guarantee is 
only as strong as its guarantor. Should a bailout be required, then the central government 
could be forced to intervene. Explicit government guarantees ensure that debtors can borrow 
at the most favourable terms, as a result of the ex-ante decision of the government to bail out. 
In the case of implicit guarantees, the guarantor will decide ex-post whether to provide a 
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bailout or not. 
 
The Netherlands has put in place explicit government guarantees for municipalities and social 
housing associations (housing corporations). This phenomenon is typically Dutch and unique 
in Europe. Other countries are reluctant to provide explicit guarantees because they fear moral 
hazard, where debtors abuse financial facilities by over-borrowing, leading to unsustainable 
debt levels as a result of the security of certain bailout. Providing well-designed explicit 
government guarantees must go hand in hand with an adequate institutional setting and 
borrowing practice to prevent abuse. 
 
The Netherlands has positive experiences with their guarantee system. This thesis investigates 
the design of the Dutch guarantee system and the inextricably linked institutional context that 
is necessary to reduce the risk of abuse. The Netherlands, with its explicit government 
guarantees, offers a unique opportunity for empirical research. This thesis includes three 
empirical studies, all related to borrowing costs.  
 
This thesis uses the borrowing costs on credit for SNGs as a starting point. There are two 
main reasons for this choice. Firstly, the unique Dutch setting of government guarantees 
where SNGs can borrow with explicit government guarantees enables a level playing field 
suitable for empirical research. Secondly, we have access to a unique and rich micro-level 
dataset on the borrowing costs of SNGs.  
In the Dutch context, all SNGs borrow with an equal credit risk (i.e., zero risk) and should be 
able to get the same terms for identical loans. To be absolutely clear, this was the situation 
during our research period, which ranges from 1997-2014. Since 2014, European supervisory 
authorities force banks to assess all credits and apply credit risk surcharges, even to those 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




assessed as risk free. 
  
A study of credit markets would not be complete without an examination of the role of 
financial intermediaries. In this thesis we do not analyse credit markets however; instead we 
use credit as a standard commodity and the related borrowing costs as the starting point for 
our research. We explore the public domain of government guarantees. The Dutch setting for 
government guarantees, where SNGs borrow with explicit government guarantees has proven 
sustainable but is not self-evident. This unique Dutch setting needs further investigation for a 
better understanding of borrowing with explicit government guarantees. This forms the 
foundation for our research. There is as yet no literature available that fully describes the 
Dutch institutional setting and borrowing practice in this context, and therefore Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 will focus on these issues. 
 
In the Netherlands all SNGs have access to the same providers of credit. In this thesis we 
focus on the borrowing costs for credit from the main sector bank, BNG Bank. In our research 
we only use loans that are actually made and interest rates that are actually paid. This 
information is not publicly available, only BNG Bank has allowed to access the database to 
disclose this information. We have no information from other suppliers of money. For this 
reason we focus on BNG Bank only. All SNGs in this study deal with the same provider of 
credit. This setup ensures the likelihood that SNGs are treated in the same way by the bank, 
following the same procedures and using the same pricing curve. The pricing curve 
incorporates the actual market situation, all banking costs (inclusive costs of refinancing risk) 
and the required margins. The use of the same pricing curve levels the playing field for SNGs 
for these elements. This approach, and the focus of this study, make it less relevant to analyse 
the supply side of the credit market. 
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We use this unique Dutch setting to study three economic and societal problems:  
- Firstly, the provision of guarantees generates considerable debate in the literature. 
While most countries in Europe provide implicit guarantees to SNGs, it is of interest 
to explore whether, and to what extent, making such government guarantees explicit 
could help to lower borrowing costs. Lower borrowing costs could lead to lower costs 
for providing public services. To this end, Chapter 4 investigates the effects of explicit 
government guarantees on the borrowing costs of housing corporations and 
municipalities.  
- Secondly, as a result of the decentralisation of government tasks to SNGs, in many 
countries, municipalities seek opportunities to encourage a more efficient delivery of 
services. Two possible solutions are municipal amalgamations and intermunicipal 
organisations (IOs). However, questions arise about the efficiency implications of 
such choices. In this respect, the Dutch setting allows a completely novel approach to 
measuring efficiency. Because municipalities and certain IOs are covered by a 
uniform guarantee system, the interest they pay on loans with the same characteristics 
should in theory be the same. However, it takes some effort to arrange a loan at 
minimum cost. Chapter 5 argues that differences in interest rates on identical loans can 
be viewed as an indication of differences in efficiency.  
- Thirdly, SNGs who take loans have limited possibilities to minimise borrowing costs. 
They mainly depend, aside from some room for bargaining, on the loan offers from 
banks and on market conditions. One subject that is much discussed in the financial 
departments of SNGs is whether an optimal moment to arrange a loan can be found, 
aiming to lock in the best interest rate. Lower borrowing costs could lead to more 
room to finance public services. Chapter 6 compares five different timing-based 
decision rules, all easy to implement at low costs by SNGs, and explores whether 
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some strategies outperform others under different performance criteria. 
 
This thesis adds to the literature in various ways. To the best of our knowledge, research on 
explicit government guarantees has not been done before. Moreover, empirical studies on 
bank loans as a source of credit for SNGs are very limited. This study thus adds new research 
to the existing literature. Finally, we apply a novel approach to compare the efficiency of 
intermunicipal organisations with the efficiency of municipalities. 
 
1.1 The rationale for government guarantees 
 
In Europe, the dominant source of credit for SNGs is bank loans (Halling et al., 2016), with 
municipal bond issues lagging far behind (Schultz & Wolff, 2009; Caperchione & Salvatori, 
2012). The studies available on SNG borrowing costs by means of bank loans are limited. 
Batisda et al. (2014) investigate the municipal borrowing costs of bank loans in a Spanish 
institutional setting, which differs from the Dutch setting as it provides other forms of 
government guarantees and does not protect against default. The study finds that accounting 
information provided by municipalities exerts an influence on the credit price policy of the 
banks with respect to the municipalities. If their conclusions also hold for the Netherlands, we 
would expect that borrowing costs will depend on the financial particulars of the debtor. By 
the same token, Navarro-Galera et al. (2015) develop a loan price model for Spanish local 
governments to determine borrowing costs, which includes financial factors as well as social, 
demographic and political drivers. Here, the question arises whether these findings also hold 
in the Dutch setting. 
 
In theory, borrowing costs are influenced by the credit risk of the debtor. In the absence of 
unconditional guarantees, debtors with different levels of credit risk will have different 
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borrowing costs and opportunities to access credit. Such an uneven playing field could be less 
desirable for SNGs, which are expected to provide comparable public services. Government 
guarantees, however, can help to realise a level playing field with respect to borrowing costs 
and access to credit. Implicit guarantees go hand-in-hand with uncertain bailout expectations, 
which may be reflected in borrowing costs. To remove uncertainty in relation to bailout 
expectations, guarantees can be made explicit. However, it is unclear whether and to what 
extent this influences borrowing costs. A major advantage of providing explicit guarantees (in 
contrast to subsidies for example) is that they need not cost society anything. 
 
The idea of providing explicit guarantees meets considerable resistance in the economic 
literature (Kornai et al., 2003; Rodden, 2006) because it is believed to be inextricably linked 
to moral hazard. Even if there are no explicit guarantees, banks might expect a bailout in any 
case (implicit guarantees), for economic or political reasons (Kalamov & Staal, 2016), as 
actual bankruptcy could entail high costs to social wellbeing as well as other political costs 
(Goodspeed, 2002; Plekhanov & Singh, 2006). Indeed, there are numerous examples of 
bailouts actually occurring despite the existence of a formal no-bailout clause (Heppke-Falk 
& Wolff, 2008; Rodden, 2006). These bailout expectations may have resulted in lower 
interest rates.  
 
However, loan guarantees might not be fully credible either, which could result in higher 
interest rates. If no differences are found in interest rates, this could be interpreted as a 
redundancy in the explicit guarantee, leaving room for moral hazard. Nevertheless, in the 
Netherlands, explicit government guarantees are part of the institutional setting of municipal 
borrowing and that of housing corporations as well. The Netherlands has positive experiences 
with explicit guarantees, and bailouts seldom occur (Allers, 2015). Nonetheless, making use 
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of explicit guarantees demands an adequate and sustainable institutional setting and 
borrowing practice. This is necessary to reduce the likelihood of abuse. 
 
Given the setting described above, it is of interest to investigate the effects of explicit 
guarantees. To our knowledge, this is the first study in this field, as the existing literature 
focuses on implicit guarantees. Chapter 4 tests whether and to what extent explicit guarantees 
lower borrowing costs, and whether they are successful in creating a level playing field for 
borrowing costs. To evaluate this guarantee system, the effect on borrowing costs is compared 
with the actual bailout payments during the period 1990-2014. Of course, outcomes in the 
past do not predict future performance, and the cost of a bailout system go beyond actual 
bailout spending. Nevertheless, such a comparison can help put things in perspective. In 
addition, Chapter 4 compares two different explicit guarantee schemes, in order to determine 
whether they have the same effect on interest rates. The results of this study could support 
countries that wish to design an adequate setting for explicit guarantees with the aim of 
lowering borrowing costs. 
 
Chapter 4 tests three hypotheses. The first and second focus on the interest spread, which is 
defined as the difference between the actual interest rate paid by the SNG and a risk-free 
reference rate. The first hypothesis tests whether the guarantee does what it is designed to do; 
that is, to lower interest rates. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Unguaranteed loans have higher interest spreads than guaranteed loans. 
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Another goal of the guarantee is to create a level playing field for borrowing costs. To this 
end we test Hypothesis 2 and investigate the influence of housing corporation characteristics 
on interest rates in the case of guaranteed and unguaranteed loans.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Housing corporation characteristics do not influence the interest spread of 
guaranteed loans. 
 
The bulk of the existing literature concludes that higher debt leads to higher interest rates. 
With Hypothesis 2, we can test whether the characteristics of a housing corporation’s 
financial position, such as higher debt (or riskiness), influences interest spreads for 
unguaranteed loans compared to guaranteed loans. The findings provide an indication of the 
extent to which the lending banks, over our research period, relied on the credibility of the 
guarantee (bailout clause) and the assessment of the supervisory authorities. From this we can 
deduce whether the guarantee system was effective in removing credit risk. 
 
In the Netherlands, we distinguish two forms of explicit guarantees: that of housing 
corporations, which may default, with a guarantee fund that secures individual loans; and that 
of municipalities, where the guarantee secures the entire financial position and protects 
against default. It is not inconceivable that these differences will be reflected in different 
interest rates. Therefore, we investigate whether housing corporations and municipalities pay 
different interest rates on equivalent loans.  
 
Hypothesis 3. The interest rate on guaranteed housing corporation loans exceeds the 
interest rate on municipality loans. 
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If we find no differences in interest paid, we may conclude that the two different forms of 
government guarantees have the same effect on interest rates.  
 
1.2 The efficiency of different types of SNG 
 
The existence of risk-free credit provides an interesting opportunity to study differences in the 
efficiency of SNGs. In the absence of credit risk, interest rates should only depend on loan 
modalities, credit market rates and the effort on the part of the borrower to secure a good deal. 
With sufficient data, the first two determinants can be controlled for and the latter estimated. 
When, for example, intermunicipal organisations systematically pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities for equivalent loans, it might be deduced that they operate less efficiently. This 
is the topic of Chapter 5. 
 
This is a highly relevant issue. In many countries, the small size of local government is 
increasingly thought to lack the necessary scale to operate efficiently. Two possible solutions 
to this problem are amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation. Each of these options may 
have very different implications. Amalgamations often lead to public resistance because 
communities fear loss of autonomy or identity. Moreover, amalgamation is a blunt instrument, 
as services offered by municipalities are quite heterogeneous. While some services (e.g. 
capital intensive) may operate under economies of scale, the opposite may be true of other 
services. Hence, increasing scale across the board might encourage efficiency gains in some 
public services but efficiency losses in others. In addition, amalgamation may result in more 








Intermunicipal cooperation offers municipalities a way to increase the scale of production for 
selected public services, while continuing to provide other public services on a municipal 
level and preserving local autonomy. Cooperation may thus allow municipalities to exploit 
economies of scale (Bel et al., 2013), but it may also have effects that reduce efficiency. 
Corporate governance theory predicts that cooperation exacerbates agency costs and reduces 
the intensity with which the activities of public servants are monitored. Thus, a control system 
combining monitoring with sanctions and rewards (henceforth referred to as ‘monitoring’) is 
needed to align public servants’ objectives with those of citizens. 
 
Agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitoring and, as a result, less 
efficiency in intermunicipal organisations (IOs). Firstly, it introduces an extra tier in the 
hierarchy: the board of the IO. Adding hierarchical layers increases monitoring costs. 
Secondly, monitoring could be further hampered by the fact that a municipal government’s 
grip on an IO is weaker than that on their own organisation. Thirdly, intermunicipal 
cooperation in effect creates a common pool. When a particular municipality puts a lot of 
effort into monitoring an IO, much of the ensuing efficiency gain will benefit other 
participants. As a result, the level of monitoring is likely to be lower than that for the 
operations of the municipality itself. As this disincentive to monitor is a result of the existence 
of a common pool, its strength will depend on the size of this pool. Dispersed ownership of 
IOs, or the number of partners cooperating in an IO, could influence the level of monitoring. 
The ‘law of 1/n’ states that the level of monitoring will deteriorate when the number of 
owners increases. 
 
A lower level of monitoring could result in higher borrowing costs if the absence of rewards 
or sanctions results in less effort to realise the best interest rate for the organisation. Staff of 
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the client desk of a bank have commercial targets. The interest rate set on a loan in this 
oligopolistic market may vary within small margins (indicative up to 10 basis points, i.e. 0.1 
percentage point). This is the result of a bargaining process. The room for negotiation is 
determined by the bank’s pricing model (which is kept secret for reasons of competition), the 
requested spreads and the competition. Banks keep track of failure and success rates for loan 
offers (quotes) at an overall level. Periodically, banks will adjust the spreads to reach the 
required levels of success. These failure and success rates are also recorded at a client level. 
Banks’ client desks are well aware of the nature of their individual clients and will find ways 
to realise commercial targets. Clients who always accept a first loan offer or loan offers from 
the same bank, i.e. loyal clients, will end up with a higher interest rate. This higher interest 
rate could be interpreted as a form of inefficiency because there is no economic reason to 
accept such an offer. This brings us to our first hypothesis related to efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Intermunicipal organisations (IOs) pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities on equivalent loans. 
 
Higher interest rates paid by IOs might point to inefficient borrowing practices, but this is not 
the only possible explanation. In this respect, note first that there are two forms of IOs: 
guaranteed public companies and public bodies. Because public companies can default and 
municipalities and public bodies cannot, creditors could charge the former higher interest 
rates to cover possible legal or administrative costs of enforcing a loan guarantee. However, 
the higher interest paid by public companies would then not be the result of inefficient 
borrowing practices. The following hypothesis is designed to test this possibility. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Public companies do not pay higher interest rates than public bodies. 
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If we observe no difference in interest rates between public bodies and guaranteed public 
companies, this would mean that IOs pay higher interest rates than necessary (i.e. there is no 
economic reason for doing so). A difference in interest rates between municipalities and IOs 
might also be due to differences in bargaining efficiency (e.g. collecting market information, 
negotiating). However, more bargaining effort would only be advantageous if the benefits of 
putting in this additional effort exceeded the costs. This brings us to the third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The benefits of an additional bargaining effort by IOs would exceed costs. 
 
If Hypothesis 3 is supported, less bargaining effort would reflect inefficiency, because there is 
no economic reason to do so. The question then arises of why IOs would make less effort in 
bargaining. This may occur when efforts are not, or are less strictly, monitored and when the 
lack of rewards and sanctions encourage other objectives than a best rate for the organisation. 
As we saw above, agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitoring and, 
thus, less efficiency in IOs: the introduction of additional hierarchical layers; the limited 
influence of municipality governments on IO boards; and dispersed ownership of IOs. We can 
test the validity of the latter explanation by investigating whether interest rates increase as the 
number of participants in an IO increases. Several papers (Weingast, 1979; Primo & Snyder, 
2008) argue that inefficiency due to common pool effects increases with the number of 
participants; the phenomenon called the ‘law of 1/n’, mentioned above. This brings us to the 
fourth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The interest rate paid by IOs increases as the number of participating 
municipalities increases (i.e. the ‘law of 1/n’ holds). 
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Amalgamation, which is an alternative to cooperation, might also affect monitoring efforts. 
Recently amalgamated municipalities may be less able to monitor their borrowing activities. 
Amalgamation is an arduous process that may have severe disruptive effects on managerial 
behaviour and organisational outcomes; for example, because of poor staff morale, loss of 
managerial expertise due to increased turnover or work overload. At the same time, 
amalgamation may have a beneficial effect on efficiency. Existing organisations usually have 
well-established ways of doing things, which may have become outdated. Amalgamation 
forces organisations to reconsider procedures and operations, possibly resulting in the 
adoption of more efficient practices. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. After amalgamation, municipalities pay higher interest rates than non-
amalgamated (or recently amalgamated) municipalities. 
 
Our final hypothesis investigates whether a decision to amalgamate rather than form an IO 
influences interest rates. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Interest rates paid by recently amalgamated municipalities are lower than 
those paid by IOs. 
 
1.3 The impact of the timing of a loan on borrowing costs 
 
SNGs who take loans have limited possibilities to minimise borrowing costs. Because loans to 
Dutch municipalities are risk free, they can be arranged at very short notice. Banks are happy 
to lend money to municipalities and do not need to assess credit worthiness. One phone call or 
email suffices to secure a loan that may start the same day. This allows municipalities to 
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closely control the moment in time they arrange a loan. The question arises whether 
municipalities can optimise the timing moment in order to lower borrowing costs. Lower 
borrowing costs could lead to more room to finance public services. 
 
In cases where credit is needed, this need is usually known well in advance. Existing loans 
coming to maturity need to be refinanced and funds are needed for investment projects; none 
of this will come as a surprise in any well-managed organisations. This provides borrowers 
with the option to choose the moment when a loan is arranged. Rather than waiting until the 
funds are needed to execute payments, a loan can be arranged earlier using what is known as a 
‘forward start’. This means that there is a time lag between the contract date – the date the 
loan is arranged and the interest rate set – and the date the funds are made available. 
 
In the Netherlands, forward starting loans are quite common in SNG borrowing practice. 
Forward starts may have different motivations. Firstly, a forward start may appeal to risk-
averse borrowers. By arranging the loan as soon as the need for capital has become clear, a 
cost increase as a result of rising interest rates is prevented. Secondly, loans may have to be 
approved at meetings of high-level officials that take place at various intervals; for example, 
as part of a budget for a project. If finances will be needed in six weeks’ time and meetings 
where a loan can be approved are held monthly for example, a forward start of several weeks 
is to be expected. Finally, and most relevant for this study, a forward start may be chosen by a 
borrower who expects the interest rate to rise. By arranging the loan immediately at the 
current rate, the loan will be cheaper – provided the borrower was right.  
 
The mainstream literature shows that it is difficult to outperform a prediction that is equal to 
the current interest rate. That is, the best prediction of the rate tomorrow is the rate today. This 
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does not mean, by definition, that it is impossible to find a timing-based decision rule that 
reduces interest rates. For example, does it make sense in a period of volatile interest rates to 
wait until the interest is somewhat lower? Chapter 6 tests the success of five strategies that 
might be employed to choose the moment a loan is arranged, using actual interest rates only. 
 
1.3.1  Strategies related to timing a loan 
In Chapter 6, we test whether interest rates on loans might be optimised by finding the right 
moment to arrange a loan within a 20-day time slot. In fact, this is called an ‘optimal 
stopping’ problem, where an irreversible choice must be made under conditions of uncertainty 
and within a finite time horizon (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006; Allaart, 2012). A well-known 
example is the secretary problem (Ferguson, 1989), where the best secretary must be selected 
from n applicants. The optimal decision rule (in fact, an approximation that moves closer to 
the optimal one as n increases) is to dismiss the first1 n/e candidates, and then select the 
applicant who is better than the best candidate up to that point. In the case of a better 
candidate not appearing, the latter candidate is chosen.  
 
Our case differs from the secretary problem with respect to some of the assumptions and the 
objectives. Nevertheless, it is interesting to determine whether this optimal stopping strategy 
can help minimise interest rates.  
 
In this study, we investigate five strategies that are easy to implement at low costs. We test the 
performance of these strategies using daily interest rates for the previous two decades.  
 
The first strategy is a passive strategy. It looks back to choose the best interest rate in a certain 
                                                 
 
1 Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm: approximately 2.72. 
2 Bernard van Ommeren (2019), responsible credit risk assessments municipalities BNG Bank. 
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time period and sets this rate as the reference rate for the following decision period. The loan 
is arranged at the moment that the current interest rate is lower than or equal to the reference 
rate. If this is not the case, the loan will be arranged on the last available day. The second 
strategy is slightly different: it is an active strategy, which means that the reference rate is set 
on every new day. The third strategy uses the drift of the market, in other words, the positive 
or the negative difference between a past interest rate and the rate at the beginning of the 
decision period. If the drift is upwards, the loan is arranged immediately; if it is downwards, 
the loan is arranged on the last available day. The fourth strategy follows the classic secretary 
approach. No historical data are used. Instead, a waiting period is created, during which the 
best interest rate is set as the reference rate. The loan is arranged as soon as the current 
interest rate is lower than or equal to the reference rate in the following decision period. If this 
is not the case, the loan will be arranged on the last available day. The final strategy is the 
simplest: always choose a fixed day to arrange the loan, for example always select day 1, day 
2 or another fixed day in the decision period. 
 
We shall see that there are substantial differences between the performance of these strategies 
and that the policy implications will depend strongly on the goal that one wants to achieve.  
 
1.4 Reading guide 
 
The core of this thesis consists of three empirical research papers, as described above. 
However, before turning to these papers, for a better understanding of the unique Dutch 
setting in which SNGs can borrow with explicit government guarantees, Chapter 2 clarifies 
the institutional setting in the Netherlands, that is, the tiers of government and the financial 
institutions and their roles related to municipal borrowing. In Chapter 3 we describe the 
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practice of municipal borrowing, practical issues concerning municipal borrowing and a 
quantitative description of contracted loans. The subsequent chapters present the three main 
studies. Chapter 4 investigates the effect of explicit government guarantees on the borrowing 
costs of housing corporations and municipalities. Chapter 5 applies a novel approach to 
compare the efficiency of SNGs with the efficiency of municipalities. Chapter 6 explores 
whether the right timing when arranging a loan can help achieve lower interest rates, while 








2 Institutional context of municipal borrowing 
 
This chapter addresses the institutional setting of municipal borrowing in the Netherlands, 
starting from a European perspective. This is necessary for a better understanding of the 
unique Dutch setting of municipal borrowing with explicit government guarantees. There is as 
yet no literature available that fully describes this unique setting. However, before we start to 
describe this setting, we will elaborate on the relevancy of this analysis. 
 
2.1 The relevancy of the unique Dutch setting 
 
Every country has its own unique setting how municipalities are financed. In the European 
context, this financing mainly takes place in the form of bank loans to municipalities. For 
lenders, this automatically implies the risk of bankruptcy of the borrower, with all its 
consequences. Most European countries have regulations to protect munipalities against 
bankruptcy (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, England, Germany, Netherlands, Spain). For some 
countries, it is not clear how potential bankruptcy is handled (e.g. France, Italy). Only a few 
countries in Europe allow municipalities to go bankrupt (Austria, Hungary, Switzerland). The 
United States of America also allows municipalities to go bankrupt and consequently offers 
protection against creditors through a Chapter 9 procedure. All this does not make the Dutch 
setting unique: European countries provide some form of financial assistance when 
municipalities face budgetary problems. While this has not been stipulated in a formal bailout 
duty, it is reflected in implicit bailout expectations. The design of the bailouts strongly differs 
between countries based on certain conditions e.g. legal basis, type of help, eligibility, 
procedures, causes, etc. The Netherlands is the only country that has stipulated an 
unconditional formal bailout duty for all municipalities. This explicit government guarantee is 
enshrined in law. This is what really makes the Dutch setting unique.  
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It is interesting to analyse a setting that makes such an unconditional bailout duty sustainable, 
given the moral hazard problems this may cause. Moreover, such an unconditional bailout 
duty relieves lenders from the duty to thoroughly assess the credit-worthiness of 
municipalities. Lending to municipalities can be effectuated in a highly efficient way with a 
minimum of costs and lead times. This could be reflected in the low interest that 
municipalities pay on their loans as well as the easy access to these loans, both a result of the 
Dutch setting.  
The uniqueness of the Dutch setting makes it complicated to explain and for others to 
understand. Even in 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB, acting as a supervisor of bank 
lending) has requested that the main Dutch public sector bank provide a fully qualitative 
description of the rationale of lending without credit risk surcharges2. This is socially relevant 
as understanding the Dutch setting may be necessary to continue the current lending 
procedures for municipalities, which provide easy access to money at low interest rates and 
thus leave financial room for more public facilities. This chapter may be helpful in providing 
this information. The academic relevance of this chapter lies in the study of the institutional 
context in a country that offers formal unconditional bailouts in the form of explicit 
government guarantees, without encountering the moral hazard problems the literature would 
predict (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003; Rodden, 2006) and over-borrowing (Litvack, 
Eskeland, & Rodden, 2003). 
  
2.2 The European perspective 
 
The Netherlands is a founding member of the European Union (EU), a geo-political entity 
covering a large portion of the European continent and founded upon numerous treaties. 
                                                 
 
2 Bernard van Ommeren (2019), responsible credit risk assessments municipalities BNG Bank. 
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Members of the EU are completely free to design procedures and protocols to finance their 
local governments, and there are a variety of mechanisms used, based on different historical, 
political, cultural and social backgrounds. To enhance price stability within the eurozone, 
political criteria have been set with regard to central and local government debt levels and 
deficits. 
 
From a monetary perspective, price stability within the eurozone is the primary objective of 
the ECB.3 When price stability is met, room is created for lower interest rates to enhance 
growth. The ECB is directly governed by European law, and has a corporate structure, with 
the EU Member States (national central banks) as shareholders. The ECB directly influences 
prices for short-term capital by setting the interest rates for banks that rely on such credit. 
Money market prices for banks with access to ECB credit (e.g. in the case of refinancing) do 
not differ substantially. These short-term prices in turn influence long-term prices through the 
shift in preferences of maturities. The ECB is increasingly using longer term monetary tools 
to directly influence prices for long-term credit. 
 
Although a well-functioning ECB is a precondition for stability, national central banks do 
play an important role in securing access to money, also in difficult times. Stability in markets 
is crucial for ensuring access to money against reasonable prices.  
 
The banking industry regulations are based on a set of recommendations known as the Basel 
Accords: Basel I, II, III and the forthcoming IV. The recommendations must be adopted by 
national supervisors and enforced by national law or European laws, and there are also 
                                                 
 
3 Price stability is defined as an inflation rate of 2% or a little less. 
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regulations such as Credit Requirement Directives and Credit Requirement Regulations.4 The 
main objective is to align own funds with bank exposure. Exposure with negligible credit risk 
is zero-risk weighted, which means that no additional risk capital is required. In the 
Netherlands, decisions about the level of credit risk applied to capital requirements are taken 
by the national supervisor – the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) – and formalised in regulations.5  
 
2.3 The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands can best be described as a decentralised unitary state. It consists of twelve 
provinces and 388 municipalities (2017). In accordance with their respective powers, the 
majority of competences still remain with the central government. It is within the power of 
central government to create, amalgamate and terminate a municipality. However, this rarely 
occurs, and most amalgamations are bottom-up processes. Financial and juridical rules 
applicable to a municipality and the division of tasks and powers are determined by the 
central government. Municipalities are democratically governed jurisdictions with their own 
broad set of responsibilities. To fulfil these, certain tasks and powers are partly delegated to 
municipalities, which leaves them free to decide how to spend their budget within the 
boundaries of the legal requirements.  
 
Municipalities are allowed to borrow money to perform their public tasks, mainly relying on 
national sector banks for loans. Until recently, the DNB acted as a supervisor of these sector 
                                                 
 
4 In the Netherlands, the Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht, Wft) regulates solvency requirements. 
5 Art. 2.8, Regulation of Capital Requirements for Credit Risk, and its explanatory notes, annex 2B, lapsed on 01-01-2014 and were replaced by a 
phased implementation of CRD IV and CRR regulations (Regeling solvabiliteitseisen kredietrisico en grote posities Wft 2010, vervallen per 01-01-
2014). CRD IV and CRR incorporate the Basel III recommendations, which introduced a minimum ‘leverage ratio’. This is a non-risk-based 
leverage ratio and is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by a bank’s average total consolidated assets. The banks are expected to maintain a 
leverage ratio in excess of 3%. 
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banks, but as of 2014 this authority was transferred to the ECB. In this role, it maintains an 
overview of risk and capital requirements of individual banks to prevent bankruptcy and 
instability. The required levels of capital influence the price of credit and, of course, equity is 
not free: investors demand a return on their capital. The DNB has assigned lending to 
municipalities, or under municipal guarantee, the status of zero-risk weighted exposure, an 
equal risk weighting as that of the State of the Netherlands. This means that banks do not have 
to allocate credit-risk capital, which in turn keeps interest rates low. The possibility of default 
is negligible because the legal system triggers predefined processes to avoid such a situation. 
Therefore, a Dutch municipality cannot default (see Section 2.4). 
 
Loans provided to Dutch municipalities (or to debtors under municipal guarantee, as well as 
certain guaranteed funds) may be used as collateral in Monetary Policy Operations of the 
ECB. Because of these regulations, Dutch banks are able to finance municipalities against 
favourable prices, particularly banks with higher credit ratings. Since 1945, no municipality 




Municipalities in the Netherlands are relatively large compared to those in other European 
countries. As a result of a continuous amalgamation process, the average size of 
municipalities has grown from 29,600 inhabitants in 2000 to 43,800 in 2016 (source: Statistics 
Netherlands). The decentralisation of national tasks to municipalities is an ongoing process 
and puts pressure on municipalities to operate efficiently. An alternative to amalgamation, and 
widely used, is intermunicipal cooperation (see Chapter 5). In the section below, we describe 
Dutch municipalities according to the tasks they perform, their organisational form, the way 
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they are financed, accounting standards, supervision by the province and the bailout 
mechanism. The legal and regulatory framework can be found in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
2.4.1 Municipal tasks 
Municipal tasks and related expenditures are extensive. Dutch municipal and regional public 
sector expenditures amount to 33% of total public expenditure.6 The main areas of these 
expenditures are education 28%, social welfare 15%, general services 8%, health 2%, 
economic affairs 18%, and 28% other (e.g. housing and community amenities, public order 
and safety, recreation and culture, environment and defence). Direct capital expenditure of the 
municipal and regional public sectors amounts to 65% of total public capital expenditure 
(source: CEMR factsheets).  
 
Municipalities perform many tasks that are of direct importance to the inhabitants. In addition 
to their legal responsibilities, municipalities have autonomy regarding public service 
provision. However, there is much public and political pressure to provide an implicit 
‘minimum level’ of public services. Examples of legal tasks include: the registration of 
inhabitants, the issuance of official documents, social welfare and school facilities. Public 
service provision related to local policies might include, for instance, developing zoning 
plans, infrastructure projects and local investments.  
 
Municipalities are required to present a balanced budget. The municipal council has the 
exclusive right to allocate and approve this budget. Execution of this budget is in the hands of 
the municipal executive (the board of aldermen and the mayor). If the policies of central 
government lead to changes in the duties and activities of municipalities then, under Section 2 
                                                 
 
6 CEMR (2013), Factsheets: A figure-based portrait of local and regional Europe, CEMR, Brussels. 
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of the Financial Relations Act, a specification must be given of any financial consequences to 
the municipalities, and the means by which these are to be financed must be indicated. In 
practice, the division of duties between central government and the municipalities, as well as 
the financial resources required, are subject to intensive consultation between central 
government and the municipalities. 
 
2.4.2 Municipal organisation 
The municipal organisation is laid down in the Municipalities Act. Every municipality has a 
council and a board of aldermen and a mayor, which represent the inhabitants of the 
municipality, determining local policy and controlling the execution of it. The number of 
councillors depends on the size (inhabitants) of the municipality. The mayor is the chair of the 
council. The mayor is not elected, but nominated by the municipal council and appointed by 
the central government. The board of aldermen and the mayor represents the municipal 
executive. The mayor is the chair of this board, while the number of aldermen amounts to at 
most 20% of the total number of councillors, with a minimum of two. The aldermen are 
selected by the municipal council and have political responsibility for their allocated portfolio 
of tasks. The municipal council cannot bind the municipality to external parties, only 
resolutions from the municipal executive can do so. However, if executives do not follow the 
directives of the council, the council can dismiss them, thus giving the council the power to 
enforce political wishes. 
 
The ongoing decentralisation of tasks has had its effects on municipal organisation. In this 
dynamic environment, municipalities are exploring ways to increase operational excellence in 
order to meet new conditions. To this end, new forms of intermunicipal organisation are being 
considered. In addition, municipal amalgamation has also been considered as a possible way 
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to enhance efficiency. The choice of a specific solution is complex and depends on many 
factors. Sometimes amalgamation would be too blunt an instrument, as up-scaling every 
service may not be optimal, while intermunicipal organisations may create common pools 
leading to inefficiencies. Chapter 5 elaborates on these issues. 
 
Municipal executives are ‘horizontally’ supervised by the municipal council, elected through 
proportional representation every four years. The Municipalities Act (Art. 189) stipulates that 
the council must ensure that a municipality’s budget is balanced in a structural and material 
way. ‘Structural’ balance means that the budget presented is consistent with previous years 
and years to come, while ‘material’ balance means that the budget reflects the true state of 
affairs. The structure and authorisation within the municipality, as defined in the 
Municipalities Act, are organised so that both the council and the municipal executive are 
countervailing powers with regard to budgetary spending. However, the municipal system of 
budgeting and reporting is complicated and open to interpretation.  
 
2.4.3 Municipal revenues and finance 
Dutch municipalities depend heavily on funds provided by the central government, with 
relatively little power to raise taxes themselves. This vertical fiscal imbalance makes it 
difficult for municipalities to cope with substantial financial setbacks. 
 
To a large extent, fiscal disparities between municipalities are aligned through an elaborate 
grant system (Allers & Vermeulen, 2016). This system aims to ensure that municipalities are 
able to provide similar service levels at similar tax rates. The allocation formula in the grant 
system (the Municipal Fund), although cost oriented, is chosen in such a way as to prevent 
municipalities from influencing the amount of grant they receive.  
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Municipalities enjoy, within statutory limits, a certain degree of autonomy in determining the 
taxes to be levied and their rates. The relevant regulations are laid down mainly in the 
Municipalities Act, Sections 216-257. Municipalities are prohibited from levying taxes based 
on income and wealth; the most important tax they do levy is a property tax. Municipal 
income from all taxes and levies add up to 17% of the budget.7 Shortages used to be financed 
with revenues from profitable land development programmes.  
 
In the Netherlands, SNGs may borrow unlimited amounts within a balanced budget. The 
budget is accounted for on an accrual basis. According to this standard, costs and 
expenditures may be incurred that will be accounted for at a later date, conforming to the pay-
as-you-use philosophy. As a result of this, the budget may be in balance but at the same time 
indicate a cash shortage, which needs to be funded with credit to execute the necessary 
payments, resulting in increasing debt levels. Borrowing within a balanced budget can be 
achieved as long as the interest on loans and depreciations of investments are covered by the 
budget. The loan amount and the investment are not part of the budget and are presented on 
the balance sheet. A balanced budget thus says nothing about the availability of money to 
achieve this balance, and it is possible that new loans are required. This is in contrast to the 
central government, which balances the budget on a cash basis, meaning that no additional 
loans are needed. Dutch SNGs borrow under a form of government guarantee, but because of 
a lack of discipline in the working of the market on the level of interest that must be paid, 
regardless of the level of debt or economic performance, this could lead to unsustainable debt 
levels and financial distress. However, in the Netherlands, SNGs do not go bankrupt and 
bailouts rarely occur.  
 
                                                 
 
7 Statistics Netherlands. 
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Regulations concerning municipal activity on the money market and the capital markets are 
laid down in the Financing Act and the Decree on Loan Conditions. These aim to limit 
interest risk exposure resulting from municipalities’ funding activities. For instance, the 
volume of short-term funding is limited to a percentage of the budget (Art. 4, Financing Act). 
The interest risk on long-term borrowing is limited by choosing the modalities in such a way 
that refinancing risk does not exceed a certain percentage of the budget (Art. 5, Financing 
Act). The applicable percentages are defined in the Implementation Rules.  
 
Municipalities may only borrow in euros (Art. 1, Decree on Loans). Moreover, they may not 
become a party to index linked loans (Art. 2, Decree on Loans). Pursuant to the Financing 
Act, municipalities may only enter into derivative transactions if these transactions are entered 
into for the purpose of limiting the financial risks of the municipality. Financial transactions 
may not aim to generate income by accepting more financial risk (Art. 2a, Depositing Fund 
Regulation and Art. 2a, Financing Act). Only a couple of specified derivative transactions are 
allowed (Art. 4, Depositing Fund Regulation). Investments or borrowing of funds by 
municipalities are only permitted to the extent they benefit their public function (Art. 2, 
Financing Act). The assessment of public function is the responsibility of the municipal 
council (Section IX, Municipalities Act). 
 
2.4.4 Accounting standards and the budget 
Budgetary regulations, as described in the Municipalities Act and the Decree on Budget and 
Accountability, rest on the following principles: 
- the budget of a municipality must be balanced – only deviating from this principle if it 
may be assumed that the budget will be balanced in the following few years (Art. 189, 
Municipalities Act);  
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- a medium-term budget estimate must be made for a minimum of three years following 
the budget year (Art. 190, Municipalities Act);  
- pursuant to the Decree on Budget and Accountability, budgetary risks which may be 
of substantial significance given the financial position of the municipality must be 
specified in a special section of the budget (interest rate exposure would be a case in 
point). 
 
The municipal annual report includes the financial statements. These statements must be 
audited by a certified accountant and compiled according the Decree on Budget and 
Accountability. The financial regulations leave a lot of room for interpretation. Consequently, 
the accountant may play an important role in determining how to balance the budget and also, 
as a result of this, comply with additional political wishes. An audit by a certified accountant 
is not mandatory for the annual budget. 
 
2.4.5 Financial supervision and bailout 
The provinces are an intermediary layer between the central government and municipalities 
and are responsible for the financial supervision of the municipalities within the provincial 
boundaries. This legal responsibility is laid down in the Municipalities Act, aiming to enhance 
financial soundness and to prevent municipalities from having to fall back on central 
government support in case of financial distress. Ensuring a balanced budget is the 
responsibility of the municipal council, with any financial imbalance indicated in a budget 
deficit. A structurally and materially balanced budget must be presented to the province (Art. 
189, Municipalities Act). The interpretation of this structural and material balance may differ 
between municipalities and provinces.  
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The most usual form of monitoring is ex post supervision. In this case, the province receives 
the financial statements, the budgets (including a multi-annual budget projection) and any 
other required documents (Arts. 200; 203, Municipalities Act) from the municipal executive. 
As long as the information is received in time and budgets are found to be structurally and 
materially balanced (Art. 203, Municipalities Act), supervision will remain ex post and the 
budget of the following year will be approved by the province. The municipality is then free 
to spend the approved budget. 
 
However, if the information is not received in time, or if the budget is considered to not be 
balanced, then the province will request that the municipal council take measures to constrain 
the municipal executive, although provinces cannot force municipalities to take measures. 
However, if these are not taken, the following year’s budget cannot be spent. Any expenditure 
must be approved ex ante by the province. To prevent such a situation occurring, municipal 
executives do their best to come to an arrangement. 
 
Ex ante supervision can be described as follows: 
 
- If the budget of a municipality is structurally out of balance in the opinion of the 
provincial authorities, the municipality will be placed under ex ante supervision. This 
means that the budget requires the approval of the provincial authorities (Art. 203, 
Municipalities Act). In the event that the budget is not approved, the provincial 
authorities must approve every single expenditure incurred by the municipality above 
a certain euro threshold (Art. 208, Municipalities Act). If the municipal council should 
authorise any expenditure which the provincial authorities do not approve, the 
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members of the council who voted in favour of authorising such expenditure may be 
held personally liable (Art. 210, Municipalities Act). 
- Debt servicing of loans contracted by a municipality forms a mandatory part of the 
budget and consequently has priority over non-mandatory expenditure. Provincial 
authorities may order the municipality to repay such debts if the municipality omits to 
do so (Arts. 193; 195, Municipalities Act). 
 
If, in spite of these actions, the municipality still fails to achieve a balanced budget, it may 
receive additional financial assistance by means of an Article 12 procedure. Article 12 of the 
Financial Relations Act stipulates that a municipality may receive a supplementary grant if 
revenues are significantly and structurally insufficient to cover necessary outlays while local 
tax rates are sufficiently high. Grant money is taken from the municipality fund, from which 
grants to all municipalities are paid. Thus, it is not the budget of the central government but 
grants to other municipalities that suffer when a municipality is bailed out. A municipality has 
to ask for a bailout before it will be considered. Whether or not a bailout is granted will be 
decided by the national Ministry of Internal Affairs. If a bailout is not granted, the 
municipality must first comply with supervisory requirements (e.g. selling assets). If a bailout 
is granted, Article 12 comes into force and additional funds are received.  
 
In 1967, the first year in which bailout grants under Article 12 of the Financial Relations Act 
were provided, 15% of all municipalities were bailed out (Allers, 2015). As the number of 
small municipalities steadily fell due to amalgamation, and the fiscal equalisation system was 
refined, bailouts became less frequent. Since the gradual introduction of an elaborate new 
grant equalisation system in 1997-2005, bailouts have become a rare event. This equalisation 
grant is formula-based, so implicit bailouts through this grant do not occur, unlike, for 
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example, in Germany (Fink & Stratman, 2011). 
 
Before the new equalisation scheme was in place, bailouts were often believed to result from 
insufficient means, combined with nationwide minimum standards for local public services 
(Allers, 2015). Thus, there was no stigma attached to bailout. Since then, however, each 
municipality is expected to be able to finance the standard package of local services while 
levying a standard tax rate. Thus, municipalities bailed out after 1997 are much more likely to 
bear responsibility. Typical bailout grants vary between EUR 150 and EUR 400 per inhabitant 
per year, with typical bailout periods of up to three to four years (Allers, 2015). If the central 
government believes that the fundamental reason for the troubled financial position of a 
municipality is local mismanagement, a bailout may still be granted. In such cases, however, 
local tax rates above the normal rates may be required. In addition, in some cases, the 
province may require a long-term recovery plan, which will affect the budget for a longer 
period. 
 
There is a different bailout system for housing corporations. This is described in Section 
4.2.2.  
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Appendix: Municipal borrowing: the legal and regulatory framework 
 
Municipal debt finance in the Netherlands is set within a complex and overlapping network of legislation and 
regulations. An overview of the applicable rules with an explanation is given below. 
 
Legislation and regulations 
This set of legislation and regulations is the result of an elaborate democratic process of balancing the needs and 
wishes of all the stakeholders. Therefore, it is not easy to improve or reproduce this framework, as all parts are 
deeply interconnected. This makes it difficult to copy. We have divided this appendix into three parts; the 
Constitution and Acts (with mandatory national parliamentary approval), Decrees and Ministerial regulations, 
and local regulations. 
 
Constitution and Acts 
- The Constitution (Grondwet). 
The fundamental rights of citizens and the organisation and division of powers within the government (also 
between the central government, provinces and municipalities) are described in the Constitution. The purpose of 
the Constitution is to protect citizens. 
- The Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet). 
The Municipalities Act specifies: the organisation and the authority of the municipality; the fundamentals for 
administrative procedures and the budget process; the division of powers between the municipal council and 
aldermen; the legal responsibilities; possible taxes to be levied. Municipalities are obliged to balance their 
budgets in a structural way. In 2002, a dualisation of municipal administration was introduced, with municipal 
executives (aldermen) fully responsible for executing the approved budget on the one hand, and the municipal 
council setting the municipal framework to approve and control the execution of the budget on the other. The 
purpose of this Act was to ensure an efficient and transparent democratic process. 
- Common Regulations Act (Wet op de gemeenschappelijke regeling, WGR). 
This specifies: the organisation and the authority of intermunicipal cooperation; the fundamentals for 
administrative procedures and the budget process; the division of powers between the municipal council and the 
general board of the cooperative body; legal responsibilities. Note that the general board of the intermunicipal 
organisation approves the budget, not the municipalities involved. The purpose of this Act was to clarify the 
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organisation of intermunicipal cooperation. As this Act does not regulate a bailout, the articles of association 
should state that as a last resort all the municipalities involved will act as creditors should there be a shortfall.  
- Sustainable Finance Act (Wet Houdbare Overheidsfinanciën, Wet Hof). 
As a result of European budgetary agreements between countries on how to deal with EMU debt and budgetary 
deficits, the Sustainable Finance Act was brought into force in the Netherlands. This Act allows the national 
government to intervene if deficits and debt levels of local governments are not in line with the regulations of the 
Act. 
- Subnational Government Financing Act (Wet financiering decentrale overheden, Wet Fido). 
This Act clarifies how to act financially prudently, i.e. how to avoid overly high interest risk. Furthermore, the 
Act states that in a situation of a cash surplus, the means should be placed in the National Treasury, if not used to 
finance other local governments. It stipulates that financing activities are only allowed to support the 
performance of public tasks (as approved by a municipal council). The purpose of this Act is to create a common 
basis on how to act prudently. 
- Financial Relations Act (Financiële Verhoudingswet). 
Financial relations between the central government, provinces and municipalities are regulated in the Financial 
Relations Act. This is of great importance due to vertical and horizontal imbalances in the Dutch system. Taxes 
are largely levied at central government level and partially transferred to local governments, with limited local 
tax authority. 
 
Decrees and ministerial regulations 
Decrees and ministerial regulations are more flexible and more easily adjusted than Acts because they do not 
need national parliamentary approval. 
- Decree on Budget and Accountability Provinces and Municipalities (Besluit Begroting en 
Verantwoording). 
This governmental Decree is based on Art. 186 of the Municipalities Act. It stipulates the details and the 
requirements of the budget, the multi-annual estimates and the annual accounts and reports. The purpose of this 
Decree is to enhance transparency and comparability of the budgets and the annual accounts. 
- Local and Regional Government Authorities Decree on Funds and Derivatives (Regeling uitzettingen en 
derivaten decentrale overheden, RUDDO). 
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This stipulates how to deal with surplus means and derivatives. It states that derivatives are only allowed to 
reduce financial risks and that open positions are not permitted.  
- Local and Regional Government Authorities Decree on Loan Conditions (Besluit leningvoorwaarden 
decentrale overheden). 
This ministerial regulation stipulates that local governments may only borrow in the euro and that principal 
amounts are not permitted to be indexed.  
- Local and Regional Government Implementation Rules of the Subnational Government Financing Act 
(Uitvoeringsregeling financiering decentrale overheden, UFDO). 
The conditions on how to mitigate interest risk and how it is calculated are set out here. The purpose of this is to 
find common ground for interpretation and calculating interest risk. Because percentages may differ over time, 
some flexibility is needed, and therefore this is not included as part of the Act. 
 
Local regulations 
- The Decree ex Article 212 and the Municipal Treasury Regulations (financiële verordening ex artikel 
212 en Treasurystatuut). 
The Municipalities Act, Article 212, stipulates that each municipality lays down a decree regarding this Act. The 
Decree not only declares the principles of financial policy but also the management and setup of the financial 
organisation. This Decree aims to regulate financial requirements and needs approval by the municipal council. 
It should provide sufficient comfort for the council to manage its financial situation. In practice, however, this 
Decree ex Art. 212 is nothing more than a rough outline of financial principles. For this reason, more details are 
given at an operational level in the Treasury Regulations. Any changes to the Decree must be approved by the 
municipal council, while Treasury Regulations must be approved by the municipal executive, as these changes 
are considered to be a further elaboration of the already approved Decree. Together, the Decree ex Art. 212 and 
the Treasury Regulations provide the requested information in line with the Municipalities Act. Most Municipal 
Treasury Regulations are comparable because most municipal treasuries have adopted the initial format 
suggested by the BNG Bank. Furthermore, other financial legislation, such as the Sustainable Finance Act and 
the Subnational Government Financing Act, are elaborated on in this Decree and the Treasury Regulations. The 
purpose of these regulations is to maintain a clear and transparent treasury policy. This can also assist creditors 
to gain a better understanding of the borrower, who is authorised to do what, what financial products are 
allowed, and so on. 
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3 Municipal borrowing: practice 
 
This chapter addresses some key features of the practice of municipal borrowing with explicit 
government guarantees. These key features reinforce the sustainability of the guarantee 
system and are part of the unique Dutch setting. To start, we will explore the different credit 
sources for municipalities. The national sector banks play an important role, while other 
financial institutions (i.e. commercial banks, pension funds, asset managers, life insurance 
companies, intermediaries and foreign banks) play a minor role. However, they all support the 
financial stability of the Dutch capital market. Municipalities can also access capital markets 
directly by issuing bonds, although there is not much activity in this field. We will elaborate 
how the bank sets interest rates in this oligopolistic market. Furthermore, we will distinguish 
three main forms of municipal borrowing: balance sheet finance, project finance and 
borrowing through intermunicipal organisations. An important tool in municipal borrowing 
practice is the use of an annual treasury plan, which will also be addressed, as will the process 
of borrowing. We conclude the chapter with an overview of the types of loan agreements 
available and a quantitative description of total debt, amortisation schemes and types of loans. 
The appendix to this chapter presents the relevant provisions of the general terms and 
conditions of credit from the main Dutch public sector bank. 
 
3.1 The relevancy of the municipal borrowing practice 
 
The academic relevance of this chapter lies in studying a number of key elements of the 
municipal borrowing practice in a country with formal unconditional bailouts in the form of 
explicit government guarantees, whithout the expected moral hazard problems (Kornai, 
Maskin, & Roland, 2003) and over-borrowing (Litvack, Eskeland, & Rodden, 2003). 
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Alongside obtaining a clear view of the institutional context of the Dutch setting it is 
important to understand how municipalities actually borrow in such a setting. The existing 
literature is rather silent on this matter. A European study on how municipalities keep control 
of their borrowing levels (Dafflon, 2002), finds that municipalities are usually obliged to 
balance their budgets, that they are subject to some form of borrowing restrictions and that 
they are controlled by a higher level of government. The Netherlands is not included in this 
study. In the Dutch context, these findings are confirmed by Diamant et al. (2016). With a 
view to borrowing costs however, these studies lack a clear view on the borrowing practice.   
 
3.2 Tapping the credit markets 
 
Because of the legally enshrined bailout system (Section 2.4), Dutch municipalities can access 
credit markets at favourable conditions. Below, we discuss the different sources available. 
Foreign banks in the Netherlands offering services to municipalities are not active in lending. 
They do, however, offer asset-related services and special products, such as derivatives. 
In the Netherlands, only a select group of banks provide credit services to municipalities: 
ING, ABN Amro, Rabobank, BNG Bank and NWB Bank. The first three are commercial 
banks, while the latter two are sector banks specialising in lending free of credit risk. The 
small margins on risk-free credit do not enhance activities from a commercial perspective 
(Fitch, 2014). Low funding costs and a sufficient lending scale are essential to operating 
profitably in this market. Therefore, commercial banks that have lower credit ratings than 
sector banks play only a minor role. In effect, competition mainly takes place between the two 
sector banks, although there are always opportunities for commercial banks to make more 
interesting offers. Most municipal treasury regulations include a provision that at least two 
banks should be contacted when taking a long-term loan, but this does not mean that 
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commercial banks are always consulted.  
 
3.2.1 The sector banks 
Sector banks are founded and owned by public entities; whether the central government, 
municipalities, provinces or district water boards. Their main objective is to service the local 
public sector and government-backed organisations by providing easy and sustainable access 
to credit at affordable prices. In addition, shareholders obtain a ‘reasonable’ return (dividend) 
on their equity. This means that sector banks also have commercial targets. The two Dutch 
sector banks, BNG Bank and NWB Bank, have a market share of 70% and 20% respectively 
of outstanding long-term loans to SNGs.8 Sector banks are funded on the international capital 
markets and have access to cheap money due to their high credit ratings. This is reinforced by 
the likelihood of government support as a result of their public policy mandate (Birry, 
Hauville, Roy, & Ashworth, 2013). Both sector banks have been ranked at the top of the list 
of the world’s safest banks by Global Finance.9 
 
To obtain best prices for their clients, loans are priced on a daily and real-time basis. Cheap 
credit also means low operating costs and a low risk profile for the entire bank.  
 
Shares in sector banks can only be held by Dutch public entities. These shareholders approve 
the appointment of members of a supervisory board, which is composed of experts in the field 
of government (local or otherwise) as well as financial experts with the responsibility of 
supervising the bank’s managing board. In turn, the managing board is involved in the price-
setting process for loans. 
                                                 
 
8 Estimation marketing department BNG Bank. 
9 Global Finance, 2015. 
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Founded in 1914, BNG Bank is a statutory two-tier company under Dutch law 
(structuurvennootschap). This means that considerable shareholder power is shifted towards 
the supervisory board, such as the power to appoint the managing board. This was done 
because, in the past, shareholders made little use of their governing powers. Half the bank’s 
share capital is held by the Dutch State and the other half by municipal authorities, provincial 
authorities and one district water board. BNG Bank was established in The Hague and has no 
branch offices. It finances itself mainly by issuing bonds. After the State, the bank is one of 
the largest bond issuers in the Netherlands. BNG-issued debt securities are rated AAA by 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Aaa by Moody’s and AAA by Fitch. In addition, the bank has been 
awarded the highest possible Bank Financial Strength Rating (A) by Moody’s.10 The bank’s 
articles of association limit lending to clients subject to some form of government 
involvement. As a result, the vast majority of the credit portfolio comprises loans to and/or 
guaranteed by local governments and housing corporations. Due to the virtual lack of any 
credit risk in this portfolio, the process of assessing and lending credit to these clients is 
structured on a ‘straight-through’ basis, lending directly from the client desk. All other 
lending assessed as a credit risk (maximised to 10% of total long-term lending) is preceded by 
a credit-worthiness analysis that serves to allocate the relevant internal rating and determine 
the risk premium. BNG Bank employed 290 FTE in 2016, with a total asset base of EUR 150 
billion. 
 
NWB Bank was founded in 1954 as a sector bank and is comparable to BNG Bank. It offers 
short and long-term finance arrangements exclusively free of credit risk to the public sector 
and government-backed organisations. The bank is funded through international capital 
                                                 
 
10 Research period 1997-2013, rating reports are available on the website: www.bngbank.nl/investors. 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




markets. NWB Bank is a public limited liability company with shares owned by local 
governments, mainly water boards. In contrast to BNG Bank, with its State holding of 50% of 
shares, the State is a minority shareholder in NWB. The bank is an ‘ordinary’ public limited 
liability company, which means that shareholders have significant powers, such as the power 
to appoint the managing board and the supervisory board. NWB Bank employed 53 FTE in 
2016, and had a total asset base of EUR 91 billion. It has a substantial share in credit to water 
boards and only a small share of municipal credit. 
 
3.2.2 Other financial institutions 
Other institutions operating on the financial market are pension funds, asset managers and life 
insurance companies. They manage enormous sums of assets necessary to finance their future 
liabilities. As they look for an optimised return in order to match future liabilities, lending to 
municipalities used to be of value in times of high interest rates. However, as a result of 
interest market developments, they are no longer as active as they were before.  
 
In addition, intermediary parties are active in the lending market, not by lending directly 
themselves but by finding the best offer for their clients, in this case, the municipalities, which 
pay a commission for this service. Intermediary parties play a role in situations where banks 
are not willing to quote or to offer a competitive market price. This can be the result of bad 
business relations, or the bad timing of a request (e.g. near closing market and closed books). 
Banks might also consider that they have been maltreated by a borrower who asks for a quote 
only for reference purposes, taking the risk of competitive quotes with no upside potential. 
Another reason for this practice is the increase in failure rates (rejected loan offers), which 
will have a negative effect on commercial targets. 
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3.2.3 Issuing municipal bonds 
As noted, issuing loans or municipal bonds only plays a limited role in the Netherlands, with 
an outstanding total of 2% of total municipal debt in 2015.11 Issuing bonds, compared to bank 
lending, has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages of bonds include potentially 
better interest rates and pursuing borrowing according to one’s own terms and conditions. 
However, issuing bonds requires access to the capital market, which can be costly and 
cumbersome. Municipalities have to issue in a sufficient size, invest in a good reputation, 
disclose requested information to investors and adopt an adequate level of transparency. For 
this reason, banks may act as an underwriter to facilitate this arduous process. At the same 
time, bank lending is open to all municipalities and offers competitive interest rates with a lot 
of convenience and flexibility to satisfy individual needs. 
 
During the financial crisis, the issuing of municipal bonds came to a halt. Municipal 
borrowing from well-capitalised sector banks thus appears to be more crisis proof than the 
municipal bond market (Fungáčová et al., 2013).  
 
The most active party in facilitating these bond issues is BNG Bank, which offered a Medium 
Term Notes Programme to Dutch municipalities starting in 1998. This particular programme 
is still running and enables municipalities to have direct access to the European Capital 
Market.12 Moreover, within this programme, it is possible to issue loans and tradable bonds 
with maturities ranging from 2 to 30 years. With BNG Bank acting as the arranger and paying 
agent, issuing bonds by means of this programme incurs operational costs. These types of 
bonds generally have a limited secondary market and more price volatility than debt securities 
                                                 
 
11 Internal data BNG Bank. 
12 The following municipalities were active in this programme (2001-2014): Amsterdam, Arnhem, Breda, Delft, Eindhoven, Emmen, Enschede, 
Gorinchem, Groningen, Haarlem, Helmond, Maastricht, s-Hertogenbosch, Spijkenisse, Terneuzen, Tilburg, Urk, Utrecht, Velsen and Zaanstad. 
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issued by central governments. Moreover, illiquidity may have a severely adverse effect on 
the market value of these bonds. Dutch sector banks have never stopped lending to 
municipalities, even when markets became distressed. 
 
3.3 Setting the interest rate by the bank 
 
Knowledge of the interest rate setting process of the bank is important for an understanding of 
how interest rates are set and how these can change with no apparent market reason to do so. 
This will clarify why comparing rates of different banks remains useful for borrowers and 
how competing banks operate to realise their targets.  
 
Sector banks borrow long-term capital on the international capital markets by means of bond 
issues.13 Because of their high credit ratings, they are well served. To finance the funding 
needs of the bank as efficiently as possible, these bonds are issued with different maturities, 
principals and currencies, and are well spread over time. Proceeds of these issues are hedged 
immediately against interest rate and currency risk. Short-term borrowing is obtained through 
the money market based on Euribor rates. 
 
Before the start of every business day a pricing yield curve is built, a norm price for bank 
loans free of credit risk. The pricing yield curve for bank loans is based on a formal term 
structure model. Personnel involved in pricing decisions cannot influence surcharges or 
discounts on this normative yield curve. Pricing models include real time (daily), variable 
(monthly) and fixed (annual) components. 
 
                                                 
 
13 Savings/deposits positions are negligible for funding. 
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Building this normative pricing yield curve takes into account market developments with 
respect to funding and refinancing risk, resulting in a variable component, a surcharge or a 
discount, according to the respective maturities. Furthermore, a fixed cost component is added 
based on a yearly estimate that is the same for all maturities. After entering the relevant daily 
benchmark rates into the model, the interest rates for bank loans are set by the system. These 
norm prices are applicable to all risk-free credit clients. In addition, a commercial margin is 
negotiated, which may be positive or negative (or a risk premium in case of non-risk-free 
lending). 
 
The variable component is evaluated on a monthly basis. The initiative to do this is in the 
hands of the treasury department of the bank. The request is evaluated by the management 
team and, if needed, a member of the managing board. If the evaluation results in a ‘no 
change’ assessment, the process stops. If a change is proposed, this new proposal will be 
evaluated by the risk-control department. If no problems arise from a risk perspective, the 
request is transmitted to the appropriate department for input into the primary database. The 
same process is followed for the annual fixed cost component. 
 
The process of setting a price yield is strictly regulated. Once agreed upon, the pricing yield 
curve is adjusted in the primary database system of the bank. The client desk that sets interest 
rates for municipalities is informed about the pricing yield when accessing the system. During 
the day, the client desk evaluates the pricing yield in order to identify whether market rates 
differ substantially from the initial setting for the day. This is done by tracking the yield of the 
German Bund. If yields differ substantially, the client desk will adjust the commercial 
margins in line with the observed change. For this reason, it is important for municipal 
treasurers to be aware of market developments during the day. If interest rates drop during the 
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day, it is not a matter of course that the client desk will offer a lower rate – negotiations are 
needed to obtain a better result. At the same time, it is not a matter of course that the client 
desk will charge a higher interest rate should market interest rates rise in the course of the 
day, either due to laxity, their belief in a temporary interest movement or with an eye to 
increasing turnover. 
 
Because of this interest rate setting process, sudden changes in interest rates offered to clients 
are possible even when market rates do not move. If competing banks have no parallel timed 
interest rate setting processes, rates can suddenly differ between banks. Another reason why 
interest rates between banks may suddenly differ is the specific liquidity position of the bank. 
This can make a loan welcome or not, influencing the interest rate, especially for the short 
term. For these reasons, among others, a provision is often included in municipal treasury 
regulations which stipulates that an offer from several banks should be requested when 
arranging a loan. 
 
Operating in this oligopolistic market14 also influences interest rate setting. The banks keep 
track of failure and success rates for loan offers (quotes), and these rates are evaluated 
periodically. If success rates are assessed as high, it is assumed that there is room for a higher 
setting of the pricing yield curve. This will leave the client desk to realise a lower commercial 
margin. In contrast, if failure rates are assessed as high, this will probably lead to a lower 
setting of the pricing yield curve. Furthermore, these failure and success rates are also 
recorded at a client level. Clients that always accept a first loan offer or loan offers from the 
same bank (loyal clients) will end up with a higher interest rate. Personnel at the client desk 
have commercial targets, one of which is a low failure rate. For this reason, they are keen to 
                                                 
 
14 Which is assumed to be the case when individual banks have a market share greater than 50% (which is the case in the Netherlands). 
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make loan offers with a high success rate. Successes result from the low funding costs of the 
bank and astute negotiation, but also from a comparative interest rate setting advantage 
(composition of the pricing yield curve) with respect to other banks. 
 
3.4 Municipal borrowing 
 
Dutch municipalities make use of five basic forms of credit: current account, day loans, short-
term loans (cash loans), long-term loans and loans with floating interest rates and/or floating 
principal amounts. A credit facility agreement may comprise all basic forms of credit. For 
some municipalities, often only a current account with an applicable interest rate based on the 
daily Euribor is included in this agreement. As municipalities have easy access to other kinds 
of loans against competitive rates, there is no need for additional agreements. A credit facility 
agreement or a loan agreement includes an agreement letter and a term sheet.  
 
While arranging a loan, the municipal treasury decides the modalities of the requested loan; 
that is, the loan amount, the maturity, the starting date, the fixed interest period and the 
repayment schedule. After authorisation in compliance with municipal procedures, the 
municipal treasury can contract the loan. The bank offers an interest rate with no other costs 
or fees applied. For loans with a credit assessment (i.e. loans with credit risk), the bank will, 
however, charge higher interest rates and sometimes an arrangement fee to cover the costs of 
the loan process.  
 
Any conceivable amortisation scheme can be priced and is available. To facilitate procedures, 
loans can be arranged and made available on the same day. For additional convenience, it is 
possible to arrange loans with a defined forward starting period. However, this may result in 
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an extra interest charge. If agreed upon beforehand, modalities such as principal amounts and 
interest may change during the maturity of the loan. Loans are available for up to a period of 
50 years; although, due to financial turmoil, shorter maturities are more common. 
 
The main reasons for the existence of long-term loans are investments (new loans) and 
refinancing. In addition, loans can be the result of a mismatch between money inflows and 
outflows. These loans can be both short-term or long-term. The difference is of importance 
because regulations differ according to this label (Arts. 4, 6 of the Municipalities Act). A 
short-term loan is defined by an initial fixed interest bearing period of less than one year – 
anything longer would be considered long term. When liquidity is needed for payments, 
current account credit (labelled short term) might be used, but this leads to higher interest 
rates. If money is needed beyond the current account credit limits, this could lead to an 
expensive overdraft. To avoid these costs, municipalities aim for current accounts of zero. A 
current account is not a loan but a credit facility and, accordingly, requires a credit agreement. 
Of course, it is possible that municipalities borrow long term for short-term purposes. This is 
not against the rules when acting within the framework of the Financing Act, as long as the 
municipal budget is balanced. 
 
When a municipality decides to invest, borrowing can be accomplished in three different 
ways: balance sheet finance, project finance or borrowing through intermunicipal 
organisations.  
 
3.4.1 Balance sheet finance 
In the case of balance sheet finance, loans are not linked to specific projects. Balance sheet 
finance is based on projections of future need for liquidity of the entire municipality. 
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Liquidity plans with a multi-annual horizon help the municipal treasury to decide on how to 
finance liquidity gaps. A liquidity plan comprises operational, financial and investment cash 
flows. While operational and financial cash flows are easy to target, investment cash flows are 
much more difficult to control. As a result of delays, as well as uncertain inflows and 
outflows, and especially overestimations of investment budgets, only part of the budget may 
be executed. Consequently, financing the liquidity gap remains difficult. Only experience in 
dealing with the investment budget can help to prevent over or under-financing.  
 
Once a realistic plan has been made, the subsequent challenge concerns how to finance the 
liquidity gap, choosing to do so with long and short-term loans and/or current account credit 
with various modalities. Planning is crucial, as early loan redemptions may incur high costs 
and are only possible if the bank is in agreement. Moreover, being over-financed incurs 
interest charges that could be avoided. Furthermore, deposits only offer low returns, and 
current account credit and overdrafts are expensive and limited by regulations.  
 
3.4.2 Project finance  
In the case of project finance, as the name suggests, a specific project is financed. Two main 
forms of project finance can be distinguished: 
 
- without a legal entity; 
- with a private/public legal entity. 
 
In the simplest form of project finance, without legal entity, an administrative distinction is 
made for a defined project. Such a project cannot borrow from a bank directly and so the 
municipality borrows on its behalf, extending this loan to the project financing of the 
investment. This form is used in situations where the progress of the investment is difficult to 
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plan or substantially differs from normal practice. Not allowing these uncertainties to interfere 
with the normal planning and control cycle is then sometimes considered preferable. 
 
Some activities or investments that substantially differ from usual municipal practice, with 
regard to risk, financial or organisational perspectives, are usually hosted in separate legal 
entities.15 These can apply for a sector bank loan on the condition that public involvement is 
sufficiently substantial. Such a legal entity is not assessed as free of credit risk (except in the 
case of a municipal guarantee being applicable). Assessed with credit risk, it must comply 
with credit assessments, annual credit reviews and bank covenants. This is done only after an 
approval of the client loan application (compiled by the client manager of the bank) by the 
credit committee of the bank. Once a credit request is approved, an arrangement fee is 
charged and a credit-risk surcharge is applied to the normative pricing curve. Receiving bank 
finance for loans with credit risk is not an easy process. A loan application requests the 
following information: 
 
- general information on activities and legal structure, which is duly reviewed by the 
bank; 
- financial exposure to banks and the bank’s financial return on the client; 
- an explanation for the application (purpose of borrowing and overview of cash flows 
for reimbursement of the loan, explanation of why the loan is of importance to the 
bank, demonstration that debtor is compliant with the bank statutes); 
- financial analysis of and projections on solvability, liquidity (cash flows), financial 
return; 
                                                 
 
15 E.g. forms of public-private cooperation. 
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- risk analysis of all relevant aspects (such as land development projects, and risks 
associated with land allocation, land purchase, execution, sales and finance) must be 
elaborated on; 
- accepted types of collateral; 
- checks on bank covenants (e.g. loan to value, cash flow to costs of borrowing, cash 
flow to paid interest); 
- assessment of managerial quality (e.g. a history of realising budgets). 
 
Acceptance of such a credit application is far more complex and time consuming than 
applying for a loan that is free of credit risk and made with just a phone call or one email 
(with documentation to follow later). Therefore, in some cases, an unconditional guarantee 
from the municipality to the bank is requested to obtain a loan free of credit risk. This allows 
borrowing against the lowest possible prices and without the extensive annual bank demands. 
Municipalities carefully consider whether or not to provide a guarantee to support public 
services. In the case of default of payments by the debtor, failure to satisfy the terms of a loan 
obligation or failure to pay back a loan, the due amounts become immediately payable by the 
guarantor, in this case, the municipality. However, in practice, negotiations immediately 
commence to avoid such a situation.  
 
3.4.3 Borrowing through intermunicipal organisations  
If intermunicipal organisations are assigned the status of a legal entity, they can borrow on 
their own behalf instead of through participating municipalities. This shifts municipal debt 
levels to these new organisations. It is not a matter of course, however, that intermunicipal 
organisations can borrow against the same conditions as the participating municipalities. In 
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the case of public legal entities,16 they are only financed free of credit risk if their articles of 
association comply with the bank’s requirements, which in turn must be in line with the 
provisions of the Dutch Central Bank.17 The predefined triggers to avoid a situation of default, 
as regulated for municipalities in Article 12, are not applicable to intermunicipal 
organisations. When applying for risk-free credit, statutory provisions should stipulate that in 
the case of default, the participating municipalities are held fully accountable. If this is not the 
case, lending is assessed with credit risk. Similarly to municipalities, intermunicipal 
organisations must present a balanced budget and, after approval, they are free to borrow 
within the legal boundaries to execute their budget. In the case of budgetary shortage or 
default, the participating municipalities will contribute. 
 
This is somewhat different in the case of a private legal entity (governed by private law). 
When situations are assessed to have credit risk, the distance between the participating 
municipalities and the entity is perceived to be larger than in the case of a public legal entity. 
One of the main reasons for a municipality being involved in creating a private entity is to 
remove the assessment of financial risk. Participating municipalities do not agree beforehand 
to be fully accountable for any budgetary shortage or default. Private legal entities can borrow 
from the sector banks if public involvement is assessed as sufficient; however, they must 
comply with bank demands and borrow with credit-risk surcharges. To facilitate borrowing 
issues, an unconditional municipal guarantee might resolve problems, but municipalities are 
not eager to enter into new financial risks. Dilemmas can arise, particularly if political and 
social welfare costs are coupled with default. For example, should the construction of a school 
or a bridge be in default before completion of the project, the municipalities involved may be 
                                                 
 
16 Governed by the Common Regulations Act (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen). 
17 Art. 2.8, Regulation of Capital Requirements for Credit Risk, and its explanatory notes, annex 2B. Replaced by CRD IV in 2014. 
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forced to finish and finance the project themselves anyway. 
 
3.4.4 The annual treasury plan 
To facilitate treasury decisions, it is common practice for municipalities to draw up a treasury 
plan, which may come in many forms. The core of this plan is to delineate how the 
municipality will comply in a practical way to the financial requirements throughout the year.  
 
The loan portfolio and developments are clarified as are specifications of new loans to be 
arranged, as well as providing information concerning guarantees and municipal lending 
issues. Information related to financial reports, such as interest levels, charges and payments, 
is also included, as well as how the municipality will deal with new financial regulations and, 
in addition, a schedule of periodic meetings and the topics to be addressed. In a municipal 
environment it is important to pay attention to the calendar of resolutions by the municipal 
executive and the council and to address the multiple deadlines of policy notes to ensure the 
right procedures are followed and things are done in a timely manner. 
 
In addition to the treasury plan, municipalities are obliged to publish financial ratios 
conforming to official calculation methods, and these must be used in the budget and the 
financial statements as well. The following ratios are compulsory: equity to total assets ratio 
(solvency), net debt to budget ratio, land assets to budget ratio, and local tax burden to the 
national average ratio. These ratios are developed and implemented to help the council 








3.5 The process of municipal borrowing 
 
Municipal borrowing is prepared and executed by the treasurer or the treasury committee. In 
most cases, an annual treasury plan is submitted by the treasury to the municipal executive, 
with relevant financial developments and transactions for the coming year. After approval, the 
treasury is free to operate within this plan. This significantly facilitates operational 
procedures.  
 
The treasury is required by those responsible for the budget to provide the money in time to 
make the necessary payments. The treasury is under pressure to ensure the right amount of 
money is available at the right time, the right place and at the best price. To optimise the 
process of borrowing, a liquidity plan provides information on which to base financial 
decisions and transactions. A liquidity plan summarises the expected cash inflows and 
outflows on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis. Refinancing existing debt makes up a 
substantial share of treasury decisions. Furthermore, an analysis of the capital market can help 
sharpen treasury decisions when negotiating with the bank.  
 
In line with the municipal treasury regulations, various offers from banks are usually 
requested by the municipal treasury, at the same time in the same format, by email or by 
phone, and are then compared. Each bank’s quote will be valid for some time, depending on 
the volatility of the market and the competitiveness of the bid. This time slot can differ from a 
couple of minutes to a couple of hours and sometimes even days. 
 
Accepting an offer is done by email or phone and confirmed by the bank, whose back and mid 
offices are responsible for the registration of the transaction in the administrative system and 
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the required flow of documents. If a rebound is agreed upon, the offering bank will be given a 
second chance to improve its offer if needed. Demanding customised borrowing solutions 
makes it more difficult for municipalities to work with simple formats to compare the 
different offers of the banks, and they also provide opportunities for an additional commercial 
margin for the bank.  
 
The loan agreement comes into force when a legally effective signing of the agreement letter 
and term sheet is completed. If not explicitly agreed upon elsewhere, the disbursement of the 
loan will only be effective after the following documents have been received within 14 days: 
 
- The legally effective initialled and signed agreement, with the name and the position 
of the signatory. 
- A copy of the decision for arranging the loan by the municipal executive, or a duly 
authorised representative of the municipal executive, accompanied by the mandate 
decision. The latter might be stipulated in the municipal treasury regulations. 
A copy of a valid identity document of the signatory. 
 
In addition, all requested information must be disclosed and the general terms and agreements 
complied with. 
 
Two authorised bank employees from the bank’s client desk co-sign the agreement and check 
the authenticity of the signatures. For practical reasons, it is common practice that the official 
documents follow after the loan has been disbursed: indeed, a municipal loan may be 
disbursed on the same date as agreed upon by phone (recorded) or email. The client desk will 
note if unusual transactions are made and will perform additional checks when needed. Art. 
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203 of book 6 of the Dutch civil code enables the recollection of money in the case of non-
performance, that is, not receiving the legally effective signed agreement letter and term 
sheet. To prevent abuse, loans are only disbursed to the assigned current accounts at the bank. 
From that moment, the municipal treasury can make payments with the usual additional safety 
checks. 
 
3.6 Quantitative description of municipal borrowing 
 
In this section, we will present some key figures concerning municipal borrowing in the 
Netherlands. 
 
3.6.1 Total debt of municipalities 
Research on municipal debt levels should not focus solely on total debt. A distinction should 
be made between the varieties of debt forms. There are essential differences between long-
term debts, short-term debts, accounts payable and accrued liabilities. Accounts payable may 
total up to 5%, while accrued liabilities (including interest payable in the next year) may add 
up to 10% of total debt.  
Total municipal debt in 2014 in the Netherlands was EUR 52 billion, comprising EUR 36 
billion long-term, EUR 8.3 billion short-term, EUR 3.3 billion accounts payable and EUR 4.4 
billion accrued liabilities.18 In 2014, total municipal expenditures amounted to EUR 50.7 
billion, almost equal to total debt. 
 
The market share of BNG Bank is estimated at 70%.19 
                                                 
 
18 Own calculation based on internal data from BNG Bank and Statistics Netherlands. 
19 Annual reports of BNG Bank report high market share. Source: internal data BNG Bank. 
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3.6.2 The amortisation schemes chosen 
Amortisation schemes influence the duration of the loan, and therefore the interest that must 
be paid. Municipalities use a current account or short-term loans to bridge cash imbalances for 
up to one year.20 Short-term loans have no amortisation scheme, just a fixed interest rate and a 
final bullet payment at the end. Long-term loans are used to finance investments and to bridge 
the long-term liquidity gap with a maturity related to the liquidity need. In this case, 
standardised amortisation schemes are usually used; however, requested amortisation schemes 
are available. The following standardised schemes are available (all with a fixed interest rate): 
 
1. Long-term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (fixed or bullet). 
2. Long-term loans where amortisation and interest is paid in equal instalments (annuity). 
3. Long-term loans where the principal is paid back in equal instalments (linear). 
 
The following table indicates the relative importance of the amortisation schemes used for 
loans made by BNG Bank.  
 
Table 3.1 Average percentage of amortisation schemes used (research period n = 5464. Source: internal data 
BNG Bank) 
Amortisation  1997-2013 2009-2013 
Annuity 7.3% 3.8% 
Bullet 21.8% 36.7% 
Linear 70.8% 59.5% 
 
Here, we note a shift towards bullet loans. A possible explanation for this phenomenon could 
be a shift from project-based finance towards balance-sheet finance. In the latter case, a loan 
                                                 
 
20 According to the definition in the Finance Act, short-term loans have a contracted fixed interest period shorter than one year. 
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is not linked to an asset but to overall liquidity needs. Balance-sheet finance is considered to 
be more efficient because all available and foreseeable liquidity is taken into account. Another 
possible explanation for the shift towards bullet loans is that less liquidity is needed to finance 
amortisations during maturity. 
 
Linear loans are still the most common loan form for municipalities. Linear loans are the 
primary source due to the advantages of spreading amortisations over time and limiting 
interest risk when the amortisations have to be refinanced. Linear loans deal with uncertainty 
in liquidity plans and offer opportunities to take advantage of lower interest rates in the future. 
Annuity schemes are typically asset-related and are no longer common. 
Analysing the maturity of the loan portfolios of up to one year and beyond, we find that Dutch 
municipalities are mainly financed by long-term loans (beyond one year), while short-term 
loans, including the current account, add up to 11% (Table 3.2). As a result of this, interest 
shocks would have only a limited effect on the budgets of municipalities.  
 
Table 3.2 Average percentage of types of loans/credit used, measured according to total loan sum at year end 
(2009-2013). Source: internal data, BNG Bank. 









                                                 
 
21 Loan amount and interest rate can change during maturity. 
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Appendix: Provisions of general terms and conditions of credit 
 
General Terms and Conditions of Credit (Algemene Kredietvoorwaarden) 
As municipal borrowing is provided by sector bank lending, the General Terms and Conditions of Credit of each 
respective bank are in force. These terms and conditions cover, among other topics, definitions, the jurisdiction 
and the fundamentals of the agreement. The purpose of the general terms is to clarify how the agreement should 
be dealt with in all circumstances. They protect the bank from liability, unless serious misconduct or fraud can 
be proven. As such, they are an essential part of reducing credit risk for the bank and enhance the credit quality 
of municipalities. These terms and conditions are applicable to every bank loan made to a municipality.22 Some 
of the provisions that can be linked directly to the quality and price of credit are mentioned below. 
 
The following provisions are included in the general terms and conditions for credit agreements. 
- The bank is entitled to transfer loans to a third party. This enhances liquidity in the secondary market 
and, therefore, the price of credit.  
- To avoid small transactions with relatively high transaction costs, loan transactions have set minimums 
(i.e. cash loans a minimum of EUR 1 million, and changes to the amount are set at a minimum of EUR 
100,000). The bank may ignore this provision for commercial reasons. 
- The bank is entitled to vary the timeslot and the validity of an offer according to the market situation. 
With volatile markets, the timeslot is short. The smaller the spreads, the shorter the timeslot. This 
means requesting a long timeslot because authorisation procedures require larger spreads. 
- The calculation methods and the timing of interest and instalment payments due are covered by the 
provisions. 
- In the case of a loan with the possibility of re-pricing the interest rate during maturity, the borrower 
must present any substantially lower offer, if changing bank. In such cases, the bank may make a final 
offer. 
- Unless previously agreed upon, early repayment of the loan is not permitted. Should this occur, a fee is 
due to the bank equal to the present value of the early repayment plus all applicable costs. 
                                                 
 
22 The general terms and conditions of BNG Bank are written in Dutch and not available in English (www.bngbank.nl). For international transactions, 
other terms and conditions are applicable. 
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- A penalty is charged if payments of interest and instalments are not in line with the agreement. 
- Unless previously agreed upon, the bank does not charge any costs or fees as a result of the credit 
agreement. Any juridical costs incurred when executing the agreement are to be paid by the client. 
- As a result of ensuring all laws and regulations have been complied with, additional costs may be 
charged to the client during the agreement period. 
- The client provides all necessary information to the bank for an adequate assessment of the situation. 
- The provision ‘immediate payability or termination of the credit facility’ is common in most general 
terms and conditions. Any conditions that differ from the situation when the agreement was made, or 
that are not in line with the agreement, may be a reason for termination. Any costs in connection to this 
are to be paid by the client. 
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4 Bailout clauses and borrowing costs23 
 
The bulk of capital provided to Dutch housing corporations is explicitly guaranteed by a 
bailout clause. Using a dataset with loans provided by the largest Dutch public sector bank 
(BNG Bank), we find substantial evidence that this bailout clause has reduced interest rates by 
about 72 basis points. The annual benefits of reduced interest costs have outweighed the costs 
of default in the past (1990-2014). We also find that the interest rates for guaranteed loans are 
insensitive to the financial position of corporations. We therefore surmise that the bank relied 
on the bailout clause. Finally, the bailout clause for corporations (which guarantees individual 
loans) and the one for municipalities (which entirely protects municipalities from defaulting) 




The Dutch (semi-)public sector is well-known for its explicit bailout clauses (or guarantees). 
The unique Dutch setting is explained in more detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The 
presence of a bailout clause means that if an organisation would run into trouble, it will 
receive financial assistance from its counterparts or from the government. The idea behind 
this is to communicate to creditors that providing capital entails no risk (funds provided and 
interest payments due are guaranteed). This should reduce interest rates on loans so that more 
resources can be devoted to the public goal. A major advantage of a guarantee (in contrast to 
for example a subsidy) is that it does not have to cost society any money if it proves to be 
                                                 
 
23 This chapter is based on Veenstra, J., & van Ommeren, B.J (2017). Bailout Clauses and the Price of Credit: The Dutch Experience for Housing 
Corporations. De Economist , 165(3), 295-320. 
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In many countries, however, bailouts are explicitly ruled out by legislation. This is to prevent 
‘moral hazard’; the danger that debtors become less rigorous in controlling their finances 
knowing that they would be assisted should problems arise (Rodden, 2006). Debtors thus face 
a ‘soft budget constraint’ (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003), which is seen to encourage them 
to behave irresponsibly. Thus in the literature, the dominant view is that an explicit no-bailout 
clause must be formulated in order to emphatically state to institutions that they will not be 
rescued (Allers, 2015). In practice, however, it is difficult to credibly enforce such a clause. 
Actual bankruptcy of subnational governments or (semi-)public organisations could entail 
high welfare and political costs (Goodspeed, 2002; Plekhanov & Singh, 2006). Indeed, there 
are numerous examples of bailouts actually occurring despite the existence of a no-bailout 
clause (Heppke-Falk & Wolff, 2008; Rodden, 2006). However, in the Dutch public sector 
explicit and regulated guarantees exist for, e.g., housing corporations, health care institutions 
and municipalities. In the case of municipalities, Allers (2015) notes that the bailout clause 
has not led to excessive malpractice. Therefore, he argues, there is sufficient reason to 
challenge the traditional view that bailouts must be ruled out. It may even be the case that the 
benefits of a bailout clause (reduced interest payments) outweigh the costs (defaults on loans 
and/or increased inefficiencies). This paper attempts to measure the effect of a bailout clause 
on interest rates by focusing on loans made to (housing) corporations.  
Firstly, by comparing a set of guaranteed and unguaranteed corporation loans, we investigate 
whether the bailout clause succeeds in lowering interest rates. Secondly, we study whether 
differences in interest rates can be explained by corporation characteristics such as 
indebtedness; under a credible bailout clause all corporations should pay the same interest rate 
on similar loans, regardless of their financial position. Thirdly, we investigate whether the 
design of the bailout clause is relevant for interest payments by comparing the guarantee 
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system of corporations (which secures individual loans) with that of municipalities (whose 
entire financial position is secured).  
 
Existing literature mostly focuses on no-bailout or implicit bailout clauses (for an overview, 
see van Hecke (2012). To our knowledge, this paper is the first study investigating the effect 
of an explicit bailout clause. We exploit a unique micro-level dataset of loans made to 
housing corporations that distinguishes both guaranteed and unguaranteed loans. This enables 
us to investigate whether structural differences exist between the two groups of loans.  
As another addition to the existing literature, we provide new empirical evidence of the extent 
to which these guarantees help to lower borrowing costs. For society, the effect of the 
guarantee system on borrowing costs for housing corporations is highly relevant. If these 
borrowing costs are reduced, this will leave additional financial room for social housing. In 
addition, the guarantee system for housing corporations is compared with that for 
municipalities. The results will show whether the guarantee system for municipalities has the 
same effect on borrowing costs, thus potentially leaving additional financial room for public 
facilities. 
The rest of this paper is set up as follows. Section 4.2 describes the institutional background 
of housing corporations, paying special attention to the bailout agreements. Section 4.3 briefly 
outlines the theory on interest rate determination and provides hypotheses. In section 4.4 we 
present the research set-up and in section 4.5 the data. Section 4.6 delivers our main results. 
The robustness of our findings is tested in a sensitivity analysis presented in section 4.7 
Section 4.8 offers our conclusions. 
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4.2 Institutional Background 
4.2.1 Housing Corporations 
The social housing market in the Netherlands is dominated by housing corporations; privately 
governed institutions executing a set of public tasks. In 2014, the 363 Dutch housing 
corporations possessed a total of around 2.4 million dwellings, which equals about 30 percent 
of the total housing stock (source: Statistics Netherlands). From an international viewpoint, 
these figures are remarkably large (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007). The total value of debt in 
the sector amounted to more than 90 billion euro (source: CorpoData). Interest payments 
were approximately 4 billion euro in 2014 (an average of about 1,700 euro per dwelling).  
About half of the corporations’ external funding is obtained from BNG Bank, the largest 
public sector bank in the Netherlands. Corporations can also fund themselves through NWB 
Bank, the second largest public sector bank or, alternatively, through commercial banks. 
Public sector banks benefit from high credit ratings and therefore low funding costs. This is 
reinforced by the likelihood of government support as a result of their public policy mandate 
(Birry, Hauville, Roy, & Ashworth, 2013). In the literature, this support could be assessed as 
an implicit subsidy causing market distortions. Those who benefit from the implicit subsidy 
have a competitive advantage over those that do not (Noss & Sowerbutts, 2012). 
Until the end of the 20th century, the Dutch central government actively intervened in the 
social housing market by providing, for example, project subsidies. Over the past decades 
however, the ties between government and corporations have loosened, both financially and 
operationally. In the 1990s subsidies were eliminated. To compensate, the central government 
relieved corporations of a substantial part of their debt. The other major advantage that 
housing corporations enjoy is a system of loan guarantees. 
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4.2.2 The guarantee scheme for the social housing sector  
A credible no-bailout clause serves to make creditors aware of the risks of a loan (i.e., the 
probability of default). Higher credit risk translates into higher interest rates. As debtors aim 
for the lowest possible interest rate, they have an incentive to closely manage their financial 
positioning. In the Dutch case, where bailouts are explicitly regulated, this ‘market discipline’ 
is absent or at least distorted (Lemmen, 1999; Schuknecht, Hagen, & Wolswijk, 2009). 
However, a form of ‘rule discipline’ does exist in the Netherlands, in the form of legislation 
and policies that constrain institutions’ borrowing capacity in practice. The Guarantee Fund 
Social Housing (Waarborgfonds Sociale Woningbouw, WSW) assesses each corporation’s 
financial position in order to determine whether or not it may borrow under the guarantee of 
the bailout clause (WSW 2009). These WSW-guarantees are thus not unconditional. If the 
WSW considers creditworthiness insufficient and, if there are no visible signs of 
improvement, it may refuse the granting of guarantees. 
Dutch housing corporations access two main types of loans; guaranteed and unguaranteed. 
Only capital used for investing in the service of general economic interest (Diensten van 
Algemeen Economisch Belang, DAEB), such as building dwellings for low-income 
households, can be guaranteed. In contrast, loans financing, for example, commercial 
activities, are not guaranteed. Also, short-term loans (defined here as having a maturity of less 
than 2 years) are never guaranteed. 
The guarantee scheme consists of three levels. First, if the resources of a housing corporation 
are insufficient to resolve its own problems, ‘reorganisation subsidies’ may be provided by 
the financial supervisor, the Central Public Housing Fund (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, 
CFV).24 These subsidies are paid for by implementing a ‘one-off tax’ on other housing 
                                                 
 
24 Since July 1, 2015, the CFV has been replaced by the Authority Housing Corporations (Autoriteit woningcorporaties, Aw) and decisions 
concerning reorganisation subsidies are being made by the WSW since then. 
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At the second level, creditors can appeal to the guarantee funds of the WSW if the 
reorganisation subsidies are insufficient. The WSW has a financial reserve that can be called 
upon and if this reserve drops below a certain threshold, it can increase its resources by 
enforcing a contribution from all housing corporations. This contribution is calculated on the 
basis of outstanding guaranteed debt of each corporation. At the end of 2014, the sum total of 
WSW-guarantees was approximately 3.5 billion euro (source: Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations 2016). 
In essence, these first two levels of the guarantee scheme boil down to mutual support among 
corporations. There is a further third level, however: if necessary, the government will step in 
to provide interest-free loans to the WSW. The burden of debt thus entailed is then equally 
divided between central government and municipalities.  
De Jong (2013) concludes that the complexity of this scheme provides weak incentives for 
creditors to monitor corporations, and will lead to excessive risk for the sector as a whole. 
Indeed, a few (large) corporations did get into severe financial distress in the past decades. 
However, despite these incidents, until now only the first level of the guarantee scheme has 
ever been accessed. Thus, so far, the bailout clause is proving to be sustainable. From 31 
December, 1990 until 2014, just 21 corporations received reorganisation subsidies to a total of 
about 1.5 billion euro (in euros of 2014) (source: CFV 2015, own calculations). Therefore, if 
interest savings are large enough, it is not unimaginable that the benefits of the bailout clause 
have outweighed the costs. 
 
4.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Interest rate setting 
Suppose a party (e.g., a housing corporation) borrows from a bank. If the bank is certain that 
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the loan will be recovered, it will be satisfied with the risk-free interest rate. Suppose now, 
that the creditor faces a positive probability ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ that debtor j will default on the loan, where 
௝ܺ is a vector of variables affecting this probability. Assuming risk-neutrality, the bank is only 
willing to make the loan if the expected return ሺܴ௜ǡ௝௘௫௣ሻ at least equals the risk-free return ሺܴ௙ሻ, 
or: ൫୨൯ 
 ܴ௜ǡ௝௘௫௣ ൌ ቀͳ െ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ቁ ܴ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߬௜ǡ௝ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ܴ௜ǡ௝ െ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ܿ ൒ ܴ௙ (1) 
݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ௝ܰǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܬ 
where ܴ௜ǡ௝ is the rate of return agreed upon by the creditor and debtor ݆ ሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܬሻ on loan 
݅ ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ௝ܰሻ. Note that ܴ௜ǡ௝ ൌ ͳ ൅ ݎ௜ǡ௝, where ݎ௜ǡ௝ is the interest rate of the loan. Further, 
߬௜ǡ௝ is the proportion of the return that the creditor recovers in case of default, following 
Heppke-Falk & Wolff (2008). We extend Heppke-Falk & Wolff’s (2008) model by including 
a variable ܿ that denotes the extra costs that would not be recovered in case of default, such as 
legal costs or delays in payment (Schultz & Wolff, 2009).25  
Solving (1) for ܴ௜ǡ௝ yields: 
 ܴ௜ǡ௝ ൒
ܴ௙ ൅ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ܿ
ͳ െ ൫ͳ െ ߬௜ǡ௝൯ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯
 (2) 
It can be seen from Equation (2) that the required rate of return is increasing in ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ and ܿ, 
and decreasing in ߬௜ǡ௝.  
Two benchmark scenarios emerge from Equation (2) resembling the housing corporations’ 
situation. If there is no bailout clause ሺ߬௜ǡ௝ ൌ Ͳሻ, as would be the case for unguaranteed 
                                                 
 
25 To be more complete, the total extra costs may be both fixed (legal costs) and/or dependent on the loan sum (payment delays). Total extra 
costs would then be ܥ ൌ ܿ כ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏݑ݉ ൅ ܥҧ. To get the return on the initial investment, this term should be divided by the loan sum 
ሺܥ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏݑ݉Τ ൌ ܿ ൅ ܥҧ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏݑ݉ሻΤ . For simplicity, section 3.1 assumes that fixed costs ሺܥҧሻ are not relevant so that only ܿ appears in 
Equation (1). Still, in the empirical part, the loan sum is included in the regressions. 
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corporation loans, the minimally required return obtains its maximum value of:  
 ܴ௜ǡ௝ ൒
ܴ௙ ൅ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ܿ
ͳ െ ܲሺ ௝ܺሻ  (3a) 
On the other hand, if there is an explicit bailout clause that guarantees the loan (߬௜ǡ௝ ൌ ͳ), the 
creditor may only require a premium above the risk-free rate in order to account for the non-
recoverable costs, that is: 
 ܴ௜ǡ௝ ൒ ܴ௙ ൅ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ൯ܿ (3b) 
Finally, note the inequality sign in the equations. If we assume perfect competition, the actual 
return rate agreed upon (ܴ௜ǡ௝ሻ equals the required rate of return, because if the creditor 
demanded a higher rate, the corporation would borrow from another bank. However, if the 
creditor has market power, it may obtain an extra premium (i.e., a commercial margin), which 
may depend on e.g., bargaining skills of both parties and the availability of alternative 
financing options.  
 
In short, a positive interest spread (i.e., ܴ௜ǡ௝ െ ܴ௙ ൐ Ͳ) may occur because: (1) the loan is not 
guaranteed and there is a positive probability of default; (2) non-recoverable costs are 
relevant; or (3) the creditor succeeds in obtaining a commercial margin. 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
As noted, our dataset allows us to distinguish between guaranteed and unguaranteed (mostly 
short-term) corporation loans. This offers us the unique opportunity to see what a bailout 
clause does to interest spreads. 
 
According to Equation (3), interest spreads are lower for guaranteed loans than for 
unguaranteed loans. Hypothesis 1 tests whether BNG Bank does indeed distinguish between 
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the two types. Several authors have posited educated guesses about the effect of the bailout 
clause on interest rates: see Van der Schaar (2006); Finance Ideas (2011); Hendriks (2013). 
Expected interest advantages lie between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points (or 50 to 150 basis 
points). However, firm empirical evidence is lacking. 
Hypothesis 1.  
Unguaranteed loans have higher interest spreads than guaranteed loans. 
For unguaranteed loans, corporation characteristics ൫ ௝ܺ൯ are presumed to be relevant 
determinants of the interest spread (see Equation 3a). For guaranteed loans, according to 
Equation (3b), these characteristics are only relevant if extra non-recoverable costs ሺܿሻ matter. 
If these costs are negligible, the interest spread may become insensitive to the risk profile of 
the corporation. Hypothesis 2 tests whether the relationship between corporation 
characteristics and interest spreads is different for guaranteed and unguaranteed loans. 
Hypothesis 2.  
Housing corporation characteristics do not influence the interest spread of 
guaranteed loans.  
Van Hecke et al. (2012) provide an extensive overview of the literature on (the determinants 
of) interest spreads as far as local governments are concerned. The bulk of that literature 
concludes that higher debt leads to higher interest rates: see for example Booth et al. (2007); 
(Landon & Smith, 2007); Heppke-Falk & Wolff (2008). Some of the literature holds that local 
government budget balance is also important (Booth, Georgopoulos, & Hejazi, 2007; 
Schuknecht, Hagen, & Wolswijk, 2009).  
Most studies focus on countries where no (explicit) bailout clause exists. However, Heppke-
Falk & Wolff (2008) focus on the German case in which a bailout of a region (Land) might 
well occur. The probability of a bailout could actually be predicted by a variable that the 
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German law courts use in their assessments of bailouts. It appears that, indeed, the expectation 
of bailout payments lowers the interest rate. This suggests that investors do, in effect, take 
into account the possibility of a potential bailout.  
Nevertheless, Heppke-Falk & Wolff (2008) find that as fiscal variables do have a significant 
influence on interest spreads, investors do not see regional governments as completely risk-
free. This finding is not replicated by Schulz & Wolff (2009), however, who find that the 
effect of the debt level is only weakly significant.  
Feld et al. (2013) focus on the case of Swiss cantons where there was a structural break in 
investors’ expectations of potential bailout. In July 2003, the Swiss Federal Court officially 
decided that Valais canton was not obliged to bail out the municipality of Leukerbad after it 
came into financial trouble. Previous to this decision, Swiss law had indicated that although 
cantons did not have bailout obligations, they could still deviate from this ruling. This 
possibility apparently led to a widespread belief among investors that municipalities would be 
bailed out, if and when necessary. Indeed, Feld et al. (2013) find that, cantons, being relieved 
from any expected bailout obligations, have seen a decline in bond yields by 25 basis points 
since the 2003 judgment.  
The Swiss case shows certain similarities with the situation of Dutch housing corporations, as 
both deal with two different bailout clauses. However, in the Swiss case, a distinction is made 
between a non-credible and a credible no-bailout clause, whereas the Dutch situation features 
an explicit bailout clause and an implicit no-bailout clause. Also, there was a cut-off between 
the two Swiss schemes in 2003, whereas in the case of Dutch corporations, both schemes 
coexist over the years.  
In addition to financial characteristics, the scale of organisations can also be influential. Under 
a no-bailout clause very large organisations may be deemed ‘too big to fail’ meaning that for 
these organisations, the no-bailout clause would not be credible (Heppke-Falk & Wolff, 
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2008). Also, one may assume that large institutions have more financial expertise and so they 
would bargain more effectively. 
Finally, according to Equation (3b), even in the presence of a bailout clause, interest rates 
may exceed risk-free rates due to non-recoverable costs. If these costs are relevant, even 
guaranteed loans would not be considered completely risk-free. Hypothesis 3 tests whether 
non-recoverable costs are of relevance, by comparing the interest spreads of housing 
corporation loans with those of municipality loans. The bailout clause for municipalities 
entirely protects them from defaulting, whereas for corporations, only individual loans are 
guaranteed. Thus, for municipalities the creditor is not involved in the process of recovering a 
loan in case of default and, therefore, there is no need to worry about non-recoverable costs. 
For housing corporations, on the other hand, the creditor is directly involved in the execution 
of the clause and, therefore, it is likely that c is non-zero for corporations. Therefore, housing 
corporations may be charged higher interest rates than municipalities. 
Hypothesis 3. 
The interest spreads on guaranteed housing corporation loans exceed the interest 
spreads on municipality loans.  
 
4.4  Research Set-up 
 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate the following regression model: 
 ݎ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௦௣௥௘௔ௗ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ߬௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ߛ ௝ܺǡ௧ ൅ ߜܮ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ (4a) 
where ݎ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௦௣௥௘௔ௗ is the interest spread between a corporation loan and its risk-free reference rate. 
Thus: 
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 ݎ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௦௣௥௘௔ௗ ൌ ݎ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௖ െ ݎ௜ǡ௧௙  (4b) 
 
For each observation, a reference rate is used that has the same: (1) amortisation scheme; (2) 
contracting date; and (3) maturity. This way, we control for factors influencing the general 
interest rates in the economy, such as (expected) inflation, as well as structural differences in 
interest as a result of differences in amortisation or maturity. Opting for a spread frees us from 
the problem of explicitly controlling for these factors (Küttel & Kugler, 2002). Note that we 
construct an interest spread in absolute, rather than relative terms. This is done because BNG 
Bank maintains that credit assessments lead to an additional spread in percentage points for 
risky loans, regardless of whether the risk-free interest rates in the economy are high or low.26 
In our sensitivity analysis (section 4.7), we use a relative spread as well. 
 
Further, ߬௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is a bailout indicator, taking the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed (i.e., the loan 
belongs to the treatment group) and 0 if not (the control group), ௝ܺǡ௧ is a column-vector with 
corporation specific characteristics, ܮ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ denotes a column-vector with loan characteristics, ߠ௧ 
is a year dummy, ߤ௝ is a corporation specific (fixed) effect and ߝ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the error term. ݅ is the 
loan subscript ൫݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ௝ܰ൯, ݆ the corporation subscript ሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ܬሻ and ݐ the time 
subscript. 
Note that the nature of our data may frustrate the estimation of the effect of a treatment (i.e., a 
bailout) since the treatment and control groups are dissimilar. Indeed, all short-term loans 
(with a maturity less than 2 years) are unguaranteed, whereas nearly all long-term loans are 
guaranteed. This may make identification problematic. That is, the effect of a bailout cannot 
be isolated completely, since the bailout indicator correlates with loan type (see section 4.5.1) 
                                                 
 
26 Source: interview with the Chair of the Credit Committee of BNG Bank prof. dr. J.J.A. Leenaars 2002-2015. 
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and maturity. If loan type or maturity is a relevant determinant of interest spreads, it is hard to 
isolate the effect of the bailout. Thus, the question is: to what extent is the interest spread 
influenced by the term structure and to what extent by the bailout clause? To deal with this, 
we first of all note that in principle, loan type and maturity should have no effect on interest 
spreads since our reference rates take these factors into account (see section 4.5.2).  
For completeness however, we will investigate the term structure of the interest spreads by 
means of regression discontinuity design (Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960; Lee & 
Lemieuxa, 2010). The idea behind this is that the relationship between maturity and interest 
spread has a discontinuity at a maturity of 2 years (because beyond this threshold, we deal 
with guaranteed loans). That is, at a maturity of 2 years or longer, we expect a sharp fall in 
interest spreads. 
Additionally, note that there are also 3 unguaranteed bullet loans (11 when including inter- 
and extrapolation; see section 4.7). Although this is a small number, for these loans, the effect 
of the bailout can be isolated.  
Note also that we deal with clustered data, i.e., the data on individual loans is regressed on 
௝ܺǡ௧, which are variables measured at a higher (housing corporation) level (Moulton, 1990). 
We thus have ܬ clusters with ௝ܰ observations. This could be a reason to cluster the standard 
errors at the level of housing corporations. However, because the clusters are unbalanced, this 
may lead to a downward bias in cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993; Nichols & 
Schaffer, 2007, September). We use clustered standard errors in our main results and non-
clustered errors in the sensitivity analysis (see section 4.7). 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 3, we estimate: 
 ݎ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௦௣௥௘௔ௗ ൌ α ൅ ߜܮ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ߮ܥ݋ݎ݌݋ݎܽݐ݅݋݊݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ߠݐ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ (5) 
where ݎ௦௣௥௘௔ௗ is defined as in Equation (4b), with the only difference that we do not only 
consider housing corporation loans ሺݎ௖ሻ but municipality loans ሺݎ௠ሻ as well. According to 
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Hypothesis 3, we expect ߮ ൐ Ͳ. 
 
4.5 Data 
4.5.1 Data sources 
We have obtained micro-data on several financial products that BNG Bank provided to 
housing corporations between 1997 and 2013. We use BNG Bank data and not market rates 
because we are interested in the interest rates that they actually pay. This data is not publicly 
available. To compare equivalent loans, we use the amortisation scheme and maturity and not 
the duration of the loan.  This is because our reference rates are based on amortisation scheme 
and maturity and not on duration. We focus on four categories of products with a fixed 
interest rate and an amortisation scheme in line with available reference interest rates: 
1. Short-term loans (maturity less than 2 years), where the principal is paid back at 
maturity. 
2. Long-term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (fixed or bullet). 
3. Long-term loans where amortisation and interest is paid in equal instalments (annuity). 
4. Long-term loans where the principal is paid back in equal instalments (linear). 
These loan categories comprise 3,440 loans (6,835 when including inter- and extrapolation) 
and encompass 87 percent of the total loan sum of housing corporations borrowed from BNG 
Bank over our research period. Accurate reference rates are not currently available for other 
loan types. As noted, nearly all long-term loans (about 99.5 percent) are guaranteed. Short-
term loans on the other hand are, by definition, unguaranteed. In principle, the dataset 
comprises loans from 1997 until 2013, but for short-term loans there are no entries previous to 
2008 as BNG Bank’s internal system only maintains expired entries for limited periods. Also, 
corporation specific variables are available for 2001-2012 (annual data), obtained through 
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CorpoData; the database of the CFV. This means that for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we cannot use 
all loans in the dataset. Finally, we have a similar data set with 4,207 municipality loans 
(5,514 when including inter- and extrapolation).27  
 
4.5.2 Reference interest rates 
We have linked every housing corporation loan to a reference interest rate given by BNG 
Bank. Before the start of every business day, the bank builds a ‘pricing yield curve’ by first 
connecting the funding interest rates of different maturities, and then adding surcharges for 
profit and costs (which may depend on loan sum and maturity), a liquidity premium if 
applicable, and a surcharge for cost of capital (‘usage of balance sheet’).28 The lending yields 
represent ‘norm prices’ for risk-free lending which we use as our reference rates. The risk-free 
reference rates are published by BNG Bank on a daily basis to provide an indication to 
debtors about actual interest rate levels.29  
However, for very short-term borrowing (maturity up to one month), the published reference 
rates are not meant for actual lending but fixed at a much higher level to discourage debtors to 
make use of these loans. Very short-term borrowing is labour intensive and hardly profitable, 
so BNG Bank prefers that clients choose for a current account credit (which works 
automatically). In this case, actual lending is done at the Euribor level rather than at the 
published rate.30 Therefore, we use the Euribor rate as a reference for very short-term loans. 
In our sensitivity analysis (section 4.7), we repeat the analysis while removing these loans. 
Reference rates are available on a daily basis but not for all maturities. More specifically, we 
                                                 
 
27 Note that we exclude short-term municipality loans, since it does not make sense to compare these with short-term corporation loans, since 
the latter are unguaranteed. 
28 The BNG reference rates comprise all relevant components, including liquidity premiums if applicable. These liquidity premiums are not 
applicable to short-term loans, because the money market didn't ask for.  
29 Note that these rates are only available for clients of BNG Bank.  
30 Source: head of the Treasury department/client desk of BNG Bank, R, Boltong 1996-present. 
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have reference rates for short-term loans with 1,2,3,6 and 12-month maturity, for bullet loans 
with 5 and 10-year maturity, for annuity loans with 10, 15, 20 and 25-year maturity and for 
linear loans with 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25-year maturity. For other maturities, (linear) inter- and 
extrapolation could be used to obtain references. Because we have no reason to believe that 
the true yield curve is linear, this may lead to imprecise estimates.31 Therefore, in our main 
results we have excluded inter- and extrapolation. In the sensitivity analysis, we have included 
these observations (see section 4.7).  
Note that reference rates cannot precisely control for all loan characteristics, especially (1) the 
difference between the contracting and starting date of a loan and (2) the loan sum. Therefore, 
these characteristics are included in the regression. For completeness, we also include the 
maturity of the loan.32  
The reference rates are all based on relatively small loans (with loan sums up to 2.5 million 
euros). Because banking costs of a loan agreement are fixed to a large extent, a higher 
premium is demanded for small loans to cover costs. Therefore, the reference rates are 
relatively high and may therefore be considered to be upper estimates.33  
 
4.5.3 Independent variables 
A brief description of the independent variables (ܺ௜ǡ௝ǡ ܮ௜ǡ௝ and ߬௜ǡ௝) is given below. 
- Variables at housing corporation level (measured per dwelling): 
o Company value is the net present value of future revenues and costs, estimated 
by the corporations themselves.  
                                                 
 
31 For example, if the true yield curve is concave, this would mean that we underestimate reference rates. 
32 Some loans have a fixed interest period that is shorter than the total maturity of the loan. In this case, the reference rate is based on this 
fixed interest period, since after that period, the interest rate may change. In the regressions however, we include the total maturity of the 
loan as a potential explanatory variable. Replacing this by the interest fixed period does not change results (details not shown). 
33 BNG Bank does this to create a margin of safety in case interest rates would increase during the day. Source: interview with the manager 
of the client desk of BNG Bank, R Boltong 1996-present. 
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o Long-term debt gives the size of long-term debt.  
o Equity is a refined measure of equity which takes into account future prospects 
of the corporation (CFV 2012). Equity is important for corporations as the 
financial supervisor uses this figure to judge corporation performance. 
o Expected equity in t+5 gives the level of equity that the corporation expects to 
have in 5 years from the current year.  
o Net cash flow gives the net cash flows resulting from operational activities. 
o The number of dwellings is an indicator of the scale level. 
- Variables at individual loan level: 
o Rating BNG measures the rating score that BNG Bank assigns to the riskiness 
of the loan. For unguaranteed loans, BNG Bank itself monitors not only the 
riskiness of the corporation, but also that of the specific project being financed. 
This variable may therefore provide additional information on top of 
corporation characteristics. Note that this variable is only available for 
unguaranteed loans. 
o Maturity is the number of years in which the loan is due. 
o Loan sum is the amount of money borrowed (the principle).  
o Delay indicates the difference (in days) between the contracting and starting 
day (money transfer) of the loan arrangement. As the interest rate of immediate 
borrowing is higher than the return on a deposit for the delay period, this loss 
of interest is covered by an additional spread on the borrowing rate.  
o Guaranteed is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the loan is unguaranteed and 1 
if the loan is guaranteed.  
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics and correlations concerning the interest spreads and the 
independent variables.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 N  
(excl. inter- and 
extrapolation) 
N  





Corporations       
   Interest spread (all loans) 3,434 6,835 0.21 0.30 -1.61 3.92 
   Interest spread (guaranteed loans) 2,102 5,489 0.07 0.19 -1.61 1.55 
   Interest spread (unguaranteed loans) 1,332 1,346 0.44 0.30 -0.24 3.92 
   Company value per dwelling (in 1,000 euros) 2,791 5,587 42.16 13.39 5.85 144.49 
   Long-term debt per dwelling (in 1,000 euros) 2,791 5,587 32.58 17.45 5.21 179.42 
   Equity per dwelling (at time t) (in 1,000 euros) 2,791 5,587 10.76 6.46 -54.14 88.88 
   Expected equity per dwelling (at time t+5) per    
   dwelling (in 1,000 euros) 
2,791 5,587 
11.04 6.35 -15.57 72.05 
   Net cash flow per dwelling (in 1,000 euros) 2,791 5,587 0.91 0.99 -4.62 18.19 
   Dwellings 2,791 5,587 16,525 17,657 91 81,376 
   Loan sum (in 1,000 euros) 2,791 5,587 9,434 13,174 39 150,000 
   Rating BNG (only relevant for unguaranteed    
   loans) 
1,260 1,260 8 2 6 19 
   Delay (days) 2,791 5,587 137 220 0 2,378 
   Maturity (years) 2,791 5,587 13 11 0 50 
   Guaranteed (dummy) 2,791 5,587 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Municipalities       
   Interest spread (all loans) 4,207 5,514 0.00 0.20 -0.54 1.84 
   Loan sum (in 1,000 euros) 4,207 5,514 5,654 7,121 6.6 130,000 
   Delay (days) 4,207 5,514 70 223 0 2,193 
   Maturity (years) 4,207 5,514 16 7 4.5 50 
The units of observation are individual loans. 
Calculations are based upon the data exclusive of inter-  
and extrapolated loans. 
 
 
Amounts in 1000 euros 
 
 
4.5.4 Linking housing corporation data with loan data 
Housing corporation specific variables are given on a yearly basis – they reveal the situation 
of the corporation at the end of a year. Data on corporation loans give information on the date 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Interest Spread 1
(2) Company Value per dwelling 0,0335 1
(3) Long-term debt per dwelling 0,0682 0,8392 1
(4) Equity per dwelling (at time t) 0,1202 0,2401 0,234 1
(5) Expected Equity per dwelling (at time t+5) 0,1428 0,2438 0,302 0,7467 1
(6) Net cash flow per dwelling -0,0423 0,1022 -0,0285 0,1883 0,156 1
(7) Dwellings 0,0958 0,0808 0,1656 0,031 0,1296 -0,0583 1
(8) Loan sum (in 1000 euros) 0,1345 0,0422 0,143 0,0637 0,1073 -0,169 0,4099 1
(9) Rating BNG (unguaranteed loans) 0,2518 0,1048 0,2359 0,0838 0,2241 -0,1881 0,5552 0,5704 1
(10) Delay (days) 0,1669 -0,043 -0,0835 -0,0208 -0,0763 0,0816 -0,2228 -0,1545 -0,3186 1
(11) Maturity (years) -0,0164 -0,0277 -0,0771 -0,0019 -0,0745 0,0762 -0,334 -0,2708 -0,5796 0,3562 1
(12) Gauranteed (dummy) -0,2528 -0,1258 -0,2255 -0,1211 -0,231 0,1424 -0,5768 -0,5489 -0,9743 0,3269 0,5952 1
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of the loans. The question of how to combine yearly and daily data is somewhat arbitrary.  
According to BNG Bank, several sources are used to obtain the most recent information about 
the housing corporation.34 For our main results, we therefore assume that the bank has the 
most up-to-date information. To check for robustness, we have repeated our analysis under 
the assumption that it takes a year to obtain this data, which would be the case should the 
bank rely solely on annual reports (see the sensitivity analysis, section 4.7). Thus, we describe 
two scenarios: 
x In the standard scenario, we link all loans in the first half of year t to corporation 
characteristics in year t-1. Loans in the second half of year t are linked to year t itself.  
x In the lagged scenario, we link all loans in the first half of year t to corporation 
characteristics in year t-2. Loans in the second half of year t are linked to year t-1. 
 
4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Hypothesis 1 
Table 2 presents the estimated results of Equation (4). Regression (1) gives the results for all 
loans, and Regressions (2)-(6) give the results per loan type. 
Regression (1) shows that the coefficient on guaranteed is negative and highly significant 
which confirms Hypothesis 1. The coefficient is -0.7232, which means that the bailout clause 
reduces the interest spread by around 72 basis points. 
Note that in Regression (1), we have not included dummy variables for loan type (i.e., type of 
amortisation). This is because the variable ‘short-term loan’ suffers from multicollinearity 
with the variable guaranteed. Indeed, as noted, most unguaranteed loans are short-term loans. 
Therefore, we cannot completely isolate the effect of the bailout clause. It could be argued 
                                                 
 
34 Source: interview with the specialist for the social housing sector of BNG Bank, R Goorden 2008-present. 
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that the difference in spreads between guaranteed and unguaranteed loans is (partly) due to 
the difference in loan type. 
Table 2. Regression results of interest spreads. 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value -0.0001 0.0026* -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0459*** 0.0009 
 (-0.0474) (1.7168) (-0.7719) (-0.0223) (-6.3750) (0.2053) 
   Long-term debt 0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0015 0.0181** 0.0028 
 (0.3492) (-1.0589) (-0.5862) (-0.6171) (2.7593) (0.5406) 
   Equity 0.0048 0.0002 0.0032 -0.0025 0.0584*** 0.0102** 
 (1.4273) (0.0595) (0.9037) (-0.2853) (11.1315) (2.0244) 
   Equity t+5 -0.0031 0.0021 0.0018 0.0050 -0.0418*** -0.0064* 
 (-1.3635) (1.1604) (1.1661) (0.8045) (-3.5570) (-1.7412) 
   Net cash flow -0.0083 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0573 0.0044 
 (-1.0340) (0.0777) (0.0465) (0.0186) (0.8098) (0.3926) 
   Dwellings -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0050 0.0282*** -0.0024 
 (-0.5253) (0.0920) (-0.1738) (0.1415) (3.9619) (-0.6665) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -0.7232*** -0.8617***    -0.8164*** 
 (-7.9222) (-6.9036)    (-7.4092) 
   Rating BNG     0.1391**  
     (2.1057)  
   Loan sum -0.0050** -0.0067** -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0036 -0.0032 
 (-2.3263) (-2.2794) (-0.3902) (-1.5816) (-1.3735) (-1.5551) 
   Loan sum2 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (1.4833) (1.5628) (-0.5871) (1.5126) (1.3049) (0.9851) 
   Delay (*1000) 1.0980*** 1.2394*** 0.8697*** 1.0186*** -29.6036*** 1.2957*** 
 (11.1424) (11.2800) (9.3812) (5.1099) (-3.0343) (9.1981) 
   Delay (*1000)2 -0.5757*** -0.7394*** -0.2114** -0.4923** 1,306.2816* -0.7679*** 
 (-4.1485) (-4.2723) (-2.1517) (-2.2160) (1.8217) (-4.6726) 
   Maturity -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0108*** -0.0055 -1.5878 -0.0076 
 (-0.7060) (-0.2129) (-3.5507) (-1.0867) (-1.3484) (-1.3483) 
   Maturity2 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0001 3.6256** 0.0002 
 (0.7340) (-0.0679) (4.1552) (0.6506) (2.2082) (1.2101) 
Constant 0.6965*** 0.5400** -0.2155 -0.2226 1.1644*** 0.5647** 
 (4.2400) (2.0647) (-0.7908) (-0.0916) (3.3126) (2.2198) 
       
Observations 2,791 810 486 209 1,260 2,096 
R-squared 0.6536 0.7735 0.8860 0.8926 0.6951 0.6752 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG is not available for all 
unguaranteed loans.  
 
However, when including loan type dummies in Regression (1), we find no significant 
difference in interest spread between different long-term loan types (i.e., the coefficients of 
dummies for bullet, annuity and linear loans are insignificant; details not shown). Thus the 
loan type does not seem to be influential. 
Additionally, note that there are also 3 unguaranteed bullet loans (11 when including inter- 
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and extrapolation; see section 4.7). Regression (2), dealing with bullet loans only, indicates 
that the interest spread is about 86 basis points higher for unguaranteed loans.  
One may also argue that bullet loans and short-term loans are essentially the same (as for both 
loan types the principal is paid back at maturity). The only difference is in fact the difference 
in maturity. Regression (6) shows the results for bullet and short-term loans together. The 
bailout clause remains significant, and the coefficient is increased to -0.8164. 
However, these regressions still fail to fully separate the effect of maturity on the interest 
spread (i.e. the term structure of the interest spread) from the effect of a bailout clause.35 
Although in principle, there would be no reason to expect the interest spread to change with 
maturity (see section 4.4), we need to ascertain this empirically. Figure 1 plots interest spreads 
against maturity and provides two separate linear regression lines (one for short-term loans 
and one for long-term loans).36 The figure only includes short-term and (long-term) bullet 
loans. Cleary, interest spreads are higher for short-term (and thus unguaranteed) loans. Most 
importantly however, there appears to be no relationship between maturity and interest 


















                                                 
 
35 Although maturity and maturity2 are included in the regressions, this does not fully reveal the term structure of interest spreads. 
36 Note that on the horizontal axis of the figure, total maturity is given. In practice however, interest rates are linked to the fixed interest 
period, which may be shorter than the total maturity of the loan (see also footnote 9). Repeating the analysis for the fixed interest period 
instead of the total maturity leads to the same conclusions however (results not shown).  
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Figure 1. Scatter plot and regression lines of interest spreads against maturity. 
 
 
We have used the jitter option in Stata to show the mass of the data. 
 
To deal with this issue more formally, we estimate a regression where we explain the interest 
spread by maturity and several polynomials of maturity. When including only long-term 
bullet loans (Regression 1 in Table 3), maturity does not have a significant impact. In 
Regression (2) we combine both short-term and (long-term) bullet loans, and add a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if maturity is longer than 2 years. The idea is that the relationship 
between maturity and interest spread should show a discontinuity at a maturity of 2 years.37 
According to Regression (2) of Table 3, maturity has a (mostly weak) significant impact on 
the interest spread, but so does the dummy. So, indeed, there appears to be a structural break. 
To get an idea of a potential term structure on interest rates, Figure 2 plots the predicted 
interest spreads (based upon the regression coefficients in Table 3) against maturity. The line 
in Figure 2a is based on Regression (1) (thus excluding short-term loans), the line in Figure 2b 
is based on Regression (2) (including short-term loans). According to Figure 2a, there is 
hardly any relationship between interest spreads and maturity. According to Figure 2b, there 
is a sharp downfall in spreads after a maturity of 2 years. If maturity increases further, the 
                                                 
 
37 This approach could be classified as a regression discontinuity design (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960; Lee and Lemieux 2010).  
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term structure is almost flat. Only at very high levels of maturity the line fluctuates more, 
which is partly due to the observations at the bottom right.38 
Table 3. Regression results of interest spreads against maturity. 
 (1) (2) 
 Bullet loans (long-term) Short-term and (long-term) bullet loans 
   
Maturity 0.0353 0.2191 
 (0.2323) (1.5702) 
Maturity2 -0.0075 -0.0290* 
 (-0.4024) (-1.7077) 
Maturity3 0.0005 0.0016* 
 (0.5577) (1.8451) 
Maturity4 -0.00001 -0.00004* 
 (-0.6831) (-1.9509) 
Maturity5  1.28e-07 2.99e-07** 
 (0.7761) (2.0218) 
Dummy maturity>2 years  -0.9124** 
  (-2.3903) 
Constant 0.0431 0.4314*** 
 (0.1051) (16.0886) 
   
Observations 978 2,304 
R-squared 0.0314 0.3579 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 






















                                                 
 
38 These might be outliers due to administrative mistakes, or because of specific circumstances concerning the loan or the borrowing 
corporation. The dataset does not allow us to find this out. 
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Figure 2a and 2b. Estimated term structure of interest spreads.
 
Figure 2a: line based on Regression (1) in Table 3 
Figure 2b: line based on Regression (2) in Table 3 
We have used the jitter option in Stata to show the mass of the data. 
 
All in all, although the dataset does not allow for a perfect identification strategy, we conclude 
that we find substantial evidence that the guarantee scheme succeeds in lowering interest 
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rates. Also, the no-bailout clause for unguaranteed loans appears to be credible.  
To give an indication of the impact of the bailout clause, note that the total level of guaranteed 
corporation debt was 85.1 billion euro in 2014 (source: WSW 2015). According to Regression 
(1) in Table 2, without the bailout clause corporations would have to pay an additional 0.72 
percent interest over this debt. This implies that the estimated benefits to society of the bailout 
would be around 610 million euro (85.1 billion*0.72%) per year in reduced interest 
payments.39 Using the coefficient of Regression (6), the savings would be around 700 million 
euro (85.1 bln*0.82%). 
The direct costs of the bailout clause could be shown in the total loan sum on which 
corporations defaulted. Although we do not have this information directly, we do know the 
amount of reorganisation subsidies provided to corporations in order to restore their financial 
position. As noted in section 4.2.2, from 31 December, 1990 until 2014, the CFV provided 1.5 
billion euro in reorganisation subsidies (in 2014 euros). Note that there may also be secondary 
costs involved if, for example, the bailout clause led to operational inefficiency. It is not 
possible to measure this, however, as there are no corporations that do not operate under the 
bailout clause. But we do know that these costs would have to be substantial in order to 
outweigh the benefits of the bailout clause. Indeed, if we compare the estimate of yearly 
benefits (610 million euro) with the direct costs of about 63 million euro (1.5 billion/24 
years), the indirect costs of the bailout clause would have to amount to nearly 550 million 
euro per year for the bailout clause to be considered undesirable.40 
                                                 
 
39 Note that these are gains to society. Indeed, the bank would be indifferent between making a risk-free loan at the risk-free rate and a risky 
loan at a higher rate. Corporations would of course prefer the former. Therefore, the reduction in interest payments is a pure gain to the 
social housing sector, and because corporations have the obligation to use all of their resources for social housing, these are gains to 
society. 
40 Note that while the bailout clause also leads to monitoring costs for (the CFV and) the WSW, at the same time it relieves BNG Bank from 
monitoring. Although it is uncertain who would have lower monitoring costs, we presume that the difference between the two is not large 
enough to effect the desirability of the bailout clause. 
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4.6.2 Hypothesis 2 
According to Regressions (2)-(4) in Table 2, corporation characteristics have no influence on 
the interest spreads for guaranteed loans. This is in line with Hypothesis 2; BNG Bank does 
not appear to monitor corporations when providing guaranteed loans. One might note, 
however, that these regressions may suffer from overestimated standard errors due to 
multicollinearity among regressors. Indeed, the regressors all measure the financial position of 
corporations in some way. However, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) presented in Table 
3 a. lie well below 10 (except Maturity and squared Maturity), so multicollinearity does not 
seem troublesome.  
Table 3 a. Variation inflation factors. 
 
 
Also, removing variables (and for example keeping only long-term debt in the regression) 
does not alter our conclusions (results not shown). Additionally, one may note that the 
variation among corporations could be captured by the corporation dummies (fixed effects). 
However, removing the corporation dummies does not render the corporation characteristics 
significant.  
Regression (5) shows that, in contrast to guaranteed loans, housing corporation characteristics 
are highly relevant for short-term (and thus unguaranteed) loans: higher company value, lower 
Variable VIF
Company Value per dwelling (in 1000 euros) 3,73
Long-term debt per dwelling (in 1000 euros) 3,9
Equity per dwelling (at time t) (in 1000 euros) 2,43
Expected Equity per dwelling (at time t+5) (in 1000 euros) 2,54
Net cash flow per dwelling (in 1000 euros) 1,15
Dwellings 1,57
Loan sum (in 1000 euros) 9











long-term debt and higher expected equity all lead to a reduction of interest spreads. This is 
also in line with Hypothesis 2. The main exception, however, is the significant positive effect 
of equity on the interest spread. This appears to be counterintuitive, as higher equity implies a 
more favourable financial position (CFV (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting), 2012), which in 
turn should decrease rather than increase interest rates. One may argue that corporations with 
high equity become lax in their search for low funding costs because of their favourable 
prospects.41 We note however that the results from Regression (5) are not robust among all 
specifications. For example, the coefficient on equity becomes insignificant once all other 
corporation characteristics are excluded. Also, the other variables lose significance in some 
cases (results not shown). This means that although it is likely that monitoring is present, the 
evidence is not fully robust. 
Another confirmation of Hypothesis 2 is the fact that the risk rating BNG Bank allocates to 
each unguaranteed loan positively influences the interest spread.  
Finally, it appears that the scale of the housing corporation (i.e., the number of dwellings) is 
only relevant for short-term (unguaranteed) loans. If the number of dwellings increases, the 
interest spread increases as well. This is rather surprising as we would have expected a 
negative relationship (see section 4.3.2). It could be that for larger housing corporations, the 
stakes are higher, so that monitoring is conducted more strictly.  
 
4.6.3 Hypothesis 3 
According to Table 1, even guaranteed corporation loans show a positive interest spread of 7 
basis points on average, while for municipalities, the average spread is just zero. Equation 
(3b) shows that this may be due to non-recoverable costs (c). As noted, non-recoverable costs 
                                                 
 
41 If this would be the case, one may be surprised that we do not find an effect of equity on the interest spread for guaranteed loans. However, 
it may be more easy to bargain on guaranteed loans, because for these loans, BNG Bank publicly provides a target price (see section 5.2). 
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are probably more relevant for housing corporations than for municipalities, and therefore, 
interest spreads on guaranteed housing corporation loans may exceed interest spreads on 
municipality loans. We can compare interest rates of both groups of organisations by 
estimating Equation (5). The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no significant difference 
in interest rates between corporations and municipalities as the corporation dummy is 
insignificant in all regressions. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3 and conclude that non-
recoverable costs are not relevant. This suggests that the bailout clause for housing 
corporations (securing individual loans) succeeds in matching the one for municipalities 
(which entirely protects municipalities from defaulting). Both clauses seem equally credible.  
Still, it may be puzzling to see that interest rates for guaranteed housing corporation loans 
exceed their risk-free reference rates. As noted in section 4.3.1, this positive interest spread 
might be due to BNG Bank succeeding in obtaining positive commercial margins. A 
commercial margin may be the result of bargaining practices. Indeed, Allers and Van 
Ommeren (2016) present evidence suggesting that intermunicipal organisations can reduce 
interest rates on loans from BNG Bank by bargaining more effectively. It could also be the 
case that BNG Bank has lower funding costs than other banks because of implicit subsidies 














Table 4. Regression results of interest spreads: comparison of corporations and municipalities. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All guaranteed loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans 
     
Loan sum -0.0031*** -0.0026*** -0.0026** -0.0032*** 
 (-9.0537) (-3.9833) (-2.5247) (-5.6406) 
Loan sum2 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 
 (5.5420) (2.2311) (1.2710) (2.5494) 
Delay(*1000) 0.8639*** 1.1421*** 0.8728*** 0.8687*** 
 (26.8314) (17.1171) (16.1885) (19.7033) 
Delay(*1000)2 -0.1655*** -0.6228*** -0.1903*** -0.1288*** 
 (-5.5507) (-7.2900) (-3.6434) (-3.7067) 
Maturity -0.0054*** 0.0003 -0.0087*** -0.0076*** 
 (-6.0304) (0.1002) (-4.8993) (-4.8429) 
Maturity2 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (5.3575) (-0.2108) (5.8701) (4.3455) 
Linear loan -0.0177***    
 (-3.0520)    
Bullet loan -0.0282***    
 (-4.1534)    
Corporation dummy 0.0035 0.0045 -0.0087 0.0075 
 (0.7211) (0.6329) (-1.0402) (0.8203) 
Constant -0.0496*** 0.1531 0.0115 0.0158 
 (-3.0204) (1.4161) (0.3199) (1.0450) 
     
Observations 6,324 1,454 1,136 3,734 
R-squared 0.6703 0.5984 0.6675 0.7158 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies included. 
 
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We test the robustness of our results from Hypotheses 1 and 2 in six ways. This section 
briefly describes the results, for a more extensive discussion, see the appendix to this chapter. 
  
Firstly, we define an interest spread in relative (rather than absolute) terms. We find that the 
coefficient on guaranteed now differs significantly between Regressions (1) and (2) (see 
Table 5). Therefore, it seems that an interest premium is charged in basis points, rather than a 
percentage. This makes the absolute spread more appropriate.  
 
Secondly, we include loans for which only inter- or extrapolated reference rates are available. 
For example, the reference rate of a bullet loan with a maturity of 8 years can be found by 
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interpolating the reference rates for a 5-year loan and a 10-year loan. This increases the total 
number of observations from 2,791 (Table 2) to 5,587 (Table 5). The bailout effect is reduced 
somewhat (from -0.72 in Table 2 to -0.66 in Table 6) with estimated interest savings of about 
560 million euro (85.1 bln*0.66%). Additionally, the results still indicate that corporation 
characteristics are only relevant for unguaranteed loans. 
 
Thirdly, the results for non-clustered (but robust) standard errors are similar to the main 
results in Table 2. 
 
Fourthly, we use the lagged scenario (instead of the standard scenario, see section 4.5.4). For 
guaranteed loans, results are similar to Table 2. However, for unguaranteed loans, most 
corporation characteristics lose significance (details can be found in the appendix to this 
chapter). It appears likely therefore that BNG Bank is aware of a corporation’s circumstances 
before its financial data become publicly available in its annual report. 
 
Fifthly, we remove all loans with a maturity up to one month. The number of observations 
falls sharply, but the coefficient on guaranteed remains similar to the main results. 
 
Sixthly, we investigate whether there is a difference in monitoring in the pre- and post-crisis 
period, i.e., before or after 16 September 2008. According to Zipfel and Zimmer (2013), there 
is reason to believe that since the economic crisis, suppliers of capital may be more aware of 
the riskiness of, for example, subnational governments. Note that nearly all the short-term 
loans we study were made after September 2008 whereas our dataset contains guaranteed 
loans for the pre-crisis period as well. It may be the case that since the crisis, corporation 
characteristics are also relevant for guaranteed loans. To test this, we include interaction terms 
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between the corporation characteristics and a crisis dummy which equals 1 for all loans made 
from 16 September 2008 onwards and zero otherwise. Hardly any significant results appear so 
that we find no evidence of extra monitoring activities since the crisis. 
Table 5. Regression results of sensitivity analysis. 
  (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
Change in 
model 










-0.2475***    
 
-1.5505***
 (-5.0371) (-5.6311)    (-4.0150) 










-0.8791***    
 
-0.7195***
 (-9.6187) (-7.1347)    (-7.9756) 











-0.8617***    
 
-0.8164***
 (-13.0116) (-8.0013)    (-11.4642) 










-0.8000***    
 
-0.7950***
 (-8.2314) (-7.4060)    (-6.8613) 






characteristics Insignificant    Sometimes significant Insignificant 
 
Guaranteed  
-0.7291***     
 
-0.7719***
 (-5.3814)     (-5.5121) 







(before crisis) Insignificant 
Sometimes 






















-0.8327***    
 
-0.9373***
 (-7.4399) (-9.2415)    (-6.8100) 
Observations 2,791 810 486 209 1,260 2,096 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG is not available for all 
unguaranteed loans.  
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We also test the robustness of Hypothesis 3 by including inter- and extrapolated loans. Table 
6 shows that the corporation dummy becomes significant in Regression (1), but the coefficient 
is very small (about 1 basis point) and loses significance again in the other regressions.42 
Therefore, we conclude that we fail to find robust evidence of non-recoverable costs. 
Table 6. Regression results: comparison of corporations and municipalities (inter- and extrapolation 
included). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All guaranteed loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans 
     
Corporation dummy 0.0130** 0.0083 -0.0088 0.0074 
 (1.9843) (0.8398) (-0.4574) (0.7189) 
Constant 0.0566*** -0.1138*** 0.0118 -0.0470** 
 (2.8517) (-3.2257) (0.1847) (-2.0981) 
     
Observations 11,062 4,746 1,992 4,324 
R-squared 0.2974 0.2898 0.2213 0.6391 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




The Dutch (semi-)public sector is characterized by its bailout clauses. Though short-term 
loans to housing corporations are not guaranteed, most long-term corporation loans are 
explicitly guaranteed. The bailout clause for corporations consists of three levels: the first two 
relying on mutual solidarity, and the third on governmental support. In spite of what one 
would expect based on the literature, only rarely has the guarantee scheme been called upon. 
Recently, however, incidents involving the housing corporation sector have brought back the 
plea to rein in or even abolish the bailout clause. 
In this paper we have compared interest spreads (i.e., the difference between the actual 
interest rate paid and a risk-free reference rate) of guaranteed and unguaranteed corporation 
loans provided by BNG Bank, the market leader in this sector. While controlling for other 
                                                 
 
42 Significance is also lost when including Delay3 (which is significant) in Regression (1) of Table 6 (details not shown). 
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relevant factors we have found that the guarantee scheme lowers interest rates by about 72 
basis points. This yields yearly benefits to the social housing sector of around 610 million 
euro in reduced interest payments. Comparing this with the bailout payments provided to 
rescue corporations (1.5 billion euro in 24 years), it appears likely that the bailout clause has 
had a positive net benefit. This means that the bailout clause would only be undesirable if it 
led to very high indirect costs such as, for example, loss of efficiency. 
The relevance of the bailout clause is again confirmed by our finding that a housing 
corporation’s financial position (or riskiness) influences interest spreads for unguaranteed 
loans only. This indicates that, in our research period, BNG Bank did not monitor 
corporations when providing guaranteed loans, but relied on the credibility of the bailout 
clause and the assessment of the supervisory authorities (CFV and WSW). For unguaranteed 
loans, however, BNG Bank does monitor the riskiness of corporations as well as that of the 
project being financed.  
Finally, we find that interest rates on guaranteed housing corporation loans exceed their risk-
free reference rates. In theory, this may imply that the creditor charges a premium for non-
recoverable costs in case of default, despite the guarantee scheme. This would mean that 
guaranteed loans are not completely risk-free. However, we argue that non-recoverable costs 
are not relevant for housing corporations. If they were, we would expect corporations to pay 
higher interest rates than municipalities as non-recoverable costs would be higher for 
corporations than for municipalities. This is because BNG Bank would be involved in the 
bailout process if a corporation defaults, whereas for municipalities, the bailout would work 
automatically. However, we find no structural significant difference between the two. The 
guarantee scheme for housing corporations (securing individual loans) reduces interest rates 
to the same extent as the one for municipalities (whose entire financial position is secured). 
Positive interest spreads probably reflect a commercial margin.  
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We emphasize that we do not argue that bailout clauses are desirable under all circumstances, 
but rather that they are not undesirable per se. Further study is needed to investigate whether 
our findings also hold for other bailout clauses.  
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis 
We test the robustness of our results from Hypotheses 1 and 2 in six ways. This section 
briefly describes the results. Firstly, we define an interest spread in relative (rather than 
absolute) terms. Secondly, we include loans for which only inter- or extrapolated reference 
rates are available. Thirdly, we show the results for non-clustered (but robust) standard errors. 
Fourthly, we use the lagged scenario (instead of the standard scenario, see section 4.6.4). 
Fifthly, we remove all loans with a maturity up to one month and finally, we investigate 
whether there is a difference in monitoring in the pre- and post-crisis period, i.e., before or 
after 16 September 2008.  
Allers and Van Ommeren (2016) argue that a relative interest spread can control more 
precisely for interest changes over time and differences between loan types (compared with an 







We find that the coefficient on guaranteed now differs significantly between Regressions (1) 
and (2). This may be due to the fact that Regression (1) includes unguaranteed (short-term) 
loans with relatively low interest rates while Regression (2) includes only long-term loans 
with relatively high interest rates. This contrasts with our main results in which the 
coefficients were similar. Therefore, it seems that BNG Bank increases its required interest 
rate by a certain amount of basis points for unguaranteed loans, rather than a percentage. This 
makes the absolute spread more appropriate. 
 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




Table A1. Regression results of interest spreads (relative interest spread). 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value -0.0039 0.0008* -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.3187*** -0.0099 
 (-0.4870) (1.8212) (-1.0613) (-0.0177) (-8.2688) (-0.5529) 
   Long-term debt 0.0083 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.1017*** 0.0247 
 (1.2345) (-1.4146) (-0.5726) (-0.7313) (6.7822) (1.4492) 
   Equity 0.0080 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 0.2761*** 0.0322 
 (0.6103) (-0.1405) (0.2654) (-0.1801) (7.8292) (1.5458) 
   Equity t+5 0.0043 0.0009 0.0004 0.0012 -0.1229*** -0.0079 
 (0.3948) (1.5444) (1.1736) (0.8611) (-4.0652) (-0.4265) 
   Net cash flow -0.0247 0.0002 0.0014 0.0028 0.7123* -0.0263 
 (-0.9211) (0.0790) (0.5379) (0.6834) (2.0555) (-0.6699) 
   Dwellings 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0033 0.2594*** 0.0059 
 (0.1261) (-0.3598) (0.0876) (0.3558) (6.5807) (0.4538) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -1.5646*** -0.2475***    -1.5505*** 
 (-5.0371) (-5.6311)    (-4.0150) 
   Rating BNG     0.9458***  
     (3.9409)  
   Loan sum -0.0120** -0.0022** -0.0001 -0.0014* -0.0085* -0.0080* 
 (-2.1668) (-2.2667) (-0.1282) (-1.9409) (-1.9204) (-1.7784) 
   Loan sum2 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0000 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0001 
 (1.5323) (1.7817) (-0.6779) (1.4221) (2.0506) (1.2404) 
   Delay (*1000) 0.3470 0.3498*** 0.2018*** 0.2545*** -54.7244** 0.3893 
 (1.3393) (9.0611) (8.6681) (4.8619) (-2.3009) (0.7549) 
   Delay (*1000)2 -0.2403 -0.2132*** -0.0518* -0.1332** 6,484.2109*** -0.2349 
 (-0.8696) (-3.9329) (-1.6559) (-2.4330) (3.5505) (-0.4102) 
   Maturity -0.0193 -0.0007 -0.0029*** -0.0021* -9.4085*** -0.0806*** 
 (-1.4643) (-0.4043) (-3.9131) (-1.6899) (-3.8652) (-2.6826) 
   Maturity2 0.0005* 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000 7.4666 0.0018*** 
 (1.8664) (0.1305) (4.3535) (1.4183) (1.3302) (3.0520) 
Constant 1.5062*** 0.1508* 0.0184 -0.1945 9.0857*** 2.1900* 
 (4.1637) (1.7502) (0.2240) (-0.2996) (6.6550) (1.9247) 
       
Observations 2,791 810 486 209 1,260 2,096 
R-squared 0.6238 0.7445 0.8773 0.8952 0.8778 0.6415 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG is not available for all 
unguaranteed loans.  
When including inter- and extrapolated observations, the total number of observations 
increases from 2,791 (Table 2) to 5,587 (Table A2). Inter- and extrapolation is conducted as 
follows. For example, the reference rate of a bullet loan with a maturity of 8 years can be 
found by interpolating the reference rates for a 5-year loan and a 10-year loan. For a 3-year 
bullet loan, we interpolate for the 12-month Euribor rate and the 5-year rate. For bullet loans 
with a maturity longer than 10 years, we use the reference rate for a 10-year loan. The bailout 
effect is reduced somewhat (from -0.72 in Table 2 to -0.66 in Table A2). Using this 
coefficient, the annual interest savings as a result of the bailout would be about 560 million 
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euro (85.1 bln*0.66%). Additionally, the results still indicate that corporation characteristics 
are only relevant for unguaranteed loans. 
Table A2. Regression results of interest spreads (inter- and extrapolation included). 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0026* -0.0425*** -0.0001 
 (0.1339) (-0.3454) (0.3332) (-1.6996) (-5.2164) (-0.0423) 
   Long-term debt 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0046* 0.0025** 0.0181** 0.0017 
 (0.1523) (0.0536) (-1.8822) (2.0086) (2.6910) (0.6699) 
   Equity 0.0039 0.0009 -0.0072 0.0080 0.0532*** 0.0042 
 (1.5889) (0.2675) (-1.0283) (1.1899) (8.6168) (1.2261) 
   Equity t+5 0.0010 0.0028 0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0408*** -0.0012 
 (0.5449) (0.9909) (0.9143) (-0.5252) (-3.3961) (-0.4121) 
   Net cash flow -0.0073 0.0046 0.0021 0.0028 0.0622 0.0065 
 (-1.0973) (0.6142) (0.1340) (0.2013) (0.8054) (0.8117) 
   Dwellings -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0050 0.0254*** -0.0042 
 (-0.6253) (-0.2756) (-0.4528) (0.2095) (3.6510) (-1.0728) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -0.6621*** -0.8791***    -0.7195*** 
 (-9.6187) (-7.1347)    (-7.9756) 
   Rating BNG     0.1247*  
     (1.8332)  
   Loan sum -0.0038** -0.0051* -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0036 -0.0053*** 
 (-2.2746) (-1.6808) (-0.7323) (-0.2138) (-1.3859) (-2.9737) 
   Loan sum2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001** 
 (1.5168) (1.1963) (0.4847) (-0.4041) (1.3145) (1.9955) 
   Delay(*1000) 0.5968*** 0.5537*** 0.7296*** 0.9071*** -29.8676*** 0.5730*** 
 (6.3890) (5.4408) (5.1086) (8.5582) (-3.0554) (5.3539) 
   Delay(*1000)2 -0.2621** -0.2380** -0.2535 -0.5498*** 1,559.3548** -0.2544** 
 (-2.5109) (-2.2795) (-1.5729) (-7.0550) (2.1202) (-2.2719) 
   Maturity 0.0164*** 0.0270*** -0.0123*** -0.0080** -1.5637 0.0284*** 
 (5.8323) (7.2077) (-2.6987) (-2.3437) (-1.3276) (7.0079) 
   Maturity2 -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 3.2020* -0.0005*** 
 (-5.2664) (-7.0356) (3.3883) (2.8800) (2.0155) (-6.5694) 
Constant 0.4789*** 0.5305*** 0.3568 -0.5581 0.1627 0.5382*** 
 (7.7555) (3.7883) (0.9195) (-1.5814) (0.5762) (4.3275) 
       
Observations 5,587 3,039 898 359 1,264 4,330 
R-squared 0.4479 0.4498 0.6605 0.8634 0.6963 0.4904 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG 
 is not available for all unguaranteed loans.  
Table A3 gives the results when standard errors are not clustered (yet still robust for 











Table A3. Regression results of interest spreads (no clustering of standard errors). 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value -0.0001 0.0026** -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0459*** 0.0009 
 (-0.0935) (2.0490) (-0.7734) (-0.0227) (-7.9194) (0.4197) 
   Long-term debt 0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0015 0.0181*** 0.0028* 
 (0.9436) (-1.3117) (-0.7665) (-0.6628) (3.8553) (1.6793) 
   Equity 0.0048* 0.0002 0.0032 -0.0025 0.0584*** 0.0102*** 
 (1.7666) (0.0831) (1.0393) (-0.3063) (8.2255) (3.0025) 
   Equity t+5 -0.0031** 0.0021 0.0018 0.0050 -0.0418*** -0.0064*** 
 (-2.1274) (1.3354) (1.3000) (0.8810) (-5.5304) (-2.8987) 
   Net cash flow -0.0083 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0573 0.0044 
 (-1.0761) (0.0928) (0.0587) (0.0191) (0.8912) (0.4015) 
   Dwellings -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0050 0.0282*** -0.0024 
 (-1.2316) (0.1225) (-0.1912) (0.1764) (4.8215) (-1.2135) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -0.7232*** -0.8617***    -0.8164*** 
 (-13.0116) (-8.0013)    (-11.4642) 
   Rating BNG     0.1391***  
     (4.0266)  
   Loan sum -0.0050*** -0.0067*** -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0036** -0.0032** 
 (-3.9589) (-2.6948) (-0.4292) (-0.6807) (-2.1640) (-2.2690) 
   Loan sum2 0.0001*** 0.0002* -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0000 
 (2.7804) (1.7689) (-0.6408) (0.6523) (2.1879) (1.6452) 
   Delay(*1000) 1.0980*** 1.2394*** 0.8697*** 1.0186*** -29.6036** 1.2957*** 
 (14.6917) (14.8296) (13.8033) (6.2196) (-2.3245) (11.3543) 
   Delay(*1000)2 -0.5757*** -0.7394*** -0.2114*** -0.4923** 1,306.2816 -0.7679*** 
 (-6.2965) (-6.5447) (-2.9398) (-2.5915) (1.4718) (-6.0520) 
   Maturity -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0108*** -0.0055 -1.5878** -0.0076* 
 (-1.1196) (-0.2828) (-4.4334) (-1.0507) (-2.3507) (-1.7020) 
   Maturity2 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0001 3.6256*** 0.0002 
 (1.0778) (-0.0893) (4.9552) (0.6284) (3.3362) (1.5308) 
Constant 0.6965*** 0.5400*** -0.2155 -0.2226 1.1644*** 0.5647*** 
 (7.3551) (2.6414) (-0.9858) (-0.1115) (5.2553) (2.5866) 
       
Observations 2,791 810 486 209 1,260 2,096 
R-squared 0.6536 0.7735 0.8860 0.8926 0.6951 0.6752 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG 
 is not available for all unguaranteed loans.  
 
The results in Table A4 indicate the effect of using lagged corporation variables instead of 
standard variables (see section 4.5.4). For guaranteed loans (Regressions 2-4), results are 
similar to Table 2. However, Regression (5) shows that for unguaranteed loans, most 
corporation characteristics lose significance. It appears likely therefore that BNG Bank is 
aware of a corporation’s circumstances before its financial data become publicly available in 
its annual report. 
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Table A4. Regression results of interest spreads (lagged corporation variables). 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value 0.0038* 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0042 -0.0096 0.0032 
 (1.7487) (1.6205) (0.5000) (-0.2424) (-0.5525) (0.8341) 
   Long-term debt -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0054 0.0034 -0.0079 -0.0031 
 (-1.0191) (-1.2487) (-1.3901) (0.4348) (-1.2304) (-0.9660) 
   Equity -0.0055 -0.0003 -0.0115* -0.0056 -0.0219 -0.0051 
 (-1.0663) (-0.1083) (-1.8107) (-0.4147) (-0.8815) (-0.6951) 
   Equity t+5 -0.0041 -0.0000 0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0015 
 (-1.0384) (-0.0058) (0.5587) (-0.1641) (-0.0450) (-0.2527) 
   Net cash flow 0.0060 0.0111*** 0.0007 -0.0569 -0.3359* 0.0094 
 (0.6814) (2.6328) (0.0462) (-1.1596) (-1.8421) (1.0764) 
   Dwellings 0.0009 0.0001 0.0002 -0.2631 0.0327 -0.0014 
 (0.3777) (0.0728) (0.1628) (-1.1465) (1.5704) (-0.3970) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -0.7233*** -0.8000***    -0.7950*** 
 (-8.2314) (-7.4060)    (-6.8613) 
   Rating BNG     0.1298  
     (1.2491)  
   Loan sum -0.0046** -0.0037* 0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0038 -0.0029 
 (-2.1979) (-1.7198) (0.0302) (-0.9548) (-1.4130) (-1.4008) 
   Loan sum2 0.0001 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (1.4342) (1.7843) (-0.6776) (1.2575) (1.1020) (0.9301) 
   Delay(*1000) 1.2133*** 1.3296*** 0.7841*** 0.8912*** -29.2971** 1.3941*** 
 (11.3925) (14.6326) (3.8731) (3.2275) (-2.4657) (10.3810) 
   Delay(*1000)2 -0.7087*** -0.8191*** -0.0466 -0.4538 1,731.7316** -0.8325*** 
 (-5.1177) (-6.0815) (-0.1265) (-1.5925) (2.7130) (-5.4406) 
   Maturity -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0135*** -0.0092 -1.4760 -0.0108* 
 (-1.0313) (-0.8419) (-3.4722) (-1.3972) (-1.2915) (-1.6896) 
   Maturity2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 3.0260 0.0003* 
 (1.2958) (0.9023) (3.5678) (0.7971) (1.6774) (1.9529) 
Constant 0.6562** 0.7866*** 0.0549 18.9328 2.3994*** 0.9624*** 
 (2.5532) (6.7756) (0.6034) (1.1519) (3.9397) (11.9763) 
       
Observations 2,635 759 370 197 1,283 2,068 
R-squared 0.6717 0.8494 0.8783 0.8628 0.6270 0.6825 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
The number of observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG 
 is not available for all unguaranteed loans.  
Table A5 presents the results when all loans with a maturity up to one month are removed. As 
noted in section 4.5.2, we use a different reference rate (based on Euribor) for these loans. 
The number of observations falls sharply, but the coefficient on guaranteed remains similar to 










Table A5. Regression results of interest spreads (loans with a maturity up to one month excluded). 
 (1)a (2) (3)a 
 All loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
    
Corporation characteristics    
   Company value 0.0017 -0.0613*** 0.0043 
 (1.1635) (-4.6355) (1.4377) 
   Long-term debt -0.0005 -0.0138 0.0002 
 (-0.6046) (-0.5310) (0.0537) 
   Equity 0.0014 0.0380* 0.0031 
 (0.4849) (1.7735) (0.6222) 
   Equity t+5 -0.0006 -0.0158 -0.0024 
 (-0.3954) (-1.1469) (-0.8073) 
   Net cash flow 0.0003 0.3842** 0.0133 
 (0.0331) (2.8266) (1.0062) 
   Dwellings -0.0007 0.1471*** -0.0002 
 (-0.2837) (3.6898) (-0.0433) 
Loan characteristics    
   Guaranteed -0.7291***  -0.7719*** 
 (-5.3814)  (-5.5121) 
   Rating BNG  0.6076*  
  (1.8414)  
   Loan sum -0.0083** -0.0078** -0.0093** 
 (-2.2335) (-2.7489) (-2.0965) 
   Loan sum2 0.0002* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (1.6814) (4.2981) (2.7721) 
   Delay(*1000) 1.1485*** -19.6102 1.3655*** 
 (12.2924) (-1.6894) (9.2258) 
   Delay(*1000)2 -0.6185*** 647.3191 -0.8156*** 
 (-4.6891) (0.7348) (-4.6292) 
   Maturity -0.0024 -0.4081 -0.0049 
 (-0.6189) (-1.5596) (-0.8193) 
   Maturity2 0.0001 0.9701 0.0001 
 (0.6557) (1.3956) (0.7949) 
Constant 0.5397* -0.6645 0.1454 
 (1.7506) (-0.4419) (0.4861) 
    
Observations 1,714 190 1,019 
R-squared 0.6153 0.9178 0.6750 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies (fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed. 
According to Zipfel and Zimmer (2013) there is reason to believe that the impact of debt 
levels on interest spreads reflects a structural break between the period before the global 
economic crisis began in 2008 and the period afterwards. They argue that since the economic 
crisis, suppliers of capital may well be more aware of the riskiness of, for example, 
subnational governments. Zipfel and Zimmer (2013) find that for German Länder, in the 
period prior to the collapse of Lehman on 15 September 2008, the relative economic output 
and the debt/GDP ratio had no significant impact on the interest spread, whereas in later 
years, they did find a significant impact. Note that nearly all the short-term loans we study 
were made after September 2008 whereas our dataset contains guaranteed loans for the pre-
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crisis period as well. It may be the case that since the crisis, corporation characteristics are 
also relevant for guaranteed loans.  
Table A6 repeats the regressions while including interaction terms between the corporation 
characteristics and a crisis dummy variable which equals 1 for all loans made from 16 
September 2008 onwards and zero otherwise. The question whether corporation 
characteristics are significant after the crisis cannot be answered by examining only the 
coefficients on the interaction terms. Indeed, the marginal effect of for example company 
value on the interest spread if the crisis dummy equals one, is the sum of the direct effect 
(0.0009) and the interaction effect (-0.0064), which is -0.0055. In a similar fashion, the 
corresponding standard error has to be calculated accordingly (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 
2006). Table A6 therefore also presents the coefficients and corresponding t-values of the 
corporation characteristics, under the condition that the crisis dummy equals one. Hardly any 















Table A6. Regression results of interest spreads (including interaction with crisis dummy). 
 (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
 All loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans Short-term loans Bullet & Short- 
term loans 
       
Corporation characteristics       
   Company value 0.0009 0.0048** -0.0003 0.0016 -0.0459*** 0.0067 
 (0.5252) (2.4830) (-0.1901) (0.6477) (-6.3750) (1.6476) 
   Long-term debt -0.0005 -0.0056*** -0.0012 -0.0038 0.0181** -0.0072 
 (-0.3661) (-2.9208) (-0.3644) (-1.3837) (2.7593) (-1.4402) 
   Equity -0.0053 -0.0026 0.0052* 0.0055 0.0584*** -0.0148 
 (-1.1246) (-0.4380) (1.8805) (0.2733) (11.1315) (-1.0881) 
   Equity t+5 0.0021 0.0014 0.0010 0.0134* -0.0418*** 0.0046 
 (1.0260) (0.3979) (0.5995) (1.6734) (-3.5570) (0.9249) 
   Net cash flow -0.0075 0.0060 -0.0008 -0.0040 0.0573 0.0089 
 (-0.8972) (1.1462) (-0.0801) (-0.1486) (0.8098) (1.0580) 
   Dwellings 0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0273 0.0282*** 0.0067 
 (1.2716) (-0.6148) (-0.2795) (-0.7572) (3.9619) (1.2120) 
   Company value*Crisis dummy -0.0064* -0.0059* 0.0250 -0.0122  -0.0174*** 
 (-1.8786) (-1.8706) (1.2313) (-0.9488)  (-3.1904) 
   Long-term debt*Crisis dummy 0.0042 0.0062* -0.0030 0.0071  0.0160** 
 (1.6350) (1.9467) (-0.2677) (0.7546)  (2.2512) 
   Equity*Crisis dummy 0.0149** 0.0073 -0.0142 -0.0137  0.0350** 
 (2.4197) (1.2156) (-1.1372) (-0.7038)  (2.1374) 
   Equity t+5*Crisis dummy -0.0092* -0.0004 -0.0488 -0.0152  -0.0151* 
 (-1.7609) (-0.1068) (-1.3710) (-1.3199)  (-1.7193) 
   Net cash flow*Crisis dummy 0.0065 -0.0367 -0.3873** -0.0087  -0.0110 
 (0.1483) (-0.9393) (-2.1231) (-0.1661)  (-0.2050) 
   Dwellings*Crisis dummy -0.0049** 0.0017 0.0131** -0.0068**  -0.0072** 
 (-1.9912) (0.8141) (2.3858) (-2.0669)  (-2.0969) 
Loan characteristics       
   Guaranteed -0.8121*** -0.8327***    -0.9373*** 
 (-7.4399) (-9.2415)    (-6.8100) 
   Rating BNG     0.1391**  
     (2.1057)  
   Loan sum -0.0048** -0.0069** 0.0005 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0029 
 (-2.4030) (-2.3823) (0.2536) (-1.3424) (-1.3735) (-1.4079) 
   Loan sum2 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (1.5192) (1.6867) (-2.3362) (1.5594) (1.3049) (0.9755) 
   Delay(*1000) 1.1436*** 1.2523*** 0.8577*** 1.0462*** -29.6036*** 1.3811*** 
 (10.8624) (11.7956) (9.2033) (5.4099) (-3.0343) (8.6844) 
   Delay(*1000)2 -0.6441*** -0.7522*** -0.2010* -0.4788* 1,306.2816* -0.8996*** 
 (-4.2587) (-4.4550) (-1.9726) (-1.9029) (1.8217) (-4.9333) 
   Maturity -0.0012 0.0009 -0.0106*** -0.0081 -1.5878 -0.0059 
 (-0.2145) (0.1808) (-3.3661) (-1.1949) (-1.3484) (-0.8573) 
   Maturity2 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001 3.6256** 0.0002 
 (0.3950) (-0.3410) (3.9884) (0.9881) (2.2082) (0.9176) 
Constant 0.7561*** 0.6629 0.0659 2.7012 1.1644*** 0.7111** 
 (5.7473) (1.4125) (0.3089) (1.0693) (3.3126) (2.4785) 
       
Observations 2,791 810 486 209 1,260 2,096 
R-squared 0.6629 0.7811 0.8918 0.9108 0.6951 0.6906 
Panel B: Cumulative effect of 
interaction terms (if Crisis dummy=1) 
      
   Company value -0.0055 -0.0011 0.0247 -0.0106 -0.0459*** -0.0107* 
 (-1.5366) (-0.3601) (1.2345) (-0.7893) (-6.3750) (-1.9346) 
   Long-term debt 0.0037 0.0006 -0.0042 0.0033 0.0181** 0.0088** 
 (1.4088) (0.2463) (-0.3668) (0.3819) (2.7593) (2.021) 
   Equity 0.0096* 0.0047* -0.0090 -0.0082 0.0584*** 0.0202*** 
 (1.7624) (1.6861) (-0.6699) (-1.1027) (11.1315) (2.8162) 
   Equity t+5 -0.0071* 0.0010 -0.0478 -0.0018 -0.0418*** -0.0105* 
 (-1.6808) (0.5496) (-1.3264) (-0.253) (-3.5570) (-1.796) 
   Net cash flow -0.0010 -0.0307 -0.3881** -0.0127 0.0573 -0.0021 
 (-0.0242) (-0.7833) (-2.08) (-0.2418) (0.8098) (-0.0397) 
   Dwellings -0.0021 -0.0002 0.0128** -0.0341 0.0282*** -0.0005 
 (-1.1168) (-0.1073) (2.2738) (-0.9153) (3.9619) (-0.134) 
Robust t-statistics (based upon clustered standard errors) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year and corporation dummies(fixed effects) included. 
a Dummy variables denoting the type of loan and Rating BNG are omitted because of multicollinearity with Guaranteed.The number of 
observations in Regression (1) does not equal the sum of Regressions (2)-(5), because Rating BNG 
 is not available for all unguaranteed loans and because annuity loans are omitted. 
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Finally, the robustness of Hypothesis 3 is tested by including inter- and extrapolated loans. 
Table A7 shows that the corporation dummy becomes significant in Regression (1), but the 
coefficient is very small (about 1 basis point). Also, the coefficient loses significance again in 
the other regressions. Therefore, we conclude that we fail to find robust evidence of non-
recoverable costs. 
Table A7. Regression results of interest spreads: comparison of corporations and municipalities (inter- 
and extrapolation included). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All guaranteed loans Bullet loans Annuity loans Linear loans 
     
Loan sum -0.0028*** -0.0024*** -0.0019 -0.0023*** 
 (-5.6749) (-2.6415) (-1.2067) (-3.5076) 
Loan sum2 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 
 (3.0120) (0.1756) (0.2354) (2.7281) 
Delay(*1000) 0.6885*** 0.6495*** 0.8305*** 0.8210*** 
 (21.5429) (12.1535) (12.0151) (19.4010) 
Delay(*1000)2 -0.1687*** -0.3037*** -0.2113*** -0.1234*** 
 (-5.4864) (-5.5280) (-3.5888) (-3.2123) 
Maturity 0.0082*** 0.0228*** -0.0022 -0.0098*** 
 (6.8724) (12.2186) (-0.7578) (-7.3657) 
Maturity2 -0.0002*** -0.0004*** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 
 (-5.5659) (-10.3862) (2.1826) (6.8986) 
Linear loan -0.0791***    
 (-8.6466)    
Bullet loan 0.0129    
 (1.3731)    
Corporation dummy 0.0130** 0.0083 -0.0088 0.0074 
 (1.9843) (0.8398) (-0.4574) (0.7189) 
Constant 0.0566*** -0.1138*** 0.0118 -0.0470** 
 (2.8517) (-3.2257) (0.1847) (-2.0981) 
     
Observations 11,062 4,746 1,992 4,324 
R-squared 0.2974 0.2898 0.2213 0.6391 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies included. 
In short, the robustness checks do not lead to different conclusions. Firstly, the bailout clause 
still appears to reduce interest rates. Secondly, the findings that the relationship between 
corporation characteristics and the interest spread is only relevant for unguaranteed loans 








5 Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and borrowing 
costs43 
 
In many countries, local government size is increasingly thought to be insufficient to operate 
efficiently. Two possible solutions to this problem are amalgamation and intermunicipal 
cooperation. This paper applies a novel methodology to shed light on the efficiency 
implications of this choice. Using a unique and rich micro-level dataset, we find that 
intermunicipal organisations (IOs) in the Netherlands consistently pay higher interest rates 
than municipalities, while there is no economic reason to do so. We interpret this as a form of 
inefficiency. Municipal amalgamation, on the other hand, does not result in higher interest 
rates. Our analysis eliminates one possible explanation, dispersed ownership of IOs, as the 
number of partners cooperating in an IO does not affect interest rates (no “law of 1/n”). This 
leaves the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation, and the ensuing 




In many countries, local governments are believed to have a suboptimal size for offering 
public services efficiently, because of scale economies and because of spending spillovers. 
That is especially true in countries where amalgamation is rare or non-existent or where 
substantial public tasks have been decentralized recently. Local government can increase 
operating scale through amalgamation, through cooperation with other local governments and 
by contracting out to, or partnering with, private operators that also work for other local 
                                                 
 
43 This chapter is based on Allers, M. A., & van Ommeren, B. J. (2016). Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and the price of credit. 
Local Government Studies , 42(5), 717-738. 
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governments. Each of these options may have very different implications. Contracting out 
requires a competitive market, which does not exist for many services for which local 
government is responsible. Results have often been disappointing (Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 
2010). The same goes for public-private partnership (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). This paper 
focuses on amalgamation and cooperation.  
 
Amalgamations often lead to public resistance because communities fear loss of autonomy or 
identity. Larger jurisdictions may be less able to tailor local services to local demand (Oates, 
1972). Moreover, amalgamation is a blunt instrument. Services offered by municipalities are 
quite heterogeneous. While for some (e.g., capital intensive) services they might operate 
under economies of scale, for other services the opposite may be true. Hence, increasing scale 
across the board could invoke efficiency gains in some public services and efficiency losses in 
others. Also, amalgamation may result in more bureaucracy.  
Intermunicipal cooperation offers municipalities a way to increase scale of production for 
selected public services only, while continuing to provide other public services on a municipal 
level, and preserving local autonomy. Although intermunicipal cooperation is a widespread 
phenomenon (Hulst & van Montfort, (Eds) 2007), its effects on efficiency have not been 
extensively studied. 
Cooperation may allow municipalities to exploit economies of scale (Bel, Fageda, & Mur, 
2013), but it may also have effects that reduce efficiency. Corporate governance theory 
predicts that cooperation exacerbates agency costs and reduces the intensity with which the 
activities of public servants are monitored. A control system combining monitoring with 
sanctions and rewards (henceforth referred to as “monitoring”) is needed to align public 
servants’ objectives with those of citizens. Agency theory suggests three possible reasons for 
reduced monitoring, and, as a result, less efficiency, in intermunicipal organisations (IOs). 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




First, an extra tier in the hierarchy is introduced: the board of the IO. Adding hierarchical 
layers increases monitoring costs. Monitoring could be further hampered by the fact that the 
municipal governments’ grip on an IO is weaker than that on their own organisation. In 
addition, intermunicipal cooperation in effect creates a common pool. When a particular 
municipality puts a lot of effort into monitoring an IO, much of the ensuing efficiency gain 
will benefit other participants. As a result, the level of monitoring is likely to be lower than 
that for the operations of the municipality itself. As this disincentive to monitor is a result of 
the existence of a common pool, its strength will depend on the size of this pool. 
Empirical studies of intergovernmental cooperation often focus on determinants of 
cooperation e.g., (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009; Hefetz & Warner, 2011; Rodrigues, 
Tavares, & Araújo, 2012). Studies on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation are mostly 
case studies or survey studies (e.g., (Henderson, 2014; Bel & Warner, 2015) survey the 
literature, and find just eight econometric studies of the effect of cooperation on public service 
costs or spending. All of these study solid waste services, one of them in combination with 
water, electricity and gas. Results of these studies are mixed. Frère et al. (2014) find no effect 
of cooperation on total spending of French municipalities. 
The results of econometric studies on the effects of municipal amalgamations, carried out in 
several European countries and in Israel, are mixed as well (Allers & Geertsema, 2016). In the 
United States, neither city-county consolidation nor city-city consolidation seems to result in 
significant efficiency gains (Leland & Thurmaier, Eds 2010; Gaffney & Marlowe., 2014). 
Empirical studies of the effects of cooperation or amalgamation often focus on spending 
levels. Higher spending does not necessarily point to increased inefficiency, however. 
Efficiency depends on the ratio of output (or outcome) over input. Higher spending may 
simply reflect rising public service levels, leaving efficiency unaffected. Empirical studies in 
this field suffer from two fundamental problems (Geys & Moesen, 2009). The scarce output 
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indicators that are available are sometimes only crude proxies for the true level of public good 
provision. Moreover, such studies rely on strong assumptions (e.g., regarding the cost 
function), or they are vulnerable to data errors (if they use data envelopment analysis). 
Because all previous papers on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation focus on a service, 
waste, for which output is easy to quantify, the first problem does not necessarily apply to 
them. Indeed, output and quality are controlled for in some of these studies e.g., (Bel & 
Costas, 2006; Zafra-Gómez, Prior, Díaz, & López-Hernández, 2013).  
Our approach is completely different from that of previous studies. Whereas previous studies 
on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation cover all costs of providing a single service, we 
focus on a single cost in a broad range of public services. We exploit a unique and rich micro-
level dataset on the price both municipalities and IOs pay for a standard commodity: credit. 
We compare interest rates on loans to Dutch IOs, amalgamated municipalities, and 
municipalities that were not amalgamated. The credit risk for these loans is identical (i.e., 
zero). On identical loans, municipalities and IOs should be able to get the same terms. Thus, 
any systematic differences in interest rates would point ceteris paribus to differences in 
efficiency, without having to rely on strong assumptions inherent in the approaches chosen by 
previous studies.  
We find that IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities, while there is no economic 
reason to do so. We also find that the benefits of lower interest rates outweigh the extra 
bargaining cost they would require by a wide margin. Consequently, we interpret the higher 
interest paid by IOs as a form of inefficiency. However, the number of participating 
municipalities does not affect the interest rate paid by an IO. Thus, it is cooperation as such 
that results in higher interest rates, not the number of parties involved. This leaves the 
introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation and the limited influence of 
municipality governments on IO boards as the most probable explanations. 
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This study is highly relevant for both policy makers and scientists. In the Netherlands, the 
ongoing decentralisation of the public sector has been accompanied by a process towards 
amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation. A linear extrapolation of the process shows a 
decrease of the number of municipalities from 1000 in 1950, 355 in 2019, towards 1 in 2051 
(Allers, 2019). This process is fuelled by a government that assumes that municipalities that 
are cooperating on key tasks, operate less efficiently than amalgamated municipalities44. 
Amalgamation is implicitly assumed to be an efficient alternative to IOs, as it is implicitly 
assumed to lead to to fewer IOs. In the meantime, IOs are also less desirable because they 
lack direct democratic governance. However, it is not clear to what extent amalgamation 
operates more efficiently than IOs. The continuous scaling-up of municipalities as a result of 
amalgamation goes hand in hand with a decrease of democratic support by the citizens 
(Hansen, 2015; Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011; Houwelingen, 2017) and does not seem to lead to 
fewer IOs (Allers, 2019). These developments demand reconsideration of the actual situation 
of amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation as well as a search for new solutions. This 
chapter investigates one of the key elements, whether there is evidence that intermunicipal 
cooperation is less efficient than amalgamation. The academic relevancy of this chapter lies in 
providing additional evidence regarding the efficiency implications of the choice between 
amalgamation and cooperation, and by using a novel method to estimate the effect of 
intermunicipal cooperation and amalgamation on efficiency. 
 
5.2 Institutional background 
5.2.1 Municipalities and intermunicipal organisations 
Dutch municipalities are democratically governed jurisdictions with a broad set of 
responsibilities. Municipalities often cooperate to perform specific tasks, ranging from refuse 
                                                 
 
44 Dutch coalition agreement 2017, october the 10th “Vertrouwen in de toekomst”, www.kabinetssformatie2017.nl 
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collection to administering social welfare benefits. Cooperation is often aimed at reaping 
economies of scale. Other reasons to cooperate are that some municipalities are simply too 
small to perform every task independently, or that the catchment area of a public service 
exceeds the municipality’s boundaries. 
Dutch IOs cannot levy own taxes. In some cases, a grant is received from the central 
government, but most of their resources come from the participating municipalities. There are 
no limitations with respect to the number of cooperative arrangements, and municipalities are 
free to choose different partners for each (except for some cases where cooperation is 
mandatory, e.g. for fire brigades). The Joint Provisions Act enables municipalities to create 
public bodies (governed by public law), which are separate administrative entities that may 
employ staff, own assets, borrow money, etcetera. In case of financial distress, the 
participating municipalities are liable. Public bodies do not default. Municipalities may also 
create public companies under private law. Unlike public bodies, public companies can 
default, in which case shareholding municipalities lose their investment and creditors (part of) 
their claim. This does not happen often. In practice, municipalities occasionally bail out 
financially troubled public companies they participate in. 
Municipalities are free to leave a public body or terminate their participation in a public 
company. In practice, however, this is not an easy step. The public services in question must 
then be provided by the municipality itself, or a different IO is to be joined. That may not 
always be feasible. Moreover, breaking up requires that all partners agree on a division of 
property and debt. There are no general rules for this. 
Apart from these two main forms of cooperation, several other, looser types exist, e.g., 
foundations and informal communities of government officials in charge of specific public 
services. An alternative to intermunicipal cooperation is municipal amalgamation. Almost 
every year, some Dutch municipalities are amalgamated. Amalgamation may be voluntary or 
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mandatory, depending on the case (Allers & Geertsema, 2016). The number of municipalities 
gradually decreased from 572 in 1997 to 408 in 2013. With over 40,000 inhabitants on 
average, Dutch municipalities are large compared with those in other countries (Allers & 
Geertsema, 2016). 
 
5.2.2 Local government borrowing 
There are no legal limits to the amounts municipalities or IOs can borrow (Allers, 2015). 
There is no default risk associated with loans to municipalities. Dutch municipalities never go 
bankrupt, and neither do intermunicipal public bodies. The Financial Relations Act stipulates 
that a municipality may apply for a supplementary grant if revenues are significantly and 
structurally insufficient to cover necessary outlays. Bailouts occur often enough to be credible 
for potential lenders: ten times in 1998–2014 (Allers, 2015). This explicit bailout guarantee 
enables Dutch municipalities to borrow cheaply. This unique Dutch setting is explained in 
more detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Unlike public bodies, public companies sometimes go bankrupt, although this happens rarely. 
Some of the loans to such companies are guaranteed by local governments. Non-guaranteed 
debt of public companies does carry credit risk, and is excluded from this study.  
Most local governments borrow from banks; some of the bigger municipalities may hold loan 
auctions or issue bonds. Two Dutch banks specialize in loans to local governments, BNG 
Bank and NWB Bank. Apart from these banks, of which all shares are held by the central 
government and subnational governments, municipalities and IOs may borrow from 
commercial banks.  
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5.3 Theory and practice of risk-free credit 
5.3.1 Theory 
Both for municipalities and for public bodies, default risk is zero. Thus, there is no theoretical 
reason for banks to require different interest rates for loans to municipalities and to public 
bodies. For public companies, default risk is positive, but credit risk is zero, as their debt is 
guaranteed by default-free municipalities. However, some legal or administrative costs might 
be incurred in case a loan guarantee needs to be enforced, despite the official legal 
mechanisms in place for such situations. As a result, loans to public companies might carry 
more interest than those to public bodies and municipalities.  
 
5.3.2 Practice: lending 
Interest rates are not determined solely by the rate of return the bank requires; they are the 
result of negotiations between lenders and borrowers. We interviewed representatives of BNG 
Bank45 on the way interest rates are determined. 
The bank builds a so called pricing yield curve by first connecting the funding interest rates 
for different maturities, based on a formal term structure model, and then adding surcharges 
for profit and cost (which may depend on principal and maturity), a liquidity premium (if 
applicable) and a surcharge for cost of capital (“usage of balance sheet”). The exact formula 
and its parameters are the result of a highly formalized administrative decision procedure that 
needs approval from the executive board. Before the start of every business day, current 
interest rates are fed into the system which then automatically provides the bank’s client desk 
with the pricing yield curve.  
The purpose of the loans included in this study is immaterial to the bank as credit risk is zero. 
Moreover, municipalities usually do not borrow for specific projects. Rather, the 
                                                 
 
45 Source: interview with the Chair of the Credit Committee of BNG Bank prof. dr. J.J.A. Leenaars 2002-2015. 
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municipality’s treasurer reviews the entire capital needs of his or her organisation and 
borrows accordingly. Such loans are not lines of credit, though: the principal is lent and paid 
back according to the agreed amortization schedule. 
Actual interest rates are a result of negotiations, usually by telephone or email, between the 
bank’s client desk and the borrower. For the client desk, the pricing curve is exogenous and 
serves as a reference. It may offer lower rates than this curve suggests in order to attract extra 
business on days with ample supply, or when the interest rate on the international market has 
gone down during the day (recall that the pricing yield curve is calculated before the start of 
every business day). Borrowers aware of the latter are likely to secure better deals than 
borrowers who do not spend time to collect market information. BNG Bank’s client desk for 
risk-free loans consists of four persons, who share a single office. Three of them were at this 
client desk during our entire research period; one of them joined it during our research period. 
Each of them is able to follow negotiations carried out by his or her colleagues. Each of them 
arranges loans for both municipalities and IOs.  
This setup ensures that, on the part of the bank, both types of borrowers are treated in the 
same way, by the same persons, following the same procedures and using the same pricing 
curve. Any systematic differences in risk-free interest rates between municipalities and IOs 
are likely to originate from the borrowers’ behavior. Borrowers can obtain somewhat lower 
interest rates by negotiating well. This requires some general knowledge about credit markets, 
up-to-data information about current market conditions, and time. 
 
5.3.3 Practice: borrowing 
Figure 1 describes the decision making process of borrowing money by municipalities and 
IOs. Ultimately, municipalities and IOs serve their citizens. Citizens periodically vote to re-
elect or dismiss the municipal government. Ceteris paribus, higher costs (e.g., higher interest 
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rates) result in higher local taxes or less public services (Allers, 2012). Both diminish the local 
governments’ re-election chances, which provides an incentive to operate efficiently. The 
municipal government delegates day-to-day operations to management, which supervises the 
finance officer who arranges loans.  
 
Figure 1: Decision-making authority with respect to local government borrowing 
 
In the case of IOs’ borrowing, there is an additional link in the chain of command: the general 
board of the IO. Note, however, that this relationship is not as hierarchical as Figure 1 might 
suggest, and that it is shared with other municipalities. Its strength may depend on the legal 
form of the IO. A public body is governed by a general board containing members of 
municipal councils or aldermen from the participating municipalities. It is the general board, 
not the councils of the participating municipalities, that adopts the public body’s budget. This 
budget determines how much participating municipalities contribute. The municipal councils 
may express their views on the proposed budget, but they have to accept the public body’s 
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board’s decision and authorize payment of the budgeted contributions.  
The board managing a public company operates even more independently: it enjoys almost 
complete autonomy vis-à-vis local government (Hulst & van Montfort, (Eds) 2007). The 
board may (partly) consist of representatives of the participating jurisdictions, but they must 
act in the interest of the company and are not accountable to the municipal councils. 
 
5.4 Theory and hypotheses 
 
The delegation of decision-making authority introduces the problem that, due to asymmetric 
information and divergent interests, agents will not automatically act in the best interests of 
their principals. Figure 1 shows in effect a series of principal-agent relationships, with the 
citizen as principal, the finance officer as agent, while elected officials and public managers 
act both as principals and as agents. Agency theory assumes agents to have a negative utility 
for effort and a positive utility for money. It describes how a control system of monitoring, 
sanctions and rewards (referred to as “monitoring”) is needed to align the agent’s objectives 
with those of the principal e.g., (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In our case, monitoring applies to the 
oversight on finance officers who arrange loans, but also on public managers, who are 
responsible for hiring competent finance officers; etc. Less monitoring will result in less effort 
by the agent.  
Optimal monitoring requires trading off costs and benefits. Adding an additional hierarchical 
layer increases monitoring costs while leaving benefits unaffected. This suggests that persons 
arranging IO loans are monitored to a lesser extent than those arranging municipalities’ loans; 
the same applies to their bosses (Figure 1). A second reason to expect less monitoring is the 
fact that the municipal governments’ grip on the IO’s board is weaker than the grip on its own 
staff, which raises monitoring costs. IOs operate with a considerable degree of independence, 
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and financial problems are ultimately shifted to the participating municipalities.  
To make matters worse, agency theory suggests an additional problem: dispersed ownership 
(Sørensen, 2007). Public services provided through IOs are financed from a common pool; 
hence, the costs are shared with other municipalities. Consequently, when a municipality 
decides on the amount of effort (cost) that should be put into monitoring an IO, it will take 
into account that any efficiency gains from putting in that effort will only partly benefit the 
municipality itself, since they will be shared with all other participants (free rider problem). 
This is likely to result in a level of monitoring that is lower than that for the operations of the 
municipality itself.  
The public choice literature, however, provides a different perspective, assuming that citizens 
are unable to effectively oversee their elected representatives. This allows politicians to 
collect rent: they can divert public resources to further their own goals, e.g., to improve their 
chances of being reelected. In our case, it could be attractive for politicians to obtain 
campaign contributions from banks in exchange for higher interest rates on loans. Decision 
making in IOs is further removed from politicians than decision making in municipalities, and 
more different politicians are involved. As a result, it is more difficult for a particular 
politician to exploit the organisation’s resources and transaction costs are higher (Sørensen, 
2007). This could result in lower interest rates for IOs.  
Thus, theoretically, intermunicipal cooperation may result in lower efficiency because of 
reduced monitoring (agency theory), and to higher efficiency because of less political 
meddling (public choice). The net effect is uncertain. Marvel and Marvel (2007), using US 
data, found that the level of monitoring for services provided by other governmental 
organisations is lower than that for the operations of the municipality itself. We expect the 
same for our case. Here, political meddling seems to be less relevant than in other settings. As 
a publicly held company, BNG Bank never makes donations to politicians or organisations 
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involved in campaigns. Indeed, the only donations BNG Bank makes are to the BNG Culture 
Fund, an independent organisation which donates to cultural projects selected by experts in 
the field. This arrangement, and the small amount available for distribution (one million euro 
per year, while there are over 400 municipalities), make political interference in interest rates 
on loans from BNG Bank very unlikely. Thus, we hypothesize that intermunicipal 
cooperation reduces monitoring effort and therefore leads to higher interest costs. 
Hypothesis 1. 
IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities on equivalent loans. 
 
Higher interest rates paid by IOs would not necessarily point to inefficient borrowing 
practices. Because public companies can go bankrupt and municipalities and public bodies 
cannot, lenders could charge the former higher interest rates in order to cover possible legal or 
administrative costs of enforcing a loan guarantee. Then, higher interest paid by public 
companies would not be the result of inefficient borrowing practices. Defaults of public 
companies are exceptional in the Netherlands. Moreover, officials of BNG Bank we 
interviewed46 told us that the costs of retrieving a loan in such a case are negligible.  
Hypothesis 2. 
Public companies do not pay higher interest rates than public bodies. 
 
If hypothesis 2 is accepted, we conclude that IOs could pay less interest. However, this would 
require more effort (collecting market information; negotiating). Only if the benefits of 
putting in this extra effort exceed the costs can we conclude that IOs borrow inefficiently.  
Hypothesis 3. 
                                                 
 
46 Source: interview with the Chair of the Credit Committee of BNG Bank prof. dr. J.J.A. Leenaars 2002-2015. 
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Benefits of extra bargaining effort by IOs would exceed costs. 
 
Accepting hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 would suggest that IOs borrow inefficiently. The question 
then arises why that would be the case. As described above, agency theory suggests three 
possible reasons for reduced monitoring, and, thus, less efficiency in IOs: the introduction of 
extra hierarchical layers, the limited influence of municipality governments on IO boards; and 
dispersed ownership of IOs.  
We test the validity of the last explanation by investigating whether interest rates increase 
with the number of participants in an IO. Several papers argue that inefficiency due to 
common pool effects increases with the number of participants, a phenomenon called the “law 
of 1/n” (Weingast, 1979; Primo & Snyder, 2008). In the case of a particular municipality 
putting effort into monitoring an IO, the share it receives of the gains from that effort are 
proportional to 1/n. 
Although empirical findings supporting the law of 1/n exist in several contexts (e.g., (Baqir, 
2002), some authors have raised questions. Primo and Snyder (2008) give examples of cases 
where a “reverse law of 1/n“ may hold. This is in line with Tornell and Lane (1999), who 
model a situation where each participant has an outside option. This means that, for the most 
efficient organisation as well as for others, participating must be at least as attractive as 
leaving. As n goes up, inefficiency must be curbed to satisfy that condition. As municipalities 
are free to join or leave IOs, this model may be relevant here.  
The public choice literature also supports a “reverse law of 1/n“. It predicts that decision 
making in IOs is more efficient because it is further removed from politicians than within 
municipalities. As the number of participants grows, it gets more difficult for an individual 
politician to exploit the organisation’s resources, as transaction costs are higher.  
Thus, theoretically, a higher number of cooperating municipalities may result in lower 
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efficiency because of reduced monitoring, but also in higher efficiency because of less 
political meddling and because participants have an outside option. The net effect is uncertain. 
Earlier in this section we argue that, in our case, political meddling seems to be less relevant. 
Moreover, as explained, in the Dutch case there are several barriers to leaving an IO. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the first effect dominates.  
Hypothesis 4. 
The interest rate paid by IOs increases with number of participating municipalities 
(i.e. the “law of 1/n” holds). 
 
Accepting hypothesis 4 implies that dispersed ownership (partly) explains why IOs pay higher 
interest rates than municipalities.  
Amalgamation might also affect monitoring effort. Amalgamation is an arduous process that 
may have severe disruptive effects on managerial behavior and organisational outcomes, e.g., 
because of poor staff morale, loss of managerial expertise due to increased turnover, and work 
overload (Andrews & Boyne, 2012). On the other hand, amalgamation might have a 
beneficial effect on efficiency. Existing organisations usually have well established ways of 
doing things, which might have become outdated. Amalgamation forces organisations to 
reconsider procedures and operations, possibly resulting in more efficient practices (Hansen, 
Houlberg, & Pedersen, 2014). Again, the net effect is uncertain. We hypothesize that the first, 
efficiency-reducing, effect dominates, but that it is smaller than for cooperation: 
Hypothesis 5a. 








Interest rates paid by recently amalgamated municipalities are lower than those paid 
by IOs. 
 
5.5 Method and data 
 
Our units of observation are individual loans. We have data on four types of loans with fixed 
interest rates made by BNG Bank, which is the market leader in this field: 
1) Short term loans (up to one year); principal and interest are due at maturity. 
2) Long term loans where amortization and interest is paid in equal installments (Annuity).  
3) Long term loan where the principal is paid back in equal installments (Linear). 
4) Long term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (Bullet). 
Purchase or sale of loans, refinancing before maturity is reached, restructuring, consolidation 
of loans and loans with no fixed interest rate or standard amortization schedules are left out of 
our dataset. Refinancing at maturity is included. We select loans to municipalities and public 
bodies, and loans to public companies which are guaranteed by municipalities. All loans in 
our sample are officially free of credit risk. 
Interest rates vary a lot over time and over amortization schemes. In order to compare interest 
rates of different loans, we relate them to reference interest rates that apply to the same dates 
and amortization schedules. Our dependent variable is the interest rate differential (IRD), 
defined as the relative difference between the actual interest rate ݎ௝ on loan ݆ and the reference 
interest rate ݎ௥௘௙: ܫܴܦ௝ ൌ ௥ೕି௥ೝ೐೑௥ೝ೐೑ . By using a relative measure, we automatically control for 
macro-economic factors influencing interest rates. The IRD may be interpreted as follows: if, 
e.g., IOs have an average IRD that is 0.05 higher than that of municipalities, then, other things 
being equal, they spend 5 percent more on interest payments.1 
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We use the interest rate indicated by BNG Bank’s pricing yield curve as the reference interest 
rate. As explained, this reference rate is exogenous to the staff manning the bank’s client 
desk. For long term loans, reference rates based on the bank’s pricing yield curve are 
available for the most common maturities only: both 5 and 10 years for bullet loans, 5, 10, 15, 
20 and 25 years for loans with linear amortization and 10, 15, 20 and 25 years for loans with 
annuity amortization. We select loans for which reference rates are available, and exclude 
loans with less common maturities from our main analysis. We also exclude outliers 
(observations with an IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25). An extensive sensitivity analysis 
shows that these choices do not affects results (see the appendix of this chapter). 
We have data for 1997–2013. For short term loans, however, data is available for 2006-2013 
only. For each loan, we have data on the identity of the borrower and on the loan 
characteristics that influence interest rates. In our regressions, we use principal, maturity, 
market volatility and forward start (number of days between contract and start of the loan) as 
controls, and we run separate regressions for different amortization schedules. Market 
volatility is measured as the coefficient of variation of the reference interest rate in the 
previous ten business days. In order to allow for non-linearity, we also include the square of 
these variables. Furthermore, we include year dummies to control for nationwide factors 
influencing IRDs.  
Data taken from the bank’s administration are combined with data we collected through a 
survey of IOs: number of participating municipalities, field of activity and legal form. These 
characteristics are subject to change over time (Gradus, Dijkgraaf, & Wassenaar, 2014). We 
define number of partners as equal to 1 in case of loans to municipalities and equal to the 
number of participating municipalities for loans to IOs. 
We use two dummy variables for amalgamation: one indicating whether a municipality has 
been amalgamated in the year of the loan or up to 3 years before, and one indicating whether 
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it has been amalgamated 4-8 years before the loan was made. Thus, we can distinguish short 
run effects from long term effects of amalgamation. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Our dataset contains 11,301 observations, of which 
10,307 are loans to 433 different municipalities, and 994 are loans to 113 different IOs. In 
those 113 IOs, 389 different municipalities participate, ranging from very small to very large.  
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N mean st.dev min max 
Entire sample 
Interest rate 11,301 2.093 1.922 0.050 6.820 
Principal (million euro) 11,301 7.665 12.25 0.091 278.495 
Maturity (years) 11,301 5.972 8.411 0 25 
Forward start (days) 11,301 25.32 129.4 0 2,193 
Number of partners 11,301 1.543 2.400 1 35 
Volatility 11,301 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.088 
IRD 11,301 -0.012 0.084 -0.250 0.250 
IOs 
Interest rate 994 1.684 1.561 0.090 5.620 
Principal (million euro) 994 4.911 8.273 0.010 66.086 
Maturity (years) 994 3.782 6.502 0 25 
Forward start (days) 994 15.59 74.20 0 923 
Number of partners 994 7.178 5.539 2 35 
Volatility 994 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.088 
IRD 994 0.027 0.072 -0.248 0.250 
 
 
5.6 Empirical results 
5.6.1 Do IOs borrow inefficiently? 
Table 2 shows regressions of IRDs on a dummy that takes the value of one if the loan was 
made to an IO, and on a number of control variables.2 The first column includes all loans in 
our dataset. Columns 2-5 concern specific types of loans. In many cases, the control variables 
are highly significant, especially for long term loans which are more heterogeneous than short 













Figure 2. Summary of hypothese tested. 




























Regressions of interest rate differential (IRD): basic analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
IO 0.0432*** 0.0475*** 0.0464*** 0.0271*** 0.0438*** 
 (0.00405) (0.00536) (0.00981) (0.00329) (0.00836) 
Principal (million euro) -0.000815** -0.000869* -0.000855 -0.000607*** -0.000609** 
 (0.000398) (0.000502) (0.000778) (0.000155) (0.000244) 
Principal squared 3.21e-06 3.32e-06 2.55e-05 6.25e-06*** 3.44e-06 
 (3.02e-06) (3.35e-06) (2.23e-05) (2.05e-06) (3.75e-06) 
Maturity (years) -0.00201*** -0.00544 -0.00886*** 0.00191***  
 (0.000559) (0.0138) (0.00293) (0.000658)  
Maturity squared 5.99e-05*** 0.00394 0.000248*** -5.52e-05*** 4.04e-05 
 (1.72e-05) (0.00863) (8.27e-05) (1.88e-05) (4.41e-05) 
Volatility 0.464 0.582* 0.289 0.775*** 0.806 
 (0.297) (0.350) (1.624) (0.206) (0.633) 
Volatility squared 3.707 3.801 7.457 -18.72*** -26.97 
 (6.810) (7.658) (56.88) (5.128) (16.55) 
Forward start (days) 0.000208*** 0.00176 0.000212*** 0.000194*** 0.000338*** 
 (1.38e-05) (0.00142) (1.47e-05) (1.38e-05) (4.43e-05) 
Forward start squared -5.93e-08*** -5.34e-05 -6.76e-08*** -4.57e-08*** -2.06e-07*** 
      
Observations 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500 
R-squared 0.210 0.165 0.717 0.697 0.678 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies included. 
 
We now turn to the central question of this paper: do IOs pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities? The answer is quite straightforward. The coefficients of the IO dummy are 
positive and highly significant for all loan types. IOs pay 3-5 percent more interest on 
equivalent loans. This confirms hypothesis 1. 
Higher interest rates paid by IOs do not necessarily point to inefficient borrowing practices. 
Recall that public companies can (and sometimes do) go bankrupt and public bodies cannot. 
Thus, lenders might want to charge the former higher interest rates in order to cover costs 
associated with enforcing loan guarantees in case of default. In that case, the higher interest 
paid by public companies would not be the result of inefficient borrowing practices. One 
might even argue that our result that IOs pay higher interest rates may be driven partly or 
wholly by this reason. We now test hypothesis 2, stating that interest rates paid by public 
companies are not higher than those paid by public bodies. 
Table 3 presents regression results for IOs only. As extra control variables we add dummies 
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representing the fields in which IOs are active. That is because in some fields, a particular 
legal form or number of participants is more prevalent than in others. The control variables 
concerning individual loan characteristics (shown in Table 2) are included as well, but we do 
not report their coefficients.  
Our dataset does not contain any annuity or bullet loans to public companies (see Table A1 in 
the appendix of this chapter), which explains the blanks in those columns. For short term 
loans and for linear loans, the coefficient of the dummy variable public body is close to zero 
and far from significant. That means that we observe no difference in interest rates compared 
with public companies. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis 2. IOs pay higher interest rates 
while there is no economic reason to do so. 
Table 3 
Regressions of IRD of IOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Legal form: public body 0.00241 0.00297  0.00609  
 (0.0120) (0.0139)  (0.0125)  
Inverse of number of partners (1/n) -0.0318 -0.0172 -0.658 -0.0146 0.0176 
 (0.0384) (0.0590) (5.101) (0.0272) (0.101) 
Field: welfare provision -0.0220 -0.0165 0.0891 -0.0548***  
 (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.972) (0.0136)  
Field: work provision for disabled -0.00725 0.00472 -0.0384 -0.0348*** -0.0227 
 (0.00944) (0.00996) (2.907) (0.0108) (0.0271) 
Field: environmental services 0.00840 0.0246** 0.0996 -0.0184 0.0253 
 (0.0105) (0.0100) (0.997) (0.0138) (0.0478) 
Field: public health -0.00656 -0.0151  -0.0150 0.0746 
 (0.0130) (0.0241)  (0.0159) (0.0743) 
Field: public safety -0.0103 -0.00711 -0.153 -0.0371*** -0.0377** 
 (0.0142) (0.0213) (1.718) (0.0118) (0.0152) 
Field: business development 0.0119 0.0136   -0.0219 
 (0.0184) (0.0202)   (0.0213) 
      
Observations 889 631 25 197 36 
R-squared 0.098 0.084 0.959 0.408 0.978 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls (see Table 2) and year dummies included 
Observations where legal form is unknown are excluded 
 
Thus, presumably, IOs could pay less interest, but no doubt this would require more effort 
(collecting market information; negotiating). Only if the benefits of putting in this extra effort 
exceed the costs (hypothesis 3) can we conclude that IOs borrow inefficiently. A simple 
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calculation can put this into perspective. For IOs in our sample, average loan size is 4.9 
million euro and average interest rate 1.7 percent (Table 1). Thus, yearly interest paid on the 
average loan is 83,000 euro. Paying 3-5 percent more in interest means paying 2,500 – 4,000 
euro more annually. Over 3.8 years (average maturity, Table 1) that amounts to 10,000-
15,000 euro per loan (present value, calculated using average interest rate in sample). 
Assuming wage costs of 100,000 euro (which is generous) and 228 working days per year 
(the Dutch average), 10,000 euro buys 23 days of staff. Thus, spending an extra couple of 
hours or even days in order to secure a lower interest rate would be a very profitable 
investment. Hypothesis 3 is supported. IOs borrow inefficiently. 
 
5.6.2 Is dispersed ownership part of the explanation? 
Agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitoring, and, as a result, less 
efficiency in IOs: the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation, the 
limited influence of municipality governments on IO boards; and dispersed ownership of IOs 
(common pool problem). If dispersed ownership would contribute to inefficiency, we would 
expect interest rates to increase with the number of participants in an IO (hypothesis 4). This 
is tested in Table 3. In our dataset, the number of participants (n) varies from 2 to 35 (Table 
1). In order to directly test the “law of 1/n”, we include 1/n in the regressions. In each column, 
the coefficient is far from significant.  
Thus, our evidence does not support the “law of 1/n”. This implies that it is cooperation as 
such that results in higher interest rates, not the number of parties involved. 
 
5.6.3 Effect of amalgamation 
We now investigate whether amalgamation affects interest paid by municipalities. In Table 4, 
the regressions in Table 2 are extended with two amalgamation dummy variables. The 
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coefficient of none of these is significant for any of the loan types. Municipal amalgamation 
does not affect IRDs, neither in the short run nor in the long run. Using a different cut-off for 
our amalgamation dummies, or using or a linear amalgamation variable instead (number of 
years since amalgamation), does not change our conclusions (not reported).  
Table 4 
Regressions of IRD on cooperation and amalgamation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
IO 0.0426*** 0.0464*** 0.0482*** 0.0271*** 0.0438*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00563) (0.00926) (0.00331) (0.00835) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00312 -0.0113 0.0141 0.00138 0.000783 
 (0.00586) (0.00982) (0.00998) (0.00124) (0.00439) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00455 -0.00764 0.000849 -0.000354 -0.000157 
 (0.00480) (0.00780) (0.00456) (0.00144) (0.00348) 
      
Observations 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500 
R-squared 0.210 0.166 0.720 0.697 0.678 
      
 Only municipalities that participate in IOs included in regressions 
IO 0.0400*** 0.0438*** 0.0532*** 0.0267*** 0.0441*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00638) (0.00952) (0.00328) (0.00910) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before 0.00108 -0.00566 0.0209* 0.00165 1.90e-05 
 (0.00709)  (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.00138) (0.00624) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00393 -0.00650 0.00236 0.000336 0.00493 
 (0.00559) (0.00839) (0.00522) (0.00188) (0.00386) 
      
Observations 8,711 5,405 233 2,735 338 
R-squared 0.213 0.173 0.760 0.690 0.666 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables (see Table 2) and year dummies included. 
 
Thus, hypothesis 5a, which states that amalgamation temporarily leads to higher interest rates, 
is rejected. Moreover, this confirms hypothesis 5b, that amalgamated municipalities have 
lower IRDs than IOs.  
 
5.7 Sensitivity analysis 
 
It might be argued that the decision to cooperate may not be independent of a municipality’s 
efficiency. E.g., efficient municipalities could be less likely to cooperate because they already 
enjoy low costs, or more likely to cooperate because they are more attractive partners. Then, 
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we would be comparing IOs, which comprise relatively (in)efficient municipalities, with a 
group of both inefficient and efficient municipalities. As we have seen, however, the IOs 
included in our database have participants from 389 different municipalities, while the total 
number of municipalities was 572 in 1997 and 408 in 2013. Thus, the majority of 
municipalities participate in the IOs we study. Still, as a robustness check, in the lower panel 
of Table 4, we include only municipalities that participate in at least one of the IOs we study. 
The results are very similar to those in the upper panel of Table 4. 
Five additional sensitivity tests are detailed in the appendix of this chapter. First, we re-run 
regressions, now including uncommon maturities for which no reference interest rates are 
available, using interpolated values for reference interest rates. Secondly, we use a random 
effects model instead of an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification. Furthermore, we allow 
previously excluded outliers with an IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 in our regressions, and 
apply different thresholds. Additionally, we test whether our results are driven by big 
municipalities able to secure cheap loans because of a superior bargaining position. Finally, 
we check whether results are robust to our choice of control variables. The sensitivity analysis 




Local government size is the subject of a lively debate. Municipalities sometimes seem too 
small to be able to perform all tasks that are nowadays expected from them, to benefit from 
scale economies, or to avoid interjurisdictional spillovers. Such problems may be addressed 
through national reforms, e.g., amalgamating small jurisdictions into bigger ones, or 
promoting intermunicipal cooperation in fields where scale matters most. In some cases, local 
governments operating on a small scale can themselves make a choice between amalgamation 
and intergovernmental cooperation. Ideally, the choice of jurisdiction size and the extent to 
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which local governments cooperate should be guided by a comprehensive trade-off of costs 
and benefits. Efficiency effects are, of course, only part of this trade-off. Many different 
aspects need to be considered, e.g., the effect of jurisdiction size on the quality of the 
democratic process (Denters, Goldsmith, Ladner, Mouritzen, & Rose, 2014). Still, efficiency 
is an important subject, as many local governments struggle to make ends meet. This paper 
applies a novel methodology to shed light on the implications of intermunicipal cooperation 
and amalgamation for operating efficiency.  
Econometric research on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on costs is scarce and 
focused on one particular service: solid waste collection. We choose a different approach, 
comparing the price Dutch IOs, amalgamated municipalities and not-amalgamated 
municipalities pay for an identical commodity: risk-free credit. We find that IOs pay 
significantly higher interest rates.  
The higher interest paid by IOs cannot be explained by possible legal or administrative costs 
associated with enforcing guarantees on loans to public companies. That is because there is no 
significant difference in interest rates on loans to public companies (which may default, but 
which borrow under guarantee from the participating municipalities) and public bodies 
(which, under Dutch law, cannot default). Thus, there is no economic reason why IOs should 
be required to pay higher interest rates than municipalities. 
Interest rates are the outcome of a bargaining process, which is costly. It requires general 
knowledge about credit markets and up-to-date information about market conditions. If the 
cost of extra bargaining effort would exceed the benefit from somewhat lower interest rates, 
IOs would not be borrowing inefficiently, even though interest rates could be reduced. We 
show, however, that this is not the case. The benefits of lower interest rates outweigh the extra 
bargaining cost they would require by a wide margin. Consequently, we interpret the higher 
interest paid by IOs as a form of inefficiency.  
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The outcome that cooperation reduces efficiency is consistent with agency theory, but not 
with public choice theory. Agency theory predicts that less monitoring of employees and 
managers reduces efficiency. There are three reasons to expect that monitoring of IO staff and 
operations is looser than in municipalities: the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a 
result of cooperation, the limited influence of municipality governments on IO boards; and the 
fact that IOs are owned by a group of municipalities (dispersed ownership), which might 
create a free rider problem. 
If it is dispersed ownership that drives our results, we would expect the number of partners in 
an IO to affect the interest rate. With more participants, a smaller part of any efficiency 
improvement benefits a particular municipality, reducing the incentive to put effort into 
monitoring the IO. However, we find that the number of participants does not affect the 
interest rate paid by an IO. Our outcomes do not support the “law of 1/n”. That does not 
necessarily mean that dispersed ownership does not create a free rider problem, however; 
there might be a different effect working in the opposite direction, leaving a zero net effect. 
E.g., it might be necessary to curb inefficiency in IOs with more participants, to prevent the 
most efficient partners leaving the IO. Still, our result implies that it is cooperation as such 
that results in higher interest rates, not the number of parties involved. This leaves the 
introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation and the limited influence of 
municipality governments on IO boards as the most probable explanations. Attempts to 
improve IO efficiency may be targeted on these issues. 
Amalgamation, we find, does not lead to higher interest rates. Not even in the short run, 
where one might suspect the amalgamating process to divert time and effort from operational 
processes.  
Of course, interest is only one of many costs, and not the most important one. We use interest 
as an indicator, a “canary in a coalmine”, because controlling for individual loan 
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characteristics enables a clean comparison between municipalities and a broad range of IOs. 
Further research is needed to investigate whether municipal cooperation creates inefficiencies 
that extend beyond paying higher interest rates. If higher interest costs in IOs are indeed 
caused by insufficient monitoring, as suggested by agency theory and our results, we would 
expect inefficiencies elsewhere in IOs, too. Such inefficiencies should be compared with 
possible gains resulting from economies of scale in order to determine the net effect of 
cooperation on efficiency. As noted, the results of previous studies of the effects of 
Intermunicipal cooperation are mixed. It would be interesting to apply our method to 
countries where these effects already have been studied in a different way, and compare the 
outcomes. 
Notes 
1 More precisely, if the IRD of IOs exceeds the IRD of municipalities by x, the former pay 
ݔ ௥ೝ೐೑௥೘ೠ೙೔೎೔೛ as much in interest. That is because ܫܴܦ
ூை ൌ ܫܴܦ௠௨௡௜௖௜௣+x implies  ௥಺ೀି௥ೝ೐೑௥ೝ೐೑ ൌ
௥೘ೠ೙೔೎೔೛ି௥ೝ೐೑




௥೘ೠ೙೔೎೔೛Ǥ As the average value of 
௥ೝ೐೑
௥೘ೠ೙೔೎೔೛ 
in our sample is 1.02, this factor will usually be negligible. Thus, if we find a difference in 
IRD of 0.05, that implies that 5.1 percent more is paid on interest (ͲǤͲͷ ൈ ͳǤͲʹ ൈ ͳͲͲΨ). 
2 Reported standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and for correlation between 










This Appendix contains material that could not be incorporated in the paper because of 
limited space availability. Section 1 gives a detailed description of our sample. Section 2 

























Detailed sample description 
Table A1 
Number of observations by amortization schedule 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
  
IO 994 698 28 231 37 
Municipality, amalgamated 0-3 years before 640 289 23 309 19 
Municipality, amalgamated 4-8 years before 915 530 19 326 40 
Municipality, not recently amalgamated 8,752 5,305 236 2,807 404 
Total 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500 
  
 IOs: field of activity 
Welfare provision 41 36 2 3 0 
Work provision for disabled 529 404 3 116 6 
Environmental services 70 37 5 27 1 
Public health 43 19 0 21 3 
Public safety 98 29 16 47 6 
Business development 120 115 0 0 5 
Other 93 58 2 17 16 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
  
  
IOs: legal form 
Public body 799 553 25 185 36 
Public company 90 78 0 12 0 
Unknown 105 67 3 34 1 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
This Table describes the observations used in regressions reported in Tables 2-4, i.e., excluding 









Treatment of outliers 
 
Figure A1 shows the frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for IOs. Although 
most observations are in the range [-0.1, 0.1], the distribution exhibits long tails on both sides. 
That might be problematic, e.g., in case these result from data errors, especially if systematic 
differences exist between municipalities and IOs. To investigate this, we accessed the paper 
files of the ten loans with highest IRDs and the ten loans with lowest IRDs, both for short 
term loans and for long term loans, and both for municipalities and for IOs, i.e., 80 loans in 
total.47 Table A2 summarises the results. For long term loans, a forward start is the most 
common reason for an extremely high IRD (six out of ten cases, for both municipalities and 
IOs). In two cases, this coincided with a price guarantee, where IOs pay extra to secure the 
right to borrow at a certain IRD in a certain period. A small loan size may also result in a high 
IRD, as the administrative costs of making a loan are fixed. 
 
Figure A1. Frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for IOs (percentages) 
 
One high IRD was the result of a mistake made by the client desk of the bank, and three 
outliers proved to be data errors (in the computerized data we use). For long term loans, the 
                                                 
 

























reason for very low IRDs is, apart from one data error, that the bank sometimes offers interest 
rates below the reference rate given by the pricing yield curve, e.g., when market rates drop 
during the day (the pricing curve is fixed before business starts, early in the morning).  
For short term loans, small loan size and obtaining a price guarantee explain most of the very 
high IRDs; there was one data error. Very low IRDs are caused by large loan sizes, mistakes 
made by the bank’s client desk, and, in two cases, a borrower with a strong bargaining 
position. In these cases, the representative from the IO which took up the loan had recently 
negotiated cheap, big loans for a municipality, and demanded the same low IRD, which the 
bank accepted. This example nicely illustrates the existing bargaining room. 
The only systematic difference between municipalities and IOs we find among these outliers 
is that the latter sometimes pay a premium in order to get a price guarantee. This is not 
observed in our dataset, so we cannot control for it in. In most cases, outliers are related to 
forward start and loan size, which we do control for. However, the number of data errors is 
rather high among outliers. To avoid results driven by outliers, we exclude observations 
where the absolute value of IRD exceeds 0.25 from our main analysis. In our sensitivity 


















Explanations for IRD outliers 
 Municipality IO 
Long term loans 
High IRD   
Forward start 6 6 
Small loan 0 4 
Price guarantee 0 2 
Mistake (too high interest rate offered & accepted) 1 0 
Data error 3 0 
Low IRD   
Low rate offered because of market conditions 10 9 
Data error 0 1 
Short term loans 
High IRD   
Small loan 9 0 
Price guarantee 0 9 
Data error 1 1 
Low IRD   
Big loan 10 6 
Mistake (too low interest rate offered) 0 2 





We test the robustness of the findings of the paper in five ways. First, we re-run regressions, 
now including uncommon maturities for which no reference interest rates are available, using 
interpolated values for reference interest rates. Secondly, we use a random effects model 
instead of an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification. Furthermore, we allow previously 
excluded observations with an IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 in our regressions, and apply 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




different thresholds. Additionally, we test whether our results are driven by big municipalities 
able to secure cheap loans. Finally, we check whether results are robust to our choice of 
control variables. 
Because reference interest rates for long term loans are only available for common maturities, 
we excluded observations with other maturities from the main analysis. In order to check 
whether this has affected our results, we now include all maturities. To find the reference 
interest rates for non-common maturities, we linearly interpolate the reference rates that are 
available. E.g., we find the reference rate for a 12 year loan by interpolating the rate for a 10 
year loan and that of a 15 year loan. For relatively short terms, we interpolate between the 1 
year Euribor rate and the lowest available swap reference rate.48 For long term loans, over 10 
years for bullet loans and over 25 for other long term loans, we use the reference rate for 10 
years and 25 years, respectively. Table A3 presents the results of regressions similar to those 
in Table 4, but including observations with non-standard maturities. Columns 2 of both tables 
are identical, because reference rates are available for all short term loans. The R-squared 
values are somewhat lower in Table A3, which is not surprising as our method of 
interpolating and extrapolating reference interest rates is rather crude (yield curves not 
normally being linear). The coefficients of the IO dummy are hardly affected, though, nor is 
their significance. Now, we do find a significant effect of amalgamation, but only in the short-
term, and only for bullet loans. We conclude that our basic results are hardly affected by 




                                                 
 
48 To make long term loans, BNG Bank borrows money on the international capital market. The proceeds of the bonds issues, paying a fixed interest 
rate, are swapped to Euribor (European inter-bank offered rates) immediately to mitigate interest risk. Short term funding is obtained through the 
money market. Short term lending rates are based on Euribor rates, long term lending rates are based on swap rates. 
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Regressions of IRD with observations with interpolated reference interest rates included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
IO 0.0422*** 0.0464*** 0.0420*** 0.0292*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00563) (0.00872) (0.00303) (0.00644) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00106 -0.0113 0.0148 0.00117 0.0188** 
 (0.00513) (0.00982) (0.0107) (0.00151) (0.00934) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00247 -0.00764 0.00417 -0.000865 0.0160 
 (0.00466) (0.00780) (0.00503) (0.00162) (0.00981) 
      
Observations 12,637 6,822 445 4,118 1,252 
R-squared 0.209 0.166 0.589 0.650 0.454 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls and year dummies included. 
 
So far, we used OLS to estimate our models. However, our data has a panel structure: we 
have 546 organisations (municipalities and IOs) which took out 11,301 loans. Using OLS 
assumes that there are no significant differences across organisations, except for those 
reflected in the variables included in the regression. If such differences do exist, however, a 
random effects model would be appropriate.49 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests for 
random effects confirm that this is the case for regressions of short-term and linear loans in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4. For annuity and bullet loans, on the other hand, the null hypothesis of zero 
variance across organisations cannot be rejected. As a robustness test, we use a random 
effects model to re-estimate the regressions in Table 2. The outcomes hardly differ from those 
                                                 
 
49 Note that a fixed effects model cannot be used because the loan characteristics we are most interested in, i.e., whether the borrower is a municipality 
or an IO, are time-invariant and would consequently be wiped out by the fixed effects. 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




based on OLS estimates (see Table A4). Similarly, using random effects would change Tables 
3 and 4 only slightly (not reported, results available from the authors). 
Table A4 
Regressions of IRD: random effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
IO 0.0443*** 0.0577*** 0.0464*** 0.0242*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00544) (0.00981) (0.00313) (0.00949) 
      
Observations 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500 
Number of borrowers 554 418 114 456 169 
R-squared within model 0.207 0.150 0.632 0.707 0.590 
R-squared overall model 0.207 0.162 0.717 0.693 0.676 
R-squared between model 0.377 0.318 0.693 0.563 0.670 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls and year dummies included. 
 
In order to prevent outliers from influencing our results, we excluded observations with an 
IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 from our regressions. We now test whether our conclusions 
change if we include these observations, or if we instead set a lower threshold. Table A5 
shows results of regressions similar to those in Table 2, reporting only the coefficients of the 
IO dummy and the number of observations. Column 1 presents coefficients from regressions 
where observations with extreme IRDs are not excluded. Column 2 presents coefficients from 
the main analysis as reported in Table 2, excluding IRDs above 0.25 or below -0.25. Including 
extreme observations strongly increases the coefficient for short term loans, while the 
coefficients for the other loan types are hardly affected. In Columns 3–5, we exclude 
observations with an absolute IRD above 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. Obviously, the 
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coefficients are downwardly affected, but they stay positive and highly significant in all cases. 
Thus, our results are not driven by IRDs of a specific magnitude. 
One might worry that our main result is driven by differences in bargaining power of 
municipalities and IOs vis a vis banks. At first glance, that does not seem to be a problem. If 
municipalities had more bargaining power, IOs would be better off to let the participating 
municipalities borrow, and transfer the money to the IO through extra contributions. 
Remember that IOs determine their own budgets, which include such contributions. Still, 
some municipalities might have more bargaining power than others. Most municipalities and, 
as far as we are aware, practically all IOs always use banks when they need credit. However, 
some large municipalities sometimes issue bonds or use auctions to obtain credit. For small 
organisations, these are not feasible options because of the fixed costs attached to them. Thus, 
large municipalities might, because they have more alternatives, be able to secure better deals 
on bank credit. In addition, large municipalities may have better financial-management 
capacity (Simonson et al. 2001).50 We now test whether this might have driven our result that 
municipalities borrow cheaper than IOs. In the regressions underlying Tables 2 and 4, we 
added a dummy variable for big municipalities (results available upon request). We used 
different cut-offs to construct this dummy, but in none was this dummy anywhere near 
significant for any of the loan types we study. More importantly, including such a dummy 






                                                 
 
50 Simonsen, B., Robbins, M.D., Helgerson, L. (2001). The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest Rates: An 
Empirical Analysis, Public Administration Review, 61, 709-717. 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren





Regressions of IRD with observations with absolute value of IRD above threshold dropped 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 No threshold IRD<=0.25 IRD <=0.15 IRD <=0.1 IRD <=0.05 
All loans 
IO 0.120*** 0.0432*** 0.0312*** 0.0207*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.0360) (0.00405) (0.00262) (0.00190) (0.00106) 
Observations 14,216 11,301 9,956 8,853 6,814 
 
Short term loans 
IO 0.156*** 0.0475*** 0.0319*** 0.0188*** 0.00633*** 
 (0.0448) (0.00536) (0.00335) (0.00243) (0.00124) 
Observations 9,695 6,822 5,569 4,593 3,035 
 
Annuity 
IO 0.0455*** 0.0464*** 0.0381*** 0.0383*** 0.0215*** 
 (0.00979) (0.00981) (0.00962) (0.00887) (0.00485) 
Observations 309 306 289 264 227 
 
Linear 
IO 0.0295*** 0.0271*** 0.0269*** 0.0223*** 0.0158*** 
 (0.00439) (0.00329) (0.00323) (0.00263) (0.00164) 
Observations 3,701 3,673 3,612 3,525 3,152 
 
Bullet 
IO 0.0428*** 0.0438*** 0.0402*** 0.0305*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.00885) (0.00836) (0.00724) (0.00393) (0.00370) 
Observations 511 500 486 471 400 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls and year dummies included. 
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Finally, we investigate whether our choice of control variables affects outcomes.51 Leaving 
out year dummies hardly affects results. Including only year dummies as controls results in a 
somewhat stronger effect of the IO dummy on IRD, as is to be expected. Changing the time 
period we use to construct our volatility measure or including the square root or the inverse of 
control variables instead of the square does not make much of a difference. 
We conclude that the sensitivity analysis shows that our results are quite robust. 
 
                                                 
 
51 Regression results are not reported. They are available from the authors. 
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6 Choosing the optimal moment to arrange a loan52 
 
SNGs who take loans have limited possibilities to minimise borrowing costs. They mainly 
depend, aside from some room for bargaining, on the loan offers from banks and on market 
conditions. One subject that is much discussed in the financial departments of SNGs is 
whether an optimal moment to arrange a loan can be found, aiming to lock in the best interest 
rate. Lower borrowing costs could lead to more room to finance public services. We test 
different strategies for borrowers who may choose, within a 20-day time slot, the moment to 
arrange a loan. The strategy that is most successful in minimising the interest rate does not use 
historical data, but starts by observing interest rates for a number of days, and then chooses 
the day with an interest rate that compares favorably. However, differences in outcomes of the 
strategies are too small to matter much. Organisational or behavioral motives to choose a 




In cases where credit is needed, this need is usually known well in advance. Existing loans 
coming to maturity that need to be refinanced; funds needed for investment projects; in no 
well-managed organisation any of this will come as a surprise. This provides borrowers the 
option to choose the moment when a loan is arranged. Instead of waiting until the funds are 
needed, a loan can be arranged earlier, using a so-called forward start. This means that there is 
a time lag between the contract date, i.e., the date the loan is arranged and the interest rate set, 
and the date the funds are made available. 
To illustrate that forward starts are quite common, we present some statistics from a dataset of 
                                                 
 
52 This chapter is based on van Ommeren, B. J., Allers, M. A., & Vellekoop, M. H. (2017). Choosing the optimal moment to arrange a loan (no. 
17007-EEF). University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management). 
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loans of BNG Bank to Dutch municipalities and intermunicipal organisations in 1997-2015.53 
Because of the exceptionally high creditworthiness of Dutch municipalities, one phone call or 
email suffices to secure a loan that starts the same day.54 This unique Dutch setting is 
explained in more detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  However, we find that 65 percent of 
these loans have a forward start. 33 percent of the loans have a forward start of less than 10 
days. However, the maximum is a staggering 2,193 days (about 6 years). The average forward 
start, counting the zeroes, is 71 days; the median is 2.  
Forward starts may have different motivations. First, a forward start may appeal to risk-averse 
borrowers. By arranging the loan as soon as the need for capital has become clear, a cost 
increase as a result of rising interest rates is prevented. A second reason is that loans may 
have to be approved at meetings of high-level officials that take place with intervals; e.g., as 
part of a budget for a project. If, e.g., money is needed in six weeks’ time and meetings where 
a loan can be approved are held monthly, a forward start of several weeks is to be expected. 
Finally, and most relevant for this paper, a forward start may be chosen by a borrower who 
expects the interest rate to rise. By arranging the loan now, at the current rate, the loan will be 
cheaper - provided the borrower was right.  
Figure 1 shows the relative decrease in the benchmark interest rate between contract date and 
loan start in the BNG Bank dataset. Loans represented by dots below the zero line have 
become cheaper as a result of the forward start; loans represented by dots above the zero line 
have become more expensive. In fact, gains and losses seem to cancel out; the linear trend 
line in the Figure (not shown) coincides with the zero-line. On average, loans have become 
0.1 percent (not percent point) cheaper as a result of forward starts. There is a wide variation, 
                                                 
 
53 The dataset contains bullet loans with maturities of 5 and 10 years, annuity loans with maturities of 10, 15, 20 and 25 years, and linear loans with 
maturities of 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years. 
54 All loans in our dataset are risk-free. Dutch municipalities do not default, as a result of an explicit bailout clause enshrined in the law (Allers, 2015). 
The loans to intermunicipal organisations included in the dataset are risk-free because municipalities guarantee them. 
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however; the effect of a forward start ranges from 50 percent cheaper to 43 percent more 
expensive, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Relative benchmark interest rate decrease between contract and start of loan (percent). 
 
Figure 1 does not point to clear cost savings as a result of forward starts, but, as we have seen 
on the previous page, that may not always have been the objective. The question presents 
itself whether successful timing strategies exist that borrowers may use in order to secure 
relatively cheap loans. Perhaps knowledge of previous interest rates may help select the best 
date to fix the interest rate.  
Efficient markets theory does not predict that short-term interest rates follow a random walk 
(Mishkin, 1978; Pesando, 1979). However, in the absence of time-varying term premiums, 
long-term interest rates approximately follow a martingale series when observed over a short 
period (Sargent, 1976; Pesando, 1979). Thus, the best prediction of tomorrow’s interest rate is 
today’s interest rate, even if all previous interest rates are known. This theoretical insight is 
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often fail to beat the random walk model (Fauvel, Paquet, & Zimmerman, 1999; Baghestani, 
2009). 
Of course, efficient markets theory relies on assumptions, some of which may not hold. In 
particular, the assumption that economic agents behave rationally is problematic, as it is not 
applied in a systematic way (LeRoy, 1989). Indeed, there exists an entire industry producing 
financial predictions. If these would have no value, buyers in this market would behave 
irrationally. 
Even if we accept the random walk as the best model to predict tomorrow’s interest rate, 
however, an effective strategy to find a low interest rate in a pre-determined time interval is 
not a priori impossible. E.g., in times of high volatility, it may pay to wait for a day with an 
interest rate that is lower than those in the previous days. Thus, perhaps information about 
previous interest rates can help select the best moment to arrange a loan. 
 
What we have here is a so-called optimal stopping problem, where an irreversible choice must 
be made under uncertainty and within a finite time horizon (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006; Allaart, 
2012). A well-known example is the secretary problem (Ferguson, 1989), where the best 
secretary must be selected from n applicants. The applicants are assessed successively, and 
after each assessment the candidate is either chosen or dismissed. A dismissed applicant 
cannot be called back. The interviewers are able to rank all assessed applicants, but have no 
information at all about candidates who are not (yet) assessed. The optimal decision rule (an 
approximation that becomes closer as n increases) is to dismiss the first n/e candidates, and 
then select the applicant who is better than the best candidate up to that point. In case a better 
candidate does not turn up, the n-th candidate is chosen.  
 
Our case differs from the secretary problem because data about previous interest rates is 
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available. This means that is it not necessary to use part of n to gather information. In this 
paper, we consider a number of simple strategies that can be applied without expert 
knowledge or high cost. We test whether each of these strategies would have been successful 
in the previous two decades. Obviously, no conclusions can be drawn from this about the 
success of these strategies in the future. 
This analysis is socially relevant, as finding strategies that keep borrowing costs low leaves 
financial room for more public facilities. The academic relevancy of this study lies in the 
comparison of different borrowing strategies with optimal stopping strategies (Peskir & 
Shiryaev, 2006; Allaart, 2012) and more in particular that of the ‘secretary problem’ 
(Ferguson, 1989). It is not clear whether and to what extent this solution also holds for finding 
the optimal time to arrange a loan. 
 
6.2 Problem definition 
 
In order to conduct empirical tests, the problem must be defined clearly. Assume that a loan 
has to be arranged regularly. Each time, on day d = 1 it becomes known that, on day d = 20 at 
the last, a certain amount of credit must be available. The interest rate varies from day to day 
(and not during the day, we assume). Data about interest rates on previous days is available. 
The challenge is to find a strategy that selects, within the decision period of 20 days, the day 
with the best interest rate. With days we mean office days; days on which a loan can be 
arranged. 
It is not obvious how the performance of a strategy should be measured. We consider four 
possible objectives to measure the success of a particular strategy. The first objective is: 
maximise the number of times that the strategy selects the lowest interest rate of all interest 
rates within the decision period. This is the objective in the secretary problem. An important 
drawback of this objective is that, in most cases, the lowest interest rate will not be selected, 
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in which case this objective does not maximise the interest rate that is chosen. Our second 
objective does not have this limitation: it aims at choosing the lowest expected interest rate of 
all interest rates within the decision period. That is, it aims to select the lowest interest rate on 
average for all loans.  
The drawback of this objective is that interest rates in different periods cannot always be 
fruitfully compared, because the market rate can change significantly over time. The third 
objective circumvents this, by aiming to get the best ratio of the selected interest rate and the 
lowest interest rate within the decision period.  
For risk-averse borrowers, however, this will probably still be unsatisfactory. That is because 
a strategy may be successful on average, but have greatly varying outcomes. In that case, it 
may work out rather disappointingly in a particular case. The fourth objective therefore aims 
to minimise the variation in the selected interest rate (as measured by the standard deviation). 




We study five classes of strategies.  
Strategy 1(k) is to look back passively during a reference period of k days, k = 1..20. The 
lowest interest rate from that period is taken as the reference rate. Strategy 1(8), e.g., is to wait 
for a day when the interest rate is lower than or equal to the lowest rate in the 8 days 
preceding d = 1, and then arrange the loan. Strategy 1a is to wait until the interest rate is 
strictly lower than the reference rate. If no lower interest rate comes before the last available 
day, the loan is arranged on d = 20. 
 
Strategy 2(k) is to look back actively for k days, k = 1..20. On each day within the decision 
period, which runs from d= 1 to d = 20, one looks back to the k days preceding that day. The 
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lowest interest rate from that reference period is the reference rate. The difference with 
strategy 1 is that the set of k reference days is shifted one day towards the future on every day 
within the decision period, while this set is fixed in strategy 1. Strategy 2 is to arrange the 
loan as soon as the interest rate is equal to or lower than the reference rate. Strategy 2a is to 
wait until the interest rate is strictly lower than the reference rate. Again, if no (strictly) lower 
interest rate materializes, the loan is arranged on day 20. 
 
Strategy 3(k) is to first determine the drift (difference in interest rate) between k days before d 
= 1 and d = 1, for k = 1..20. If the drift is positive, the loan is arranged immediately (d = 1). If 
the drift is negative, one waits for d = 20 to arrange the loan. Thus, this strategy compares 
interest rates on two days only.  
 
Strategy 4(k) follows the classic secretary approach. No historic data are used. Instead, k days 
are used to observe interest rates, k = 1..20. The lowest rate within this period is the reference 
rate. The loan is arranged as soon as the interest rate is equal to or lower than (or strictly 
lower than, strategy 4a) the reference rate, or, if such an interest rate does not appear between 
day k and day 20, at the last day. 
 
Strategy 5(d) is the simplest: always choose a fixed day d to arrange the loan. E.g., always 
select d = 1, d = 7 or d = 20.  
 
More formally, we define strategies according to the following stopping moments: 
߬ଵ௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ͳǥʹͲȁݎௗ ൑ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎଵି௝ሽ߬ଵ௔
௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ͳǤ ǤʹͲȁ ݎௗ ൏ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎଵି௝ሽ 
߬ଶ௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ͳǥʹͲȁݎௗ ൑ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎௗି௝ሽ߬ଶ௔
௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ͳǤ ǤʹͲȁ ݎௗ ൏ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎௗି௝ሽ 
߬ଷ௞ ൌ ͳ௥భஹ௥భషೖ+ 20 ͳ௥భழ௥భషೖ߬ଷ௔௞ ൌ ͳ௥భவ௥భషೖ+ 20 ͳ௥భஸ௥భషೖ 
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߬ସ௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ݇ ൅ ͳǥʹͲȁݎௗ ൑ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎ௝ሽ߬ସ௔
௞ ൌ ሼ݀ ൌ ݇ ൅ ͳǥʹͲȁݎௗ ൏ ଵஸ௝ஸ௞ ݎ௝ሽ 
߬ହ௞ ൌ ݇ 
where r denotes interest rate. If no stopping time is found, day 20 is selected. 
 
6.4 Empirical research 
 
We test these strategies using historical benchmark interest rates from BNG Bank, with 
different maturities and different amortization schemes, from January 2, 1997 up to December 
31, 2015. BNG Bank is the Dutch market leader in credit to (quasi) public organisations like 
municipalities, IOs, water authorities and housing corporations. Benchmark interest rates are 
used by the bank in negotiations with clients requesting a loan (Allers & van Ommeren, 
2016). Benchmark rates are based on Euribor for short term loans and on swap rates for long 
term loans, and contain surcharges for profit, cost and liquidity. The benchmark rate, which 
depends on amortization pattern and maturity, is derived before the start of every business day 
by feeding the current market interest rates into an automated system. 
Interest rates on loans with a forward start are usually higher, because pricing is based on 
immediate borrowing by the bank, on the capital market, until maturity, and lending to a third 
party against a usually lower rate for the period until the loan starts. The resulting loss in the 
first period has to be compensated by a premium on the interest rate during the second period, 
leading to a higher interest rate. The forward start surcharge depends on maturity, length of 
forward start and interest yield structure. For forward starts up to 20 day, this surcharge is 
low; approximately one basis point (0.01 percent point).55 In the empirical analysis we 
                                                 
 
55 Cost neutrality for the bank implies: ሺͳ ൅ ܴ݊ሻ௡ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ܴ݀ሻௗ כ ሺͳ ൅ ܴ݂ሻ௡ିௗ. Here, ܴ݂ is the forward interest rate of a loan starting at 
year d and ending at year n; ܴ݊ denotes the current interest rate for loans with a maturity of n years; ܴ݀ the current interest rate for loans 
with a maturity of d years. Solving this equation for ܴ݂ yields ܴ݂ ൌ ቀሺଵାோ௡ሻ೙ሺଵାோௗሻ೏ቁ
భ
೙ష೏ െ ͳ. Substituting the average benchmark interest rates for 
ܴ݀ (20 days) and ܴ݊ (both 5 and 25 years) in our data period yields a forward start surcharge of 1.6 and 0.5 basis points, respectively. Of 
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therefore abstract from this. In our discussion of the results we will come back to the forward 
start surcharge. 
We apply every strategy on each of the 238 consecutive series of 20 office days that existed 
within our data period. The strategies are tested for bullet loans with maturities of both 5 and 
10 years, and for linear loans with maturities of 10, 15, 20 and 25 years, because for such 
loans, benchmark interest rates are available. Bullet loans are loans where the principal is paid 
back at maturity. Linear loans are loan where the principal is paid back in equal installments. 
With both loan types, interest on outstanding debt is paid annually. 
Figure 2. Benchmark interest rates for 5 year and 10 year bullet loans, 1997-2015. 
 
We plot the outcomes in graphs which are organized in four rows and four columns. Each row 
corresponds to a strategy; however, strategy 5 is shown in every row (black* lines). Each 
column corresponds to one of the four objectives described above. Figure 3 presents the 
results for bullets loans with 5-year maturity. The other loan types we studied yield similar 
results; they are available in the appendix to this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
course, banks are free to deviate from this theoretical surcharge, e.g., by adding a profit margin, or by not bothering to apply a surcharge for 
short-term forward starts at all. 
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The first column shows, for each strategy, in what percentage of cases the lowest interest rate 
from all interest rates within the decision period is selected. On the horizontal axis is k, the 
length of the reference period. For strategy 5, which does not have a reference period, d is on 
the horizontal axis. A value of 15 for a k of 8 denotes, e.g., that this strategy, using a reference 
period of 8 days, selects the lowest interest rate 15 percent of the time. In this column, higher 
means better.  
Column 2 presents, for each strategy, the average of the selected interest rates. The horizontal 
black lines in this column show the average benchmark interest rate in the research period. 
Column 3 presents the ratio between the selected interest rate and the lowest of all interest 
rates within the decision period. Column 4 shows the standard deviation of the selected 
interest rate (in percent point) over all 238 periods of 20 working days within our research 
period. In columns 2, 3 and 4, lower means better. 
 
Figure 3: Simulation results for bullet loans with 5- year maturity        
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Table 1 summarises the results for bullet loans with a maturity of 5 years. With objective 1, 
which maximises the percentage of cases where the lowest interest rate from all interest rates 
within the decision period is selected, strategy 4, the secretary approach, is optimal, with k = 
16. Note that this k is higher than the theoretical optimum of n/e, which approximately equals 
7.56 Recall that this theoretical optimum is an approximation, which is better with high values 
of n. Also, interest rates may not necessarily appear in random order, which is one of the 
assumptions underlying this approximation. Using strategy 4(16), in 24 percent of all cases, 
the lowest available interest rate was selected (Table 1). The second-best strategy is 5(20): 
always arrange the loan at the last possible moment. This yields the best interest rate in 17 
percent of all cases. This strategy is relatively successful because, in the research period 
(1997-2015), the interest rate went down more often than it went up. The difference in 
outcome between the best performing strategy and the second-best is 7 percent point, whereas 
the difference between the best and the worst performing strategy, 5(11), is 21 percent point. 
Table 1. Best and second-best strategy per objective; 5-year bullet loans 
 
 
With objective 2, selecting the lowest rate on average, the secretary approach is best as well; 
this time, waiting until the interest rate is strictly lower than the reference rate (strategy 4a) is 
slightly better than waiting until it is equal to or lower than the reference rate (strategy 4). The 
optimal k equals 8, which is close to the theoretical optimum of the secretary problem; recall, 
                                                 
 
56 Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm, approximately 2.72. 
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however, that this theoretical optimum pertains to objective 1. Strictly speaking, with 
objective 2, strategy 4 is second best (Figure 3), but because 4 and 4a are close variations on a 
theme, we include 3(20) as second best in Table 1. This strategy implies arranging the loan 
immediately in case of positive drift, and waiting as long as possible in case of negative drift, 
with the maximum reference period of k = 20. The difference in outcomes between best and 
second best is 0.3 basis points (0.003 percent point). The outcome of the worst performing 
strategy, 5(1), differs 2,9 basis points from that of the best performing strategy. 
 
As explained, objective 3 may be the most relevant for many organisations. This objective 
minimises the ratio of the selected interest rate and the lowest available interest rate in the 
decision period. Again, the secretary approach dominates, with k = 8. On average, the selected 
interest rate was 3.5 percent (not percent point) above the lowest available rate. As with 
objective 2, strategy 4a is slightly better than strategy 4, and the second best strategy is 3(20). 
With this strategy, the selected interest rate was 3.9 percent above the lowest available rate.  
 
The good performance of the secretary approach is remarkable. In many cases, it performs 
better than looking back passively (strategy 1), even though it sacrifices k days of the decision 
period to collect data, and even though is does not optimise objective 3 but objective 1. 
Compared with strategies 2, 3 and 5, strategy 4 also performs well for many values of k (until 
k = 10..15, depending on loan type; see Figure 3 and the Figures in the appendix). Strategy 4 
often performs best with objective 1 or 2, too. 
Based on objective 4, which minimises the standard deviation of the selected interest rate, 
strategy 5(6) would be preferred, followed by 1(2) as a second best. Strategy 4 performs 
tolerably well with this objective, as long as k is below 7. For k = 13-16, on the other hand, 
strategy 4 has the highest standard deviation of all strategies (Figure 3). 
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The most important lesson to be drawn from column 4 in Figure 3, however, is that outcomes 
vary greatly over time. The standard deviation exceeds 100 basis points for every strategy. 
Differences in standard variations between strategies are relatively limited. Compared to their 
standard deviations, differences in outcomes of strategies are very small.  
As mentioned above, a forward start results in a higher interest rate to compensate the bank 
for making the funds available before they are needed. For forward starts up to about 20 days, 
this surcharge is in the order of one basis point. This surcharge should be subtracted from the 
gains of using a strategy with a forward start, but as we have seen, this cost is negligible 




In cases where a borrower may choose, within a limited time slot, the moment to arrange a 
loan, and thus the moment the interest rate is determined, it is probable not advisable to spend 
much time on this choice. Based on a comparison of five classes of simple strategies, applied 
to interest rates from 1997-2015, we conclude that outcome differences between strategies are 
small, and that the variation in outcomes of each strategy over time is much bigger. One of the 
strategies we studied, the classic secretary approach, performs better than other strategies in 
many cases, but the potential gains from using this strategy are dwarfed by the variation of 
outcomes over time. Thus, for a particular loan, the probability that this strategy performs 
significantly better than one of the other strategies we considered is very low. Our empirical 
analysis is based on interest rates from one bank, BNG Bank of the Netherlands, but these are 
closely related to international market rates. 
Because differences in outcomes are small, organisational or behavioral motives to choose a 
particular borrowing strategy may be decisive. In cases where, e.g., a certain budget has been 
allocated to a project, it may be sensible to immediately arrange a loan carrying an interest 
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that fits within the budget, if such a loan is available at that moment. Thus, rising interest rates 
cannot jeopardize the project. More generally, risk-averse borrowers could decide to always 
use a maximum forward start, i.e., arrange the loan immediately, while risk-neutral persons 
could decide to never use a forward start, because then a forward start surcharge on the 
interest rate is avoided. 
 
However, borrowers who want to use the strategy which just outperformed the other strategies 
we considered in recent history should go for the secretary approach. This easy to apply 
strategy promises good results for different maturities and different optimising criteria, while 
no historical data are needed.  
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Figure A1. Simulation results for bullet loans with 10-year maturity 
 
Figure A2. Simulation results for linear loans with 10-year maturity
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Figure A3. Simulation results for linear loans with 15-year maturity 
 

















7 Summary and conclusions 
 
The ongoing decentralisation of the public sector is accompanied by a strong demand for 
credit at an SNG level to finance investments. To ensure a proper and sustainable 
implementation of tasks, affordable and reliable sources of credit are of key importance. In 
Europe, bank loans are by far the most important source of credit for SNGs. In most countries 
in Europe, public sector banks have been created to facilitate the financial needs of SNGs. 
Government guarantees are provided, implicitly or explicitly, to lower barriers to credit and to 
lower interest rates on loans. The Netherlands has put in place explicit government guarantees 
for municipalities and social housing associations. This phenomenon is typically Dutch and 
unique in Europe. Other countries are reluctant to provide explicit guarantees because they 
fear moral hazard. Providing well-designed explicit government guarantees is inextricably 
linked to an adequate institutional setting and borrowing practice to prevent abuse. One of the 
key elements of this institutional setting is the limitation on SNG borrowing, which is 
explained below.  
 
In the Netherlands, SNGs may borrow unlimited amounts within a balanced budget. The 
budget is accounted for on an accrual basis. According to this standard, costs and 
expenditures may be incurred that will be accounted for at a later date, conforming to the pay-
as-you-use philosophy. As a result of this, the budget may be in balance but at the same time 
indicate a cash shortage, which needs to be funded with credit to execute the necessary 
payments, resulting in increasing debt levels. Borrowing within a balanced budget can be 
achieved as long as the interest on loans and depreciations of investments are covered by the 
budget. The loan amount and the investment are not part of the budget and are presented on 
the balance sheet. Dutch SNGs borrow under a form of government guarantee. Because the 
lack of market forces on the level of interest to be paid, regardless of the level of debt or 
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economic performance, this could lead to unsustainable debt levels and financial distress. 
However, in the Netherlands SNGs do not go bankrupt and bailouts seldom occur.  
 
The Netherlands, with its explicit government guarantees, offers a unique opportunity for 
empirical research. This thesis included three empirical studies, all related to borrowing costs: 
the first examining the impact of government guarantees on SNG borrowing costs; the second 
comparing the efficiency of different types of SNGs by measuring the borrowing costs; and 
the third looking at strategies to lower borrowing costs by finding an optimal moment to 
arrange a loan. Data from 1997 to 2013 was used for all municipalities and social housing 
associations to carry out a panel regression. Before turning to a final look at these studies, it 
should be recalled that for a better understanding of the unique Dutch setting in which 
municipalities can borrow with explicit government guarantees, in Chapter 2 we clarified the 
institutional setting in the Netherlands, that is, the tiers of government, the financial 
institutions and their roles related to municipal borrowing, while in Chapter 3 we described 
the practice of municipal borrowing with explicit government guarantees, practical issues 
concerning municipal borrowing and a quantitative description of contracted loans. 
 
7.1 Bailout clauses and borrowing costs (Chapter 4) 
 
An important goal of government guarantees is to make credit available to SNGs at affordable 
prices and to create a level playing field. This chapter investigated the effects of explicit 
government guarantees on borrowing costs of housing corporations and municipalities. Four 
main issues were empirically studied. We addressed the questions of: To what extent do 
unguaranteed loans have higher interest rates than guaranteed loans? Do we find support for 
the notion that guarantees (in the Dutch institutional setting) are undesirable with respect to 
moral hazard? Are differences in the two different guarantee systems (that for housing 
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corporations and that for municipalities) reflected in interest rates? Does the financial 
situation of the borrower influence the interest rate on guaranteed and unguaranteed loans? 
 
Firstly, while controlling for other relevant factors, we conclude that the government 
guarantee substantially lowers interest rates paid by housing corporations by about 72 basis 
points (i.e. 0.72 percentage points). This could be seen as stating the obvious. However, 
credibility is not a matter of course, in the first place because unguaranteed loans may benefit 
from an implicit guarantee with a downward pressure on interest rates. In addition, if the bank 
assesses the guarantee as not fully credible, it may still charge a risk premium for guaranteed 
loans. Moreover, differences in interest rates were found in relation to the risk-free reference 
rates, probably reflecting commercial margins. We found evidence that making a guarantee 
explicit substantially helps to lower interest rates. 
 
Secondly, the annual benefits of reduced interest payments were compared with the bailout 
payments to housing corporations. The yearly benefits, in the form of lower interest 
payments, to the social housing sector amounted to around EUR 610 million. Comparing this 
with the bailout payments provided to rescue housing corporations (EUR 1.5 billion over 24 
years, 1990-2014), it appears likely that the guarantee has had a positive net benefit. This 
means that the bailout clause would only be undesirable if it led to very high indirect costs, 
such as, for example, loss of efficiency. We conclude, contrary to the mainstream literature, 
that such a guarantee is not necessarily undesirable due to moral hazard problems. Of course, 








Thirdly, we compared two guarantee systems. On the one hand, municipalities are entirely 
protected from default by law and legislation. On the other hand, for housing corporations, 
individual loans are protected by a guarantee fund. This means that housing corporations can 
default on a loan and will be bailed out by the guarantee fund ex post. This may result in extra 
costs for the bank to collect money due, so that the bank may charge a premium for this. 
However, we found no differences in interest rates paid by municipalities and housing 
corporations. This means that the guarantee system for housing corporations is equally 
successful in lowering interest rates as the one for municipalities. Therefore, we conclude that 
we can generalise the results for housing corporations to municipalities. 
 
Fourthly, the relevance of the explicit government guarantee is again confirmed by our 
finding that a housing corporation’s financial position (or riskiness) influences interest rates 
for unguaranteed loans only. This indicates that, in our research period, the bank did not 
monitor housing corporations when providing guaranteed loans, but relied on the credibility 
of the bailout clause and the assessment of the supervisory authorities. For unguaranteed 
loans, however, the bank monitors the riskiness of housing corporations.  
 
We emphasise that we are not arguing that explicit government guarantees are desirable under 
all circumstances, but rather that they are not undesirable per se. 
 
The research on the bailout clause could gain credibility by extending the datasets. The 
current research focuses on loans made by one bank, while corporations also borrow 
substantial amounts of capital from other banks. Also, nearly all unguaranteed loans are short-
term loans. This makes it hard to isolate the effect of the bailout, since, in principle, 
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differences in interest spread could also be due to the loan type. Results could gain credibility 
if the dataset could be extended by including more long-term unguaranteed loans. 
 
Avenues for further research might include the investigation of guarantee frameworks in other 
countries and how to optimise the design of guarantees to prevent abuse. Moreover, additional 
research on the effects of explicit government guarantees and implicit guarantees would be 
welcome to obtain a better understanding of the borrowing costs. In the mainstream literature, 
the downside of guarantees is emphasised by focusing on moral hazard issues. It would be 
helpful to shed more light on the institutional setting and the benefits of guarantees, such as 
easy access to credit at low costs.  
 
7.2 The efficiency of different types of SNG (Chapter 5) 
 
In many countries, municipalities are seeking opportunities to ensure a more efficient delivery 
of services. Two possible solutions are municipal amalgamations or cooperation through 
intermunicipal organisations (IOs). This study applied a novel approach to measure the 
efficiency implications of this choice by comparing borrowing costs on equivalent loans. 
Subsequently, in the case of differences, we investigated what might have been the cause. 
With respect to this, we explored the questions: Do different forms of IOs (guaranteed public 
companies and public bodies) pay the same interest rates? Does it make sense to invest in 
bargaining power to lower interest rates? Does the number of participants in an IO influence 
the interest they pay (a phenomenon called the law of 1/n)? Do recently amalgamated 
municipalities pay higher interest rates than those which are not recently amalgamated? 
  
Firstly, we found that IOs in the Netherlands consistently pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities on equivalent risk-free loans. To understand the origin of this difference we 
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investigated two different forms of IOs, a guaranteed public company and a public body. 
While a public company can default, entailing possible legal or administrative costs 
associated with enforcing guarantees on their loans, a public body cannot (under Dutch law). 
This means that the bank may demand a credit risk premium for loans to public companies. 
Despite this difference, we found no significant variation in interest rates between public 
bodies and public companies. Thus, there is no economic reason why IOs should be required 
to pay higher interest rates than municipalities.  
 
Secondly, interest rates are the outcome of a bargaining process which has its own costs. It 
requires general knowledge about credit markets and up-to-date information about market 
conditions. If the cost of additional bargaining efforts exceeds the benefit of somewhat lower 
interest rates, IOs would not be borrowing efficiently, despite interest rates being reduced. 
With a simple calculation, we showed, however, that this is not the case. The benefits of 
potentially lower interest rates outweigh the extra bargaining costs by a wide margin. 
Consequently, we interpreted the higher interest paid by IOs as a form of inefficiency. 
 
A lower level of monitoring could lead to higher borrowing costs if the absence of rewards or 
sanctions results in lesser effort to realise the best interest rate for the organisation. Staff of 
the client desk of a bank also have commercial targets. The interest rate to be set on a loan in 
this oligopolistic market may vary within small margins (e.g. 10 basis points). This is the 
result of a bargaining process. The banks keep track of their failure and success rates for loan 
offers (quotes) at a general level. If many loan offers are rejected this could be a reason to 
lower the general interest level. These failure and success rates are also recorded at a client 
level. The client desk is well aware of the nature and the determination of individual clients 
and will find ways to realise commercial targets. Clients that always accept a first loan offer 
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or loan offers from the same bank, loyal clients, will end up with a higher interest rate. This 
higher interest rate could be interpreted as a form of inefficiency because the benefit of extra 
bargaining efforts exceeds the costs. 
 
Agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitoring and, thus, less 
efficiency in IOs: the introduction of additional hierarchical layers; the limited influence of 
municipality governments on IO boards; and dispersed ownership of IOs. If it is dispersed 
ownership that drives our results, we would expect the number of partners in an IO to have an 
effect on the interest rate. With more participants, each municipality gains a smaller part of 
the benefits of any efficiency improvement, reducing the incentive to put an effort into 
monitoring the IO. However, we found that the number of participants did not affect the 
interest rate paid by an IO. Thus, our results did not support the ‘law of 1/n’. This does not 
necessarily mean that dispersed ownership does not create a free rider problem; rather, there 
might be another effect working in the opposite direction, leaving a zero net effect. For 
example, it might be necessary to curb inefficiency in IOs with more participants to prevent 
the most efficient partners leaving the IO. Nevertheless, our result implies that it is 
cooperation as such that results in higher interest rates, not the number of parties involved. 
This leaves the introduction of additional hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation and the 
limited influence of municipality governments on IO boards as the most probable 
explanations.  
 
Thirdly, we studied the effects of municipal amalgamation – which could also lead to reduced 
monitoring – on interest rates. However, we found no differences in interest rates between 
municipalities and amalgamated municipalities, not even in the short run, where one might 
suspect the amalgamation process could divert time and effort from operational processes.  
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If insufficient monitoring in IOs is indeed causing higher borrowing costs, as suggested by 
agency theory and our results, we would also expect inefficiencies elsewhere in IOs.  
 
The research on the efficiency of different types of SNGs could gain credibility by extending 
the datasets. The current research focuses on loans made by one bank, while SNGs also 
borrow substantial amounts from other suppliers of money.  
 
Further research is needed to investigate whether IOs create inefficiencies that extend beyond 
paying higher interest rates. It would also be interesting to apply our method to countries 
where these effects have already been studied in a different way and compare the outcomes. 
 
7.3 Choosing the optimal moment to arrange a loan (Chapter 6) 
 
SNGs who take loans have limited possibilities to minimise borrowing costs. They mainly 
depend, aside from some room for bargaining, on the loan offers from banks and on market 
conditions. One subject that is much discussed in the financial departments of SNGs is 
whether an optimal moment to arrange a loan can be found, aiming to lock in the best interest 
rate. Lower borrowing costs could lead to more room to finance public services. Dutch 
municipalities borrow under a form of government guarantee. Banks do not have to perform 
complicated credit-risk assessments for these loans. This enables municipalities to arrange 
loans at very short notice, some even starting the same day. In cases where credit is needed, 
this is usually known well in advance. For instance, debtors know when loans that are coming 
to maturity need to be refinanced. This provides debtors with the option to choose the exact 
moment to arrange a loan. Instead of waiting until the funds are needed, a loan can often be 
arranged earlier, using a ‘forward starting’ loan. The interest rate is fixed at the moment the 
loan is arranged. Dutch municipalities often use forward starting loans.  
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There are several reasons to arrange forward starting loans. Firstly, it may appeal to risk-
averse borrowers. Secondly, administrative procedures may be the origin of this choice. 
Thirdly, and most relevant for this study, speculative reasons, the expectation of higher 
interest rates, may be the origin of this choice. Forward starting loans may incur a small 
‘surcharge’ to cover the funding costs of the bank for making the funds available at a later 
date.  
 
This chapter focused on the possibility of lowering interest rates by choosing the optimal 
moment to arrange a loan within a timeslot of one month (20 working days). We tested this 
notion by comparing five different classes of strategies, easy to implement at low costs. Three 
of them made use of historical interest rates. For forward starts of up to one month, the 
calculated surcharge is low; approximately one basis point (0.01 percentage point). 
 
The strategies 
1) The first strategy is a passive strategy: looking back up to one month (20 working 
days), the lowest interest rate in this period is selected and this interest rate is set as the 
reference rate for the coming decision period (also 20 working days). The loan is 
arranged at the moment that the current interest rate is lower than or equal to this 
reference rate (strictly lower interest rates are indicated by ‘a’ in Table 7.1). If this 
does not occur, the loan is arranged on the last possible day. 
2) The second strategy is a variation on the first. It is an active strategy, which means that 
the reference rate is set every new day. 
3) The third strategy uses the drift of the market: the positive or negative difference 
between an interest rate in the past (1 to 20 days) and the rate at the start of the 
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decision period. If the drift is up, the loan is arranged immediately, if it is down the 
last possible day is chosen. 
4) The fourth strategy follows the classic ‘secretary strategy’ approach. No historical 
rates are used; instead, a waiting period is created (1 to 20 days), during which the 
lowest interest rate is set as the reference rate. The loan is arranged the moment the 
current interest rate is lower than or equal to this reference rate in the rest of the 
decision period (20 days minus the waiting period). If this does not occur, the loan is 
arranged on the last possible day. 
5) The last strategy is the easiest: always arrange the loan on the same day in the decision 
period, e.g., day 1 or day 2, or another fixed day. 
 
The objectives and results 
We defined different objectives to measure the results of the strategies:  
1) Maximising the probability of choosing the lowest interest rate. 
2) On average, the lowest interest rate. 
3) The lowest ratio between the chosen interest rate and the lowest rate. 
4) Minimising the variation in the selected interest rate (as measured by the standard 
deviation). 
The results of the application of each strategy are presented in Table 7.1 (with the optimal 
number of days looking back/waiting period in brackets). These results apply to loans with a 








Table 7.1 Summary of the results for bullet loans with a maturity of five years  
 
With respect to Objective 1, which maximises the percentage of cases where the lowest 
interest rate of all interest rates within the decision period is selected, Strategy 4, the secretary 
approach, is optimal on day 16. Using Strategy 4(16), in 24% of all cases, the lowest available 
interest rate was selected (Table 7.1). The second-best strategy is 5(20): always arrange the 
loan at the last possible moment. This objective does not provide information about what is 
optimised if the lowest interest rate is not selected, therefore, we included the second 
objective. With this objective, Strategy 4a(8), the secretary approach (a = variant strictly 
lower) with a waiting period of 8 days, selects on average the lowest interest rate. A 
shortcoming of this objective is that, as a consequence of volatile interest rates, the results are 
also driven by market developments. For this reason, we included Objective 3, which is 
perhaps the most relevant for many organisations.  
 
This objective minimises the ratio of the selected interest rate and the lowest available interest 
rate in the decision period. For example, a ratio of 103.5 means that when the lowest rate is 
4% the expected selected rate will be 4.14%. In the worst case, a difference of 1.5% from the 
lowest rate of 4% will result, with an expected difference of six basis points (0.06 percentage 
points). Although a strategy may perform well with an average ratio, this may be the result of 
volatile outcomes, which increases the risk. Therefore, we also included Objective 4 to 
identify the strategy with the lowest risk, measured by the standard deviation during the whole 
research period. The standard deviation for all strategies is beyond 100 basis points, which 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




could be intertreted as equally risky strategies. 
 
The good performance of the secretary approach for all objectives should be noted. In many 
cases, it performed better than strategies that set the reference rate based on historical rates. 
Nevertheless, while the classic secretary approach performed better than other strategies in 
many cases, the potential gains from using this strategy are dwarfed by the variation of 
outcomes over time. The differences in results between the strategies were small, on average 
less than 3 basis points. In addition, we have to deduct the surcharge for the forward start, 
estimated at 1 basis point. Thus, for a particular loan, we considered the probability that this 
strategy performs significantly better than one of the other strategies to be very low. Our 
empirical analysis was based on interest rates from one bank, the BNG Bank of the 
Netherlands, but these are closely related to international market rates. 
 
We conclude that organisational and behavioural motives to choose a borrowing strategy or a 
moment to arrange a loan within a limited time (one month) will have no effect on expected 
financial results. In cases, for example, where a certain budget has been allocated to a project, 
it may be sensible to immediately arrange a loan carrying an interest rate that fits within the 
budget, if such a loan is available at that moment. In this way, rising interest rates will not 
jeopardise the project. More generally, risk-averse borrowers could decide to always use a 
maximum forward start, that is, arrange the loan immediately, while risk-neutral borrowers 
might decide to never use a forward start, because they can thereby avoid the forward start 
surcharge on the interest rate. It is reassuring to know that these motives have a negligible 
effect on the expected financial results. 
 
However, borrowers who want to use a strategy which has recently proven to outperform 
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others, should use the secretary approach. This strategy is easy to apply and promises good 
results for different maturities and different optimising criteria, while no historical data are 
needed. 
 
The research on choosing the optimal moment to arrange a loan could gain credibility by 
extending the datasets with market rates and new strategies. The current research focuses on 
BNG Bank interest rates and five strategies, it would be interesting to know if the results also 
hold for market rates and other strategies. 
 
Additional research could be conducted, applying ‘optimal stopping’ solutions such as the 
secretary strategy to other optimisation processes within a limited timeslot. Perhaps these 
findings could help to improve budgetary decisions.   
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Over heel de wereld is er een tendens waarneembaar dat nationale overheden in toenemende 
mate overgaan tot decentralisatie. Dit doen ze om de prestaties van de publieke sector te 
verbeteren. De achterliggende gedachte hierbij is dat lagere overheden een beter zicht hebben 
op de lokale voorkeuren en hierdoor de vraag en het aanbod van publieke voorzieningen beter 
kunnen afstemmen op de behoeften van de burgers. Deze ontwikkeling gaat gepaard met een 
toenemend beroep op omvangrijke bedragen aan krediet, noodzakelijk om investeringen op 
lokaal niveau te kunnen financieren. Om deze ontwikkeling op een deugdelijke en duurzame 
manier vorm te kunnen geven, is de beschikbaarheid van een betaalbare en betrouwbare bron 
van krediet van cruciaal belang.   
 
Lagere overheden (LO) trekken doorgaans krediet aan door obligaties uit te geven of door 
bankleningen af te sluiten. In landen buiten Europa wordt voor het aantrekken van krediet 
door LO met name gebruik gemaakt van de obligatiemarkt. Binnen Europa is de situatie 
echter anders, hier is de belangrijkste bron van krediet, bankleningen. Om deze middelen 
tegen lage kosten en goede voorwaarden ter beschikking te kunnen stellen, hebben de 
overheden in de meeste Europese landen besloten tot de oprichting van publieke sector 
banken. Deze banken zijn gespecialiseerd in het verstrekken van goedkoop, makkelijk 
toegankelijk en betrouwbaar krediet aan LO. Om het kredietrisico te elimineren of te 
verkleinen kunnen overheidsgaranties worden afgegeven, expliciet of impliciet. 
 
Voor de meeste landen geldt dat de hoogst mogelijke kredietrisico garantie, bestaat uit een 
onvoorwaardelijke garantie die verstrekt is door de nationale overheid. Kredietrating bureau’s 
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zullen nationale instituten en LO normaal gesproken geen hogere rating geven dan de 
nationale overheid. Indien er een reddingsactie ondernomen moet worden kan de nationale 
overheid, de garantieverstrekker, gedwongen worden om financieel bij te springen. Een 
expliciete garantie waarborgt dat de kredietnemer tegen de beste voorwaarden kan lenen, als 
gevolg van een besluit “vooraf” van de overheid om bij te springen mocht het verkeerd gaan. 
In het geval van een impliciete garantie besluit de garantieverstrekker achteraf of er een 
reddingsoperatie zal volgen. In Nederland is er sprake van expliciete overheidsgaranties voor 
gemeenten en sociale woningbouwverenigingen (woningcorporaties). Dit fenomeen is typisch 
Nederlands en uniek in Europa. Andere landen zijn terughoudend om expliciete garanties te 
verstrekken omdat ze moreel wangedrag (moral hazard) vrezen; kredietnemers die meer lenen 
dan noodzakelijk hetgeen uiteindelijk leidt tot onhoudbare schuldniveaus, als gevolg van het 
comfort dat de kredietnemer heeft omdat er uiteindelijk toch iemand anders voor de 
problemen opdraait. Landen die er zo over denken, geven er de voorkeur aan om impliciete 
garanties te verstrekken. Het verstrekken van goed ontworpen expliciete overheidsgaranties 
gaat gepaard met een adequate institutionele inrichting en praktische inrichting van het 
leenproces om misbruik te voorkomen. 
 
Nederland heeft goede ervaringen met haar garantiesysteem. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt het 
ontwerp van het Nederlandse garantiesysteem en de hieraan onlosmakelijk verbonden 
institutionele context en de praktische inrichting van het leenproces. Nederland, met haar 
expliciete garanties, biedt een unieke mogelijkheid om empirisch onderzoek te verrichten. In 
dit proefschrift zijn drie empirische studies opgenomen die allen betrekking hebben op de 
rentekosten bij het aantrekken van een lening en twee hoofdstukken die de institutionele 
inrichting en het leenproces omschrijven. Deze twee hoofdstukken bieden zicht op de unieke 
Nederlandse context.  
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Daar waar de meeste landen in Europa impliciete garanties aan LO verstrekken, maakt het 
interessant om te bezien of en in welke mate, het expliciet maken van deze garanties, de 
rentekosten kan verlagen. Met het oog hierop onderzoekt onze eerste studie wat de effecten 
zijn van een expliciete overheidsgarantie op de leenkosten van woningcorporaties en dat van 
gemeenten. De volgende studie richt zich op het fenomeen dat in veel landen gemeenten de 
mogelijkheden onderzoeken om diensten meer doelmatig aan te bieden. Twee mogelijkheden 
zijn schaalvergroting (fuseren van gemeenten) en het aangaan van gemeentelijke 
samenwerkingingsverbanden (GS). Hierbij kunnen vragen worden gesteld over wat de 
gevolgen zijn van deze keuzes op de mate van doelmatigheid. De Nederlandse context biedt 
een compleet nieuwe mogelijkheid om de doelmatigheid tussen gemeenten en gemeentelijke 
samenwerkingsverbanden te vergelijken. De laatste studie richt zich op de mogelijkheden om 
een lagere rente te krijgen door een goed instapmoment te kiezen om een lening af te sluiten. 
Dit is een veel besproken onderwerp op de financiële afdeling van menig gemeente. Hiertoe 
vergelijken we vijf verschillende strategieën, allen makkelijk te implementeren tegen lage 
kosten. We onderzoeken of er strategieën zijn die beter presteren dan de andere onder 
verschillende criteria. 
Dit proefschrift draagt op meerdere wijzen bij aan de bestaande literatuur. Om te beginnen, 
voor zover we hebben kunnen nagaan, is dit het eerste onderzoek dat expliciete 
overheidsgaranties onderzoekt. Verder zijn er nauwelijks empirische studies te vinden met 
betrekking tot het financieren van LO met bankleningen. Dit proefschrift voegt hierbij nieuw 
empirisch onderzoek aan toe. Als laatste noemen we de nieuwe methodiek om de 
doelmatigheid van verschillende typen van LO met elkaar te vergelijken.  
 
De rationale achter overheidsgaranties 
Vanuit de economische literatuur is er veel weerstand tegen garantiestelsels, omdat het 
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onherroepelijk zou leiden tot moreel wangedrag. Zelfs wanneer er geen expliciete garanties 
zijn, kan een bank nog steeds verwachten dat er financieel zal worden bijgesprongen (een 
impliciete garantie), vanuit economische of politieke motieven. Een eventueel bankroet kan 
gepaard gaan met hoge politieke kosten en een groot verlies aan welvaart. Denk hierbij 
bijvoorbeeld aan de bouw van een school of een brug waarbij de ontwikkelaar voortijdig 
failliet gaat. In zo een geval kan de betrokken gemeente alsnog genoodzaakt zijn om het 
project te finaliseren en te financieren. Er zijn genoeg voorbeelden te noemen dat er tegen de 
formele afspraken in toch financieel wordt bijgesprongen. Verwachtingen omtrent een 
mogelijke redding kunnen leiden tot een lagere renteopslag. Anderzijds kunnen 
gegarandeerde leningen niet geheel geloofwaardig blijken, wat dan weer kan leiden tot een 
hogere renteopslag. Indien er geen verschil is in renteopslag, kan dit gezien worden als een 
overbodige garantie waarbij er ruimte blijft bestaan voor moreel wangedrag.  
Desalniettemin maken expliciete overheidsgaranties in Nederland een wezenlijk onderdeel uit 
van het institutionele stelsel bij het lenen door gemeenten en woningcorporaties. Vooralsnog 
lijkt het Nederlandse garantiestelsel echter prima te functioneren, er hoeven maar zelden 
reddingsoperaties te worden ondernomen. Het gebruik van expliciete garanties vraagt wel om 
een adequate, duurzame institutionele inrichting en praktische inrichting van het leenproces. 
Op deze wijze slaat de balans door van de nadelen van een mogelijk misbruik naar de 
voordelen van een eenvoudige toegang tot krediet tegen lage rentetarieven. Een ander 
voordeel van het verstrekken van expliciete overheidsgaranties is dat het de samenleving geen 
geld hoeft te kosten, zoals bijvoorbeeld subsidies. 
 
Vormen van expliciete overheidsgarantie 
De overheidsgarantie in Nederland kan meerdere vormen aannemen. Bij gemeenten is de 
gehele financiële positie gegarandeerd door wet- en regelgeving waarbij zelfs een financiële 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




ingebreke stelling uitgesloten is. Zo zijn bijvoorbeeld de financiële verplichtingen, rente en 
aflossing een verplichte uitgave uit het budget en hebben zo prioriteit op de salarisbetalingen. 
Als een gemeente in financieel zwaar weer komt, behoedt artikel-12 ervoor, dat de bank geen 
aanvullende acties hoeft te ondernemen om haar geld te krijgen. Iets anders ligt dit bij de 
woningcorporaties, zij hebben een waarborgfonds (garantiefonds) dat individuele leningen 
garandeert. Na een mogelijke ingebreke stelling neemt het waarborgfonds, nadat de bank 
aanvullende actie heeft ondernomen, de verplichtingen over.  
 
De institutionele inrichting 
De institutionele inrichting in Nederland bestaat uit het geheel aan relevante wet- en 
regelgeving, de verdeling van taken, bevoegdheden, verantwoordelijkheden en geldstromen 
binnen de verschillende overheidslagen en de daartoe opgerichte instituties, het toezicht en de 
controle. Dit geheel aan maatregelen is een complex samenspel van deels overlappende wet- 
en regelgeving en is historisch gegroeid naar wat het nu is. Een institutionele inrichting is dan 
ook niet makkelijk te kopiëren. Het is wel de institutionele inrichting die in belangrijke mate 
voorwaardelijk is voor het succes van een garantiestelsel. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 wordt dieper 
ingegaan op de unieke Nederlandse context. Eén van de elementen van de institutionele 
inrichting betreft de mate waarin LO onbeperkt kunnen lenen, dit lichten we hieronder toe. 
 
Hoeveel kunnen de lagere overheden lenen? 
In Nederland kunnen LO onbeperkt lenen binnen een sluitende begroting. De begroting wordt 
volgens de algemeen geldende regels opgesteld in lijn met een baten en lasten stelsel. Dat wil 
zeggen dat kosten en opbrengsten worden toegerekend aan de periode waar ze betrekking op 
hebben. Als gevolg hiervan kunnen LO leningen aangaan zelfs als de begroting in evenwicht 
is. Grote investeringen worden doorgaans gefinancierd met vreemd vermogen. Een sluitende 
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begroting wordt bereikt zolang de te betalen rente en de afschrijvingen op de investering 
gedekt worden door de begroting. De lening en de investering maken geen onderdeel uit van 
de begroting en worden op de balans verantwoord. Dit in tegenstelling tot de rijksoverheid die 




Het onderzoek is uitsluitend gebaseerd op daadwerkelijk afgesloten leningen en 
daadwerkelijk betaalde rente op leningen. Deze data is niet publiek beschikbaar. Om ons 
empirisch onderzoek mogelijk te maken hebben we toegang gekregen tot een dataset van de 
BNG Bank (de grootste sectorbank in Nederland). We hebben geen vergelijkbare informatie 
beschikbaar van andere aanbieders van geld. Om deze reden richten we ons uitsluitend op de 
BNG Bank. Deze dataset geeft gedetailleerde informatie over meer dan 11.000 
gemeenteleningen (inclusief gemeenschappelijke regelingen en leningen onder 
gemeentegarantie) en 6.000 corporatieleningen. Ook wordt in deze dataset, sedert 1997, de 
dagelijkse renten bijgehouden die indicatief zijn voor gemeenteleningen. De volgende LO zijn 
betrokken in het onderzoek: gemeenten, gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden en 
woningcorporaties. 
Het eerste onderzoek is getiteld “Expliciete overheidsgaranties en de rente op leningen”, 
hierbij wordt onderzocht in hoeverre het expliciet maken van de garanties erin slaagt om het 
kredietrisico te elimineren en de rente te verlagen. Het tweede onderzoek “De doelmatigheid 
van verschillende typen van LO” maakt gebruik van de unieke Nederlandse situatie van 
expliciete overheidsgaranties, waarbij de rente op leningen gebruikt wordt om de 
doelmatigheid te vergelijken tussen gemeenten en gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden. 
Het laatste onderzoek “Het optimale moment om een lening af te sluiten” onderzoekt of het 
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hanteren van verschillende strategieën kan bijdragen aan het verkrijgen van een lagere rente. 
 
Expliciete overheidsgaranties en de rente op leningen (Hoofdstuk 4) 
 
Dit onderzoek richt zich op vier hoofdzaken: In hoeverre hebben ongegarandeerde leningen 
een hogere rente dan expliciet gegarandeerde leningen? Vinden we aanwijzingen dat garanties 
in de Nederlandse setting onwenselijk zijn en leiden tot misbruik (moral hazard)? Leiden de 
verschillende garantiesystemen in Nederland, van gemeenten en van woningcorporaties, tot 
verschillen in de te betalen rente? Spelen de financiële prestaties van de debiteur een rol in de 
te betalen rente bij het afsluiten van een gegarandeerde lening in een overheidsgegarandeerde 
omgeving? 
Het hanteren van expliciete overheidsgaranties is uniek voor Nederland, andere landen geven 
bijvoorbeeld de voorkeur aan een impliciete garantie (Duitsland) of geen garanties 
(Zwitserland). Dit maakt het interessant om de Nederlandse situatie te onderzoeken. Een 
probleem dat wij bij het onderzoek naar de overheidsgarantie ervaren is dat gemeenten alleen 
gegarandeerde leningen hebben en we bijgevolg geen vergelijking kunnen maken met 
ongegarandeerde leningen. Om deze reden hebben we een uitstap gemaakt naar de sociale 
huisvestingsector. Woningcorporaties kennen zowel expliciet gegarandeerde (door een 
waarborgfonds) en ongegarandeerde leningen. Om te testen wat de geloofwaardigheid is van 
de garantie is onderzocht in hoeverre ongegarandeerde leningen een hogere rente hebben dan 
gegarandeerde. In ons onderzoek vinden we een rentevoordeel van circa 72 basispunten (0.72 
procentpunt) als gevolg van het garantiestelsel ten opzichte van een ongegarandeerde lening. 
Verschillen die gevonden zijn in de te betalen rente op gegarandeerde leningen en de risico 
vrije referentierenten (de door de BNG Bank gepubliceerde renten) zijn waarschijnlijk te 
wijten aan commerciële marges. We zien aldus voordelen voor het expliciet maken van een 
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overheidsgarantie ten opzichte van een ongegarandeerde lening. Echter, voordat we hier iets 
over kunnen zeggen moeten we eerst naar de negatieve kanten van een garantie kijken om het 
netto-effect te kunnen bepalen. 
Wat betreft de onwenselijkheid van garanties met betrekking tot het moreel wangedrag, 
hebben we onderzocht in hoeverre de baten van een jaarlijks lagere rente opwegen tegenover 
de uit te voeren reddingsoperaties (in de corporatiesector gebaseerd op historische gegevens). 
Het blijkt dat de jaarlijkse baten van 610 mln. euro aan verminderde rentelasten voor 
woningcorporaties in het verleden ruimschoots hebben opgewogen tegenover de kosten. Deze 
kosten zijn samengesteld uit de betalingen uithoofde van achtervang aan woningcorporaties, 
die over een periode van 24 jaar 1,5 mrd hebben bedragen (1990-2014). Het garantiestelsel 
zou over deze periode alleen nog onwenselijk kunnen zijn als deze tot hoge indirecte kosten 
zou leiden, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van een lagere doelmatigheid.  
 
Verder hebben we de twee garantiesystemen met elkaar vergeleken, bij gemeenten waar de 
gehele financiële positie gegarandeerd wordt door wet- en regelgeving en woningcorporaties 
waarbij alleen de individuele leningen gegarandeerd worden door middel van een 
waarborgfonds. We vinden in ons onderzoek geen verschil in renten die woningcorporaties en 
gemeenten betalen op gegarandeerde leningen. Op basis van deze resultaten stellen we dat het 
effect van de verschillende garantiesystemen gelijkwaardig is en dat we de bevindingen voor 
woningcorporaties kunnen veralgemeniseren naar gemeenten. 
 
De relevantie van de expliciete garantie wordt verder benadrukt doordat de financiële positie 
van de woningcorporatie uitsluitend van invloed is op de te betalen rente op ongegarandeerde 
leningen. Dit toont, dat tijdens onze onderzoeksperiode, de bank bij het verstrekken van 
gegarandeerde kredieten vertrouwt op de achtervang en de toezichthoudende autoriteiten 
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(Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting, Autoriteit Wonen, Waarborgfonds Sociale Woningbouw, 
Rijk, provincie, gemeenten) en hierdoor geen kredietrisico-opslag vraagt (eliminatie 
kredietrisico). Bij het verstrekken van ongegarandeerde leningen wordt er wel degelijk naar 
de financiële karakteristieken gekeken (dit is niet opgenomen in de regressieanalyses).  
 
We benadrukken dat het geenszins de bedoeling is om te stellen dat een expliciete 
overheidsgarantie altijd wenselijk is, maar eerder dat het niet per sé onwenselijk is.  
 
Het onderzoek naar het garantiestelsel zou aan kracht kunnen winnen door verdere 
datauitbreiding. Het huidige onderzoek richt zich op leningen van één bank, terwijl 
corporaties ook aanzienlijke sommen bij andere banken lenen. Ook is het aantal onderzochte 
langetermijn ongeborgde leningen beperkt, waardoor het effect van het garantiestelsel op de 
betaalde rente nog niet volledig geïsoleerd kan worden. 
 
Aanvullend onderzoek zou kunnen worden uitgevoerd naar garantiesystemen in andere landen 
en op welke wijze garanties kunnen worden ontworpen om misbruik te voorkomen. Ook is 
meer onderzoek wenselijk naar de effecten van expliciete overheidsgaranties en impliciete 
garanties om een beter begrip te krijgen van de rente op leningen. In de economische 
literatuur worden met name de negatieve kanten van een garantie belicht, het zou welkom zijn 
om ook meer aandacht te besteden aan de positieve kanten, het creëren van een gelijk 
speelveld met een makkelijke toegang tot geld tegen lage renten, rekening houdend met een 
adequate institutionele setting. 
 
 








Het bestaan van risicovrij krediet, als gevolg van overheidsgaranties, brengt met zich mee dat 
de doelmatigheid van verschillende LO met elkaar vergeleken kan worden. In de afwezigheid 
van kredietrisico wordt de rente op een lening bepaald door de modaliteiten van de lening, de 
marktomstandigheden en de moeite die de debiteur neemt om een goede rente af te sluiten. 
Met voldoende data kan er voor de eerste twee determinanten gecorrigeerd worden, de gedane 
inspanningen moeten geschat worden. Indien gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden 
systematisch meer rente betalen dan gemeenten voor gelijkwaardige leningen, zou dit kunnen 
duiden op een operationele ondoelmatigheid. Dit is een bijzonder relevant onderwerp. In veel 
landen zoeken LO naar mogelijkheden om diensten doelmatiger te verlenen. Als we naar 
gemeenten kijken zijn twee mogelijke oplossingen voor dit probleem, fusies en gemeentelijke 
samenwerking. De keus voor een van deze opties heeft gevolgen voor de doelmatigheid van 
de nieuwgevormde entiteit. Fusies leiden vaak tot openbare weerstand omdat 
gemeenschappen een verlies aan identiteit en autonomie vrezen. Hierbij komt dat een fusie 
een bot instrument is. De diensten die door gemeenten worden geleverd zijn heterogeen. Waar 
sommige (b.v. kapitaalintensieve) diensten op een optimale schaal opereren, kan dat weer 
voor andere diensten geheel niet het geval zijn. Door als geheel op te schalen kan dit leiden 
tot doelmatigheidswinsten in sommige diensten en een verlies in andere. Ook kan een fusie 
leiden tot meer bureaucratie. Grote gemeenten zouden moeilijker in staat zijn om het lokaal 
aanbod aan te laten sluiten op de lokale vraag. 
 
Gemeentelijke samenwerking biedt gemeenten de mogelijkheid om schaalvoordelen te 
behalen op de gewenste dienstverlening, waarbij de optimale schaal voor andere diensten 
bewaard blijft, hierbij blijft de lokale autonomie behouden. De samenwerking kan ook leiden 
tot minder doelmatigheid. De corporate governance theory voorspelt dat samenwerking de 
“agency” kosten doet toenemen en het toezicht op de openbare diensten vermindert. Een 
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controlesysteem waarbij toezicht gecombineerd wordt met straffen en beloningen is nodig om 
de belangen van ambtenaren en burgers op een lijn te krijgen. 
 
De agency theory geeft drie mogelijke redenen voor een verminderd toezicht en hiermede een 
lagere efficiency in gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden: het bestaan van meerdere 
managementlagen; de beperkte invloed van het gemeentebestuur op het bestuur en de 
uitvoering van het samenwerkingsverband; en gedeeld eigendom/meerdere deelnemers. Als 
gedeeld eigendom een reden zou kunnen zijn voor de hogere renten, dan zouden we 
verwachten dat gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden met meer deelnemers een hogere 
rente betalen. Met meer deelnemers, komen de effecten van inspanningen om doelmatigheid 
te verbeteren in steeds mindere mate terecht bij de gemeente die zich hiervoor inspant, 
waardoor de motivering om energie te stoppen in toezicht afneemt (de wet van 1/n).  
 
De invloed van onderhandelen op de rente 
Minder toezicht kan leiden tot een hogere te betalen rente als de afwezigheid van beloningen 
of straffen als gevolg heeft dat er minder moeite gedaan wordt om een beste rente voor de 
organisatie te realiseren. Medewerkers van de klantendesk van een bank, die de leningen 
verstrekken, hebben ook commerciële doelstellingen. De rentevoet op een lening, in deze 
oligopolistische markt, kan binnen een smalle marge variëren (indicatief 10 bp). Dit is het 
gevolg van een onderhandelingsproces. De bank houdt bij welke leningen er succesvol 
worden afgesloten en welke er gemist worden. Als er veel leningen gemist worden kan dat 
een reden zijn om het algemeen renteniveau voor te verstrekken leningen iets omlaag te 
brengen. Deze faal en succes scores worden ook op klanten niveau bijgehouden. De 
klantendesk is goed op de hoogte van de aard en de doortastendheid van individuele klanten 
en zal mogelijkheden vinden om de commerciële doelstellingen te halen. Klanten die altijd 
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een eerste rente-aanbod accepteren of aanbiedingen van dezelfde bank, loyale klanten, 
eindigen uiteindelijk met een hogere rente. Deze hogere rente kan geïnterpreteerd worden als 
een vorm van ondoelmatigheid, omdat er geen economische reden is om het zo te doen. 
 
Renteverschillen op gelijkwaardige leningen worden in de Nederlandse situatie, met name 
bepaald door de inspanningen van de LO (door onderhandelingen) om een betere rente te 
verkrijgen. De mate waarin ze daar in slagen wordt gebruikt als een maatstaf voor 
doelmatigheid. We onderzoeken eerst of GS een hogere rente betalen dan gemeenten op 
gelijkwaardige leningen. Indien dit het geval is, gaan we nader onderzoeken wat hier de reden 
voor zou kunnen zijn. Dit doen we met vier aanvullende onderzoeksvragen: Betalen 
gegarandeerde publieke deelnemingen dezelfde rente als publieke lichamen? Heeft het zin om 
te investeren in mankracht om een lagere rente te bewerkstelligen? Speelt het aantal 
deelnemers in een gemeenschappelijke regeling een rol in de rente die betaald wordt (een 
fenomeen dat de wet van 1/n wordt genoemd)? Betalen onlangs geherindeelde gemeenten 
meer rente dan gemeenten die dat niet zijn? 
 
Om te beginnen, in ons onderzoek vinden we dat gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden 
consistent meer rente betalen dan gemeenten. Om dit beter te kunnen begrijpen hebben we de 
gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden onderverdeeld in gegarandeerde publieke 
deelnemingen (vallen onder privaatrecht) en publieke lichamen (vallen onder publiekrecht). 
De publieke deelneming kan in financiële gebreke geraken waardoor er mogelijk door de 
bank kosten gemaakt moeten worden om de garanties te innen. Een publiek lichaam kan per 
definitie niet in financiële gebreke raken. Mogelijk vraagt de bank daarom een rente-opslag 
aan publieke deelnemingen. We vinden echter geen significant verschil in rente die publieke 
lichamen en gegarandeerde publieke deelnemingen betalen. Wat dat betreft is dit geen 
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verklaring waarom gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden meer betalen. We zouden dit 
verschil dus kunnen interpreteren als een verschil in doelmatigheid. 
 
Ten tweede, de te betalen rente is het resultaat van een onderhandelingsproces met de bank, 
hetgeen kostbaar kan zijn. Het vereist kennis van de kredietmarkten en de huidige condities 
om te kunnen onderhandelen. Indien de kosten van het investeren in betere onderhandelingen 
zwaarder wegen dan de baten als gevolg van de rentevoordelen, dan is hier geen sprake van 
ondoelmatig lenen, zelfs als de rente wat verder verlaagd zou kunnen worden. We tonen aan 
dat dit niet het geval is. Een simpele berekening laat zien dat de voordelen van een lagere 
rente veel groter zijn dan de kosten die nodig zijn om dit mogelijk te maken. Als gevolg 
hiervan interpreteren we de hogere rente die door gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden 
betaald wordt als een vorm van ondoelmatigheid. 
 
Ten derde hebben we onderzocht in hoeverre het aantal deelnemers in een GS van invloed is 
op de te betalen rente. We vinden echter geen verband tussen het aantal deelnemers en de te 
betalen rente, waardoor er geen steun is voor de wet van 1/n. Dat wil nog niet zeggen dat 
gedeeld eigendom niet leidt tot een “free riders” probleem, er kan immers een tegengesteld 
effect zijn waardoor het netto-effect nul is. Zo is het denkbaar dat het samenwerkingsverband 
doelmatiger moet worden ingericht om te voorkomen dat deelnemers afhaken en het verband 
verlaten. Ondanks dit alles, wijzen onze resultaten erop dat het de samenwerking is die leidt 
tot hogere renten en niet het aantal deelnemende partijen. Hierdoor ligt de meest 
waarschijnlijke verklaring bij de toevoeging van extra hiërarchische lagen en het beperkt 
toezicht van het gemeentebestuur. 
 
Als laatste onderzoeken we de effecten van een herindeling van gemeenten op de te betalen 
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rente. Herindelingsprocessen gaan gepaard met veel tijd en energie ten koste van de 
operationele processen. We vinden hier echter geen verschil in rente tussen gemeenten en 
geherindeelde gemeenten, zelfs niet op de korte termijn.  
 
Als een onvoldoende bestuurlijk toezicht en het bestaan van meerdere managementlagen de 
belangrijkste redenen zijn voor de mate van ondoelmatigheid en hiermede de hogere rente die 
gemeentelijke samenwerkingsverbanden betalen, zoals de agency theory en onze resultaten 
veronderstellen, dan kunnen dergelijke vormen van ondoelmatigheid ook elders in de 
organisatie voorkomen.  
 
Het onderzoek naar de efficiency van verschillende typen LO zou aan kracht kunnen winnen 
door verdere datauitbreiding. Het huidige onderzoek richt zich op leningen van één bank, 
terwijl LO ook aanzienlijke sommen bij andere aanbieders van geld lenen.  
 
Aanvullend onderzoek is nodig om te bezien of de ondoelmatigheden verder reiken dan 
uitsluitend op de te betalen rente, met wellicht een veel grotere budgettaire impact. Hiernaast 
zou het interessant zijn om onze methode toe te passen in andere landen waarin vergelijkbaar 
onderzoek heeft plaatsgevonden en de resultaten te vergelijken.  
 
Het optimale moment om een lening af te sluiten (Hoofdstuk 6) 
 
 
Gemeenten hebben weinig mogelijkheden om de rente die ze op leningen moeten betalen te 
beïnvloeden.  Los van enige onderhandelingsruimte zijn ze veelal afhankelijk van het 
renteaanbod van de bank en van de marktomstandigheden. Een onderwerp dat op menig 
financiële afdeling veel aandacht krijgt is of er een optimaal moment kan worden gevonden 
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om een lening af te sluiten en zich van een lage rente te verzekeren (ten opzichte van gewoon 
het moment afwachten tot dat het geld nodig is).  Een lagere rente werkt meteen door in het 
beschikbare budget en biedt mogelijk meer financiële ruimte om publieke voorzieningen te 
realiseren. Omdat Nederlandse gemeenten onder een overheidsgarantie geld lenen, kunnen 
leningen op korte termijn worden afgesloten. Banken die geld uitlenen aan gemeenten hoeven 
geen tijdrovende kredietrisicobeoordelingen uit te voeren. Een telefoontjes of een e-mail is 
voldoende om een lening af te sluiten die dezelfde dag begint. Dit stelt gemeenten in staat om 
nauwgezet het moment te bepalen waarop een lening wordt afgesloten. In sommige gevallen 
is het van tevoren bekend wanneer er geld nodig is. Zo weten organisaties ver van tevoren 
wanneer leningen vervallen en moeten worden geherfinancierd. Ook bij het doen van grote 
investeringen is het meestal van tevoren bekend wanneer de betalingen uiterlijk gedaan 
moeten worden. Dit biedt de mogelijkheid aan de debiteur om het moment te bepalen waarop 
de lening wordt afgesloten. In plaats van wachten totdat de middelen noodzakelijk zijn (en er 
betaald moet worden) kan een lening eerder worden afgesloten, gebruikmakend van een 
lening met een uitgestelde storting. Hierbij wordt de rente bepaald op het moment van 
afsluiten.   
In Nederland wordt bij gemeentefinanciering vaak gebruik gemaakt van leningen met 
uitgestelde stortingen. Er zijn meerdere beweegredenen om dergelijke leningen af te sluiten. 
In eerste plaats is het direct afsluiten van leningen aantrekkelijk voor risico-averse debiteuren. 
Door de lening meteen af te sluiten wanneer het duidelijk is dat er krediet nodig is, wordt een 
kostenstijging als gevolg van een stijgende rente voorkomen. Een andere administratieve 
reden kan zijn dat de besluitvorming met betrekking tot de goedkeuring van een lening en het 
bijbehorend rentepercentage niet gelijkloopt met de datum waarop er betaald moet worden. In 
een dergelijk geval kan een uitgestelde storting een uitkomst zijn. Als laatste en het meest 
relevant voor dit onderzoek, kan een uitgestelde storting gebruikt worden door debiteuren die 
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een stijging van de rente verwachten. Door de lening meteen af te sluiten, tegen de huidige 
rente, kan de lening goedkoper worden dan wanneer er gewacht wordt tot het uiterst 
betaalmoment, ervan uitgaande dat de debiteur gelijk heeft gekregen. Leningen met een 
uitgestelde storting kennen doorgaans een kleine opslag voor de financieringskosten die de 
bank moet maken om middelen op een latere datum beschikbaar te hebben.  
 
De wetenschappelijke literatuur toont dat het moeilijk is om een betere voorspelling te doen 
van de rente dan een voorspelling die gelijk is aan de huidige rentestand. Of anders gesteld, de 
beste voorspelling van de rente van morgen, is de rente van vandaag. Dat wil nog niet zeggen 
dat het onmogelijk is om een strategie te vinden waardoor een beter instapmoment wordt 
gevonden die leidt tot een lagere rente. Bijvoorbeeld, is het zinvol om in een periode van 
wisselvallige renten te wachten tot de rente iets lager is? 
 
Wij onderzoeken of de te betalen rente op leningen kan worden geoptimaliseerd door een juist 
instapmoment te vinden binnen een 20-daags tijdspanne (20 werkdagen, bij benadering een 
kalendermaand). Dit vraagstuk valt onder de “optimal stopping” problemen, waarbij een 
onomkeerbare keuze gemaakt moet worden in onzekerheid met een beperkte tijdhorizon. Een 
bekend voorbeeld hiervan is het “secretaresse probleem”, waarbij de beste secretaresse 
gekozen moet worden uit n sollicitanten. De optimale beslisregel is om de eerste n/e57 
kandidaten te bekijken en vervolgens de eerste kandidaat te kiezen die beter is dan de beste 
kandidaat tot dat moment. 
Ons vraagstuk verschilt met betrekking tot sommige aannames en doelstellingen van dit 
probleem. Desalniettemin is het interessant om te bezien of een dergelijke strategie 
behulpzaam kan zijn bij het vinden van een juist instapmoment. 
                                                 
 
57 n = het aantal kandiaten en e = de basis van een natuurlijke logaritme, bij benadering 2,72 
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In ons onderzoek maken we gebruik van eenvoudige strategieën die tegen lage kosten te 
implementeren zijn. We simuleren deze strategieën over de dagelijkse rentestanden van de 
afgelopen decennia om de resultaten te meten. 
 
De strategieën 
1) De eerste strategie is een passieve strategie, we kijken terug over een zekere tijdspanne (van 1 
tot 20 werkdagen) en bepalen de beste rente in die periode, deze rente wordt vastgesteld als de 
referentierente voor de komende beslissingsperiode (eveneens 20 werkdagen). De lening 
wordt afgesloten op het moment dat de huidige rente lager of gelijk is aan de referentierente. 
Als dat niet het geval is, wordt de lening op de laatst mogelijke dag afgesloten.  
2) De tweeede strategie is een variant hierop, het is een actieve strategie waarmee we bedoelen 
dat de referentierente op iedere dag opnieuw wordt vastgesteld.  
3) De derde strategie maakt gebruik van de drift van de markt, dat wil zeggen het positieve of 
negatieve verschil tussen een rente in het verleden (1 tot 20 dagen) en de rente aan het begin 
van de beslisperiode. Als de drift omhoog is wordt de lening meteen afgesloten, als deze 
omlaag is wordt de lening op de laatst mogelijke dag afgesloten.  
4) De vierde strategie volgt de klassieke secretaresse strategie. Hierbij wordt geen gebruik 
gemaakt van historische data, maar wordt een wachtperiode gecreëerd (van 1 tot 20 dagen) 
waarbinnen de beste rente als referentierente wordt vastgesteld. De lening wordt afgesloten op 
het moment dat de huidige rente in de volgende resterende beslisperiode (20 dagen minus 
wachtperiode) gelijk of lager is dan de referentierente. Als deze situatie zich niet voordoet 
wordt de lening op de laatst mogelijke dag afgesloten.  
5) De laatste strategie is het makkelijkst, altijd de lening afsluiten op hetzelfde moment in de 
beslisperiode, altijd op dag1 of dag 2 of een andere vaste dag. 
531041-L-sub01-bw-vanOmmeren




Beste Op één na beste Slechtste
Doel Strategie Resultaat Strategie Resultaat Strategie Resultaat
1 Het vaakst de laagste rente gekozen 4(16) 24,4% 5(20) 17,2% 5(11) 2,9%
2 Gemiddeld de laagste rente gekozen 4a(8) 3,456% 3(20) 3,459% 5(1) 3,485%
3 Laagste (gekozen rente/laagste beschikbare rente) 4a(8) 103,5% 3(20) 103,9% 5(1) 105,0%
4 Laagste standaarddeviatiatie gekozen rente 5(6) 1,363% 1(2) 1,364% 4(16) 1,384%
De doelen en resultaten 
Om de resultaten van de strategieën te meten zijn 4 doelen gesteld. Deze doelen zijn: 
1) Alleen voor de laagste rente gaan. 
2) Voor een gemiddelde lage rente gaan. 
3) Gaan voor de laagste ratio tussen de gekozen rente en de laagste rente in de periode. 
4) De standaarddeviatie van de strategie minimaliseren. 
 
De resultaten van de strategieën zijn als volgt (tussen haakjes staat het optimale aantal 
terugkijk/wacht dagen): 




Als we kijken naar doel 1, dan wordt met strategie 4(16), de secretaresse strategie met 16 
dagen wachttijd, een optimaal resultaat gehaald met 24% laagste renten. Dit doel zegt niet wat 
er geoptimaliseerd wordt indien niet de laagste rente wordt gekozen en daarom is doel 2 
opgenomen; hierbij wordt met strategie 4a(8) een optimaal resultaat gehaald, met de 
secretaresse strategie (a = in de variant uitsluitend lager) wordt na 8 dagen wachttijd, een 
gemiddelde laagste rente gekozen. Nadeel van dit doel is dat de renten over de 
onderzoeksperiode wisselvallig zijn waardoor resultaten naast de strategie ook door 
marktontwikkelingen worden gedreven. Om deze reden is doel 3 opgenomen. Het derde doel 
lijkt het meest relevant voor organisaties. Dit doel minimaliseert de ratio tussen de gekozen 
rente en de laagst mogelijke rente in de beslisperiode. Bijvoorbeeld, een ratio van 103.5 wil 
zeggen, dat wanneer de beste rente in de periode 4% is, de verwachte geselecteerde rente 4.14 
is. Indien het verschil tussen de beste en de slechtste strategie 1.5% is, impliceert dit met een 
beste rente van 4%, een verwacht verschil van zes basispunten (0.06 procent punt). 
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Een strategie kan dan wel een goede gemiddelde ratio opleveren, een gemiddelde kan echter 
opgebouwd zijn uit wisselvallige uitkomsten, waardoor het risico toeneemt. Daarom is ook 
doel 4 opgenomen, om aan te geven welke strategie de laagste standaarddeviatie geeft.  
De goede resultaten van de secretaresse benadering zijn opmerkelijk. In veel gevallen scoort 
deze beter dan strategieën die gebruik maken van historische informatie. Deze conclusies voor 
vijf jaars leningen (vaste rente, aflossing einde looptijd) gelden ook voor de andere 
onderzochte looptijden (10, 15, 20 en 25 jaar) en aflossingspatronen. De gemeten 
standaarddeviatie van de verschillende strategieën over de gehele onderzoekperiode liggen 
allen boven de 100 basispunten, waarbij alle strategieën bij benadering even risicovol zijn.  
Verschillen in uitkomsten tussen de strategieën zijn echter relatief beperkt: gemiddeld minder 
dan drie basispunten. Daar moet de renteopslag van ongeveer één basispunt nog van af, die de 
bank kan rekenen om een uitgestelde lening af te sluiten. Deze kosten en baten vallen echter 
in het niet bij de variatie van de uitkomsten, dat wil zeggen de standaardafwijking. 
 
Voor een individuele lening wordt de waarschijnlijkheid dat een strategie, binnen een 20-
daags tijdspanne, significant beter presteert dan een andere klein geacht. We concluderen 
hierbij dat organisatorische en gedragsmatige redenen om een lening binnen een 
kalendermaand op een bepaald moment af te sluiten geen effect hebben op de verwachte 
financiële resultaten. Zo kan in gevallen dat een projectbegroting is goedgekeurd het 
verstandig zijn om de lening meteen af te sluiten zodat de rentelasten nog in het budget 
passen. Hierdoor kunnen stijgende renten het project niet meer in gevaar brengen. Meer in het 
algemeen zullen risico-averse mensen beslissen om zo snel mogelijk af te sluiten en risico-
neutrale mensen zo laat mogelijk om kosten die gepaard gaan met uitgestelde stortingen te 
vermijden. Het is prettig om te weten dat dit geen effect heeft op het verwachte financiële 
resultaat. 
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Wie echter voor de strategie wil gaan die het beter heeft gedaan dan de andere strategieën die 
we hebben beschouwd kiest voor de secretaresse strategie. Die belooft goede resultaten voor 
verschillende looptijden en verschillende optimaliseringsdoelen, terwijl geen gegevens over 
rentetarieven uit het verleden nodig zijn. 
 
Het onderzoek naar het vinden van een optimaal moment om een lening af te sluiten zou aan 
kracht kunnen winnen door verdere datauitbreiding met marktrenten en nieuwe strategieën. 
Het huidige onderzoek richt zich uitsluitend op BNG Bank renten en vijf strategieën, het zou 
interessant zijn om te weten of de gevonden resultaten ook dan overeind blijven.  
 
Aanvullend onderzoek zou kunnen worden uitgevoerd op de toepasbaarheid en het effect van 
“optimal stopping” oplossingen zoals die bij het secretaresseprobleem op andere 
optimaliseringsprocessen binnen een gemeente met een beperkte tijdspanne. Misschien dat 
deze bevindingen kunnen helpen om budgettaire beslissingen verder te verbeteren. 
